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Glossary 
 
Affordability An HMT criterion used to approve ISTC bids: the financial ability of the health economy 
to support the scheme/ programme 
ALB $UP¶V/HQJWK%RG\ 
ASA American Society of Anaesthesiologists (physical status grade) 
ASC Ambulatory Surgical Centre (US) 
AT Acute Trust 
BMI Body mass index 
CATS Clinical Assessment and Treatment Services 
CfH Connecting for Health 
CNST Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts 
DRG Diagnostic related group (similar to HRG) 
DNA Did not attend 
Dual tariff Payment made /received by SoS to/from ISTC providers equal to the difference 
between PCT payments and the contract price 
ECN Extended Choice Network 
ESA Electives Services Agreement 
FCE Finished consultant episode 
FT NHS Foundation Trust 
FTFF FT Financing Facility 
GFV Guaranteed Fixed Value (Guaranteed percentage x Contracted Base Costs) 
HCC Healthcare Commission 
HMT +HU0DMHVW\¶V7UHDVXU\ 
HOPD Hospital outpatient department (US) 
HRG Healthcare resource group 
IDPI Immediate deduction performance indicator 
IM&T Information Management and Technology 
IMD Index of Multiple Deprivation 
IS Independent sector 
ISTC Independent sector treatment centre 
ITN Invitation to Negotiate 
ITU Intensive therapy unit  
LT Long term 
MFF Market Forces Factor 
Monitor The independent regulator of NHS Foundation Trusts 
Need An HMT criterion used to approve ISTC bids: the requirement of the health economy 
for the scheme/programme as assessed by Strategic Health Authority (SHA) capacity 
mapping exercises. 
NHS 
Equivalent 
Cost 
The cost that would be incurred by an averagely efficient NHS Trust delivering the 
identical activity at the same location (as compared to an Independent Sector provider) 
NHSPN NHS Partners Network 
PASA Purchasing and Supply Agency 
Establishing a fair playing field for payment by results  iii 
PAYG Pay-as-you go (pension scheme) 
PBC Prudential Borrowing Code that governs FT borrowing 
PBL Prudential Borrowing Limit, specified in the PBC 
PbR Payment by Results 
PCT Primary care trust 
PDC Public dividend capital 
PFI Private finance initiative 
PwC PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
SHA Strategic Health Authority 
SoS Secretary of State  
ST Short term 
VfM An HMT criterion used to approve ISTC bids: Value for Money is assessed by the 
percentage variation between NHS Equivalent Cost and the bidder price 
WACC Weighted average cost of capital, a method of calculating rate of return 
WMD :HLJKWHGPHDQGLIIHUHQFHµ'LIIHUHQFHLQPHDQV¶LVDVWDQGDUGVWDWLVWLFWKDWPHDVXUHV
the absolute difference between the mean value in the two groups in a trial and is used 
as a summary statistic in meta-analysis when outcome measurements in all trials are 
made on the same scale. Analyses based on this effect measure are termed weighted 
mean difference 
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Executive Summary 
 
Overview 
 
A key element of the reform agenda for the health service has been to encourage a plurality of 
provision for NHS patients and so improve the quality of care.  In introducing plurality, the Department 
of Health is committed to establishing a µfair playing field¶. This means that the objective of competitive 
neutrality across NHS and Independent Sector (IS) providers of NHS services µD level SOD\LQJILHOG¶ 
is tempered by the obligation upon the public sector to act in the public interest.  This fair playing field 
must be supported by the system of reimbursement ± called Payment by Results (PbR) ± that is being 
implemented to fund NHS patients.  PbR is a prospective payment system in which prices for treating 
particular types of patients are fixed in advance by the Department of Health rather than being 
negotiated locally.  As prices are fixed, any competition between providers should be on the basis of 
the quality of services, rather than their cost.  Fixed pricing regimes require that:   
 
1. The unit of service / treatment is defined accurately. 
2. Prices are determined on a fair basis. 
 
Why might NHS and IS providers be eligible for different payments? 
 
In general, there are three grounds on which IS providers might be subject to differing financial 
arrangements than NHS providers under a fixed pricing regime: 
 
1. To encourage entry and participation by IS providers; 
2. Because NHS and IS providers face different unavoidable costs; 
3. Because NHS and IS providers are delivering different services. 
 
Differential arrangements to encourage participation might be justified if NHS and IS providers face 
different barriers to entry. These arrangements are not likely to persist once entry has been achieved 
and hence do not have implications for the design of PbR. Consequently this issue is not considered 
at length. 
 
The second justification for differential payments is that NHS and IS providers may face different 
operating constraints that are beyond their control (i.e. unavoidable) which impact on their costs of 
production. These different constraints imply that providers will incur different costs in providing the 
same services ± even if they are equally efficient. Broadly these constraints fall into two categories: 
 
 Regulatory constraints 
 Production process constraints 
 
In sections 4 to 5, we identify and examine the nature of each potential constraining factor on NHS 
and IS providers, and recommend how these might be addressed to ensure a fair playing field. To this 
end, we ask two questions: 
 
 What is the differential impact of each unavoidable factor on NHS and IS providers? 
 Should these unavoidable factors be accounted for within a fixed pricing regime, and if so, 
how? 
 
The third justification arises if NHS and IS providers treat different types of patients, and the 
classification system used to define a µunit¶ of service is insufficiently refined to identify these 
differences. This would not be a problem if differences were random, where it is a matter of chance 
whether any particular patient is more or less expensive than the average patient in the service 
category to which they are classified. With sufficiently large volumes, these differences cancel out. 
Problems arise if the differences across providers are systematic, with one type of provider more likely 
to treat low-cost patients and another to treat more high-cost patients. 
 
Section 6 considers whether there is evidence of systematic differences in the type of activities 
undertaken by NHS and IS providers that are not recognised by the definitions of services (HRGs) on 
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which payments are based. There are two elements to this analysis. First, we consider the extent to 
which explicit exclusion criteria have been adopted by IS providers. Second, we undertake empirical 
analysis of HES data to identify differences in patients in specific HRGs across IS providers, NHS 
treatments centres and NHS hospitals.  
 
How might differential payments be made under PbR? 
 
Financial arrangements under PbR can be modified in two ways if there is evidence that providers 
face different unavoidable costs or provide different services: 
 
 Price adjustment. This involves allowing price to vary in line with the collective influence of 
the unavoidable factors or to be adjusted to compensate for inaccurate service 
descriptions.  
 Specific payments. This would involve making specific payments (charges or rebates) to 
compensate for the influence of each specific unavoidable cost factor. 
 
Price adjustment to correct for unavoidable constraints is not recommended because it undermines 
the integrity of a fixed pricing regime and distorts purchasing behaviour.  
 
Specific payments for unavoidable costs have the advantage of greater transparency and allow 
adjustments to be factor-specific rather than based on provider characteristics, such as ownership 
type.  The form of these payments will vary according to the factor under consideration and the 
amount will be provider specific. 
 
Where there is evidence that different types of service are being provided and this is not accurately 
reflected by the classification system used to define services, price adjustment is recommended. 
 
Which factors drive cost differences between NHS and IS providers? 
 
We investigate each factor hypothesised to drive cost differences between NHS and IS providers, in 
order to assess the extent to which these can be considered unavoidable or provide evidence of the 
provision of different types of seUYLFH)DFWRUVWKDWDUHZLWKLQWKHSURYLGHU¶VFRQWURODUHQRWFDQGLGDWHV
for compensatory arrangements under PbR. Each factor investigated is listed in Table 1, together with 
a summary of how these might be addressed ± if at all ± under a PbR regime. 
 
Our analysis allows us to categorise each factor into one of five classes: 
 Those factors which are not unavoidable ± these are not exogenous constraints and do not 
imply an unfair or uneven playing field. As such no correction is required under PbR. 
Examples are corporation tax and pension contributions. 
 Those factors which are unavoidable, but where correction is best made through 
standardisation of regulatory arrangements, rather than by financial compensation. Examples 
are inspection regimes and access to the indemnity arrangements (NHS Litigation Authority). 
 Those factors that require specific payments to be made. We recommend only four types of 
specific payments ± VAT, MFF, capital costs for PFI and payments for R&D, teaching and 
training. These payments will be provider-specific, and will depend on what VAT is incurred in 
providing NHS care, where the provider is located, the net additional cost of PFI payments, 
and how much R&D, teaching and training is undertaken.  
 Those factors that are best handled by introducing two-part tariffs, so that there is better risk 
sharing between providers and purchasers in the context of demand volatility. The 
requirement upon the NHS to have capacity available on stand-by necessitates such 
arrangements. The form of such arrangements needs to be assessed on a service by service 
basis. 
 Those factors that entail price adjustment ± this being the adoption of exclusion criteria for 
services conducted in treatment centres. As these exclusion criteria are provider-specific, a 
provider-specific reduction in tariff should be negotiated that reflects the number and type of 
exclusion criteria. 
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Table 1: Summary of recommendations 
Factor Recommendation 
Regulatory constraints 
Corporation tax No change. 
VAT (on contracted out 
services) 
Long term: seek VAT exemption for IS providers in their provision of NHS services 
Short term: work with IS providers to assess current VAT liability in providing 
services to NHS patients 
Monitoring and 
performance 
management regime  
Registration/monitoring: address as part of market entry negotiations not activity-
based payment arrangements. Legislation has proposed to standardise 
requirements 
Reporting: standardise requirements 
Contracting issues Contractual arrangements: no adjustment 
Ensure that IS providers make accurate HES returns 
Synchronise payment timing 
Production process constraints 
Cost of capital Harmonise relevant accounting guidelines across sectors 
Access to capital: no adjustment needed 
Cost of borrowing: Providers face a range of options, so it is unclear whether the 
playing field is fair. This matter requires further detailed investigation by relevant 
specialists.  PFI: identify the magnitude of the problem and make specific payments 
to compensate for these.  Consider taking legal advice on the nature of these 
contracts which appear inflexible.   
Costs of labour Recruitment: relax additionality rules 
Pay levels: no adjustment 
Pension provision: no adjustment 
Geographical differences 
in input prices ± Market 
Forces Factor 
Review the current basis for calculating MFF, taking into account its 
appropriateness to IS providers 
Make MFF payments to both NHS and IS providers, paid directly by DoH, after 
consideration of the locational constraints faced by IS providers 
Economies of scale and 
scope 
Continue with separate payments for emergency and elective patients 
Consider extending use of two-part tariffs 
Access to cheaper inputs NHS Litigation Authority: resolved once current Health and Social Bill enacted  
NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency: no adjustment 
NHS Connecting for Health: no retrospective compensation but harmonise 
arrangements across NHS and IS for future IT programmes 
$UP¶V/HQJWK%RGLHVQRDGMXVWPHQW 
Provision of other outputs Ensure transparent, separate and full funding of R&D, teaching and training 
services 
Type of service / treatment 
Exclusion criteria Price adjustment to HRG-tariff to reflect direct selection of less costly patients.  
Regular review of the HRG system may be desirable. Any exclusion criteria 
operated by NHS TCs should be made transparent. 
Casemix The evidence suggests there are casemix differences between patients treated in 
hospitals and treatment centres.  Whether these differences reflect differences in 
the cost of provision needs to be established.   
Improve the quality of HES data submitted by IS providers and NHS TC reporting in 
the provider code field. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Differentiated payments under PbR are justified on the grounds that providers face different operating 
constraints, which imply that providers will incur different costs in providing the same services.  
 
Ownership status is not necessarily a sound basis for making differentiated adjustments for 
unavoidable factors. Instead, provider-specific adjustments should be related to each constraining 
IDFWRU DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK WKH IDFWRU LPSDFWV HDFK SURYLGHU¶V FRVWV 2I FRXUVH WKH
average net effect of these factors may differ significantly between IS and NHS providers, but this will 
be because of the association of these factors with ownership type. 
 
These specific payments should be made directly by the Department of Health, rather than via PCTs 
so that purchasing behaviour is not distorted. 
 
Both the exclusion criteria and the analysis of HES data imply that casemix is less complex in 
treatment centres than in NHS hospitals. We recommend that ISTCs (and NHS TCs that adopt 
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exclusion criteria) are paid a lower price for the services they provide when exclusion criteria are in 
place. This price reduction will be provider-specific, varying to the extent to which exclusion criteria 
are adopted. 
 
If tariffs are to continue to be based on average costs, consideration should be given to extending the 
Reference Cost collection to IS providers so that the costs incurred by these providers can inform the 
price. This is particularly important for services where a large proportion of activity is undertaken by IS 
providers.  
 
Efforts should also be made by IS providers to improve the completeness and quality of their HES 
returns.
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1. Introduction 
 
A key element of the reform agenda for the health service has been to encourage a plurality of 
provision for NHS patients. The intentions are to drive up quality through an expansion of the options 
available to patients wishing to exercise choice, to increase the amount of capacity available to NHS 
patients, to reward efficiency and to foster innovative and alternative ways of organising and providing 
health care.  
 
In pursuing the aim of allowing care for NHS patients to be delivered by the independent and 
voluntary (or µThird¶) sectors, the Department of Health is committed to establishing a µfair playing 
field¶. This means that an objective of competitive neutrality across the public and private sectors 
(achieving a µlevel¶SOD\LQJILeld) should be tempered by the QHHGWRPHHWWKH1+6¶social objectives. 
These social objectives constrain NHS providers to reinvest surpluses and to offer universal access, 
so they cannot be selective about whom they treat and are obliged to offer a broad range of services, 
including accident & emergency. 
 
The method by which care for NHS patients is funded is central to achieving both competitive 
neutrality and social objectives. Funding arrangements in the NHS are being reformed under 
µPayment by Results¶ (PbR), the core principle of which is µequal pay for equal work¶, irrespective of 
where that work is undertaken. Initially, PbR was applied to the NHS hospital sector. But it is being 
introduced progressively, so that it will apply to all providers of care to NHS patients and to an 
increasing range of services. Essentially, PbR amounts to a µfee-for-service¶ funding arrangement, 
where there are two key questions for consideration: 
 
1. How should the service be defined? Health care services are difficult to define and patients 
have very different care requirements. This makes it difficult to agree service definitions and 
to determine whether different providers really are doing µequal work¶. 
2. How should the fee be determined? The Department of Health wants payments to be µfair¶, 
and recognises that providers may face unavoidable costs in providing services and meeting 
social obligations that ought to be taken into account when determining what constitutes 
µequal pay¶. 
 
The Department has commissioned research to investigate these matters in relation to the promotion 
of plurality of provision. Specifically, research was required to: 
 
 establish which factors drive significantly different cost structures for the different types of 
organisation; 
 on a quantified basis, produce a  set of weighted factors that any new tariff system would 
need to take into account (the work should quantify factors but should not produce a revised 
tariff); 
 identify potentially perverse incentives either with the current system or with the proposed 
solution;  
 identify any anticipated changes in the economic factors over time; 
 consider whether it is appropriate to apply the Market Forces Factor (MFF) to organisations 
outside the NHS; and 
 consider the implications of casemix differences in a separate, but related, phase of work. 
 
This report is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a descriptive account of the recent 
involvement of the IS sector in providing care to NHS patients. We then consider the grounds on 
which funding arrangements might be differentiated between the NHS and IS, and how these 
payments might be incorporated into Payment by Results.  
 
In sections 4 and 5 we consider each source that might give rise to unavoidable costs; section 6 
provides an analysis of types of service (casemix). 
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2. The Independent Sector and the NHS: recent history  
 
Historically, independent sector provision of health care for NHS patients was commissioned on a 
locally-QHJRWLDWHGµVSRWSXUFKDVLQJ¶EDVLV+RZHYHULQWKHSURFHVVIRUQDWLRQDOFRPPLVVLRQLQJ
was initiated.  Informed by a national capacity planning exercise, the Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres (ISTC) Programme was introduced to create targeted additional capacity for NHS patients 
(Department of Health, 2002).  The stated aims are to achieve local and national NHS targets (e.g. 
waiting times), broaden the choice for patients, promote innovative delivery models, support the shift 
from secondary into primary care and promote efficiency through increased competition (Department 
of Health, 2002).  Originally, the programme was expected to provide around half a million procedures 
annually at a cost of over £5 billion (Barron and House of Commons Health Committee, 2006).  To 
date, around 600,000 patients have benefited from this additional capacity delivered in various 
settings such as mobile units, newly built facilities, refurbished NHS facilities or existing independent 
sector facilities.1 Recently, the government appears to have scaled back its plans to expand the use 
of IS providers for NHS patients (Timmins, 2007). 
 
The programme has been implemented in two phases: Wave 1 and Wave 2 (Phase 2).  Wave 1, for 
which bidders were announced in September 2003, is expected to provide up to 171,000 episodes 
annually over five years with investment of approximately £1.6 billion (Brailsford, 2006).  Over the 
five-year period, Wave 1 also plans to deliver over 600,000 MRI scans delivered by 12 mobile MRI 
scanning units.2  In March 2005, a further £3.75 billion investment was announced under Phase 2 to 
commission elective surgery (17 schemes) and diagnostic capacity (7 schemes) expected to provide 
up to 250,000 elective procedures and 1.5 million diagnostics annually.3  This second wave also 
introduced an Extended Choice Network (ECN) of IS providers expected to deliver up to 150,000 
procedures annually on an ad hoc basis (Barron and House of Commons Health Committee, 2006, 
Healthcare Commission, 2007a). 
 
Specialities covered by Phase 2 Electives include ENT, General Surgery, Gynaecology, 
Ophthalmology, Trauma and Orthopaedics, and Urology.4  In addition, Phase 2 Electives includes 
Clinical Assessment and Treatment Services (CATS), which offer integrated care in the form of triage, 
assessment, diagnosis and treatment (Barron et al., 2006b, Department of Health, 2007d). As well as 
ECG, MRI scans and endoscopies, ISTC Phase 2 Diagnostics covers the national Positron Emission 
Tomography/Computed Tomography Procurement, which is expected to deliver 20,000 procedures 
annually.5   
 
2.1 Procurement methods for ISTCs 
 
The central IS procurement method has evolved and the process reported here is for Phase 2 
electives.  Bidders expressing an interest in the procurement announcement are required to provide 
specific data.  Informed by these data, the DoH then shortlists the bidders who receive an Invitation to 
1HJRWLDWH ,71  %LGGHUV WKDW VLJQ WKH ,71 WKHQ HQWHU WKH µ%LG (YDOXDWLRQ 3KDVH¶ (Barron et al., 
2006b), in which Bidders supply specific financial and pricing information, including financial models 
incorporating a series of deterministic sensitivity analyses (Department of Health and Central Clinical 
Procurement Programme team, 2007): 
 
 Stage 1: Bid Receipt 
 Stage 2: Evaluation 
 Stage 3: Clarification 
 Stage 4: Bidder Convergence 
 Stage 5: Final Evaluation 
 Stage 6: Preferred Bidder Selection 
 Stage 7: Finalization: Contract signed 
 
                                                 
1
 http://www.treatmentcentres.org.uk/default/patients.aspx, accessed 10/09/07 
2
 http://www.treatmentcentres.org.uk/default/shaspcts/programmes/wave1.aspx accessed 10/09/07 
3
 http://www.treatmentcentres.org.uk/default/providers.aspx, , accessed 10/09/07 
4
 http://www.treatmentcentres.org.uk/default/providers/electivesprocurementstatus.aspx, accessed 10/09/07 
5
 http://www.treatmentcentres.org.uk/default/providers/diagnosticsprocurementstatus.aspx, accessed 10/09/07 
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Box 1: Overview of the evaluation /clarification stages  
 
An overview of the evaluation /clarification process is presented in Box 1.  Of primary interest for this 
report is the assessment theme, which contains four dimeQVLRQV NQRZQ DV µSULPDU\ SURFXUHPHQW
SDUDPHWHUV¶ (Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 2006).  
Based on the evaluation results, two to four Bidders are selected who then progress to the 
µ&RQYHUJHQFH¶ VWDJH &RQYHUJHQFH LQYROYHV ³GLIILFXOW DQG UHVRXUFH-LQWHQVLYH QHJRWLDWLRQV´ 
DQG ³WKHHYDOXDWLRQPHWKRGRORJ\ « LVGHVLJQHG WR EHXVHIXO IRU FRQYHUJHQFHDQG ODWHU VWDJHVRI
QHJRWLDWLRQV´(Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 2006) (§3).  
Further reductions in contract price may be secured during negotiations to commercial close 
(Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 2007).   
 
HM Treasury uses three criteria to approve Phase 2 ISTC bids (Department of Health, 2007b):  
1. Affordability, the financial ability of the health economy to support the scheme/programme.  
This is inforPHGE\WKHµ(IIHFWLYHSULFH¶DVVHVVPHQWVHHBox 1) 
2. Value for Money (VfM), assessed by the percentage variation between NHS Equivalent Cost 
and the bidder price 
3. Need, the requirement of the health economy for the scheme/programme as assessed by 
Strategic Health Authority (SHA) capacity mapping exercises. 
 
The NHS Equivalent Cost Methodology shows how the DoH takes into account a range of factors that 
explain why bidder price and tariff may diverge.  The methodology (see Box 2LVDSSOLHGWR³FUHDWHD
level SOD\LQJILHOGFRVWFRPSDUDWRU´IRUFOLQLFDODFWLYLW\LQWKH1+6DQG,6 
 
If the price bid by an IS provider is equal to the NHS Equivalent Cost, then that price 
should reflect the cost that would be incurred by an averagely efficient NHS Trust 
delivering the identical activity at the same location (Department of Health, 2005a).  
 
Table 2: Quantified economic/ cost adjustments 
Adjustment Scheme with Capital 
Development 
Scheme without Capital 
Development 
Direct Tax + 4 % + 2% 
VAT + 3.5 % +3.5% 
CNST -1% -1% 
Total Generic +6.5% +4.5% 
Scheme Specific +/- Specific Adjustment +/- Specific Adjustment 
Source: Department of Health. Independent Sector Procurement Programme - Wave 2 NHS Equivalent Cost Methodology. 
London: Commercial Directorate, 2005 (Department of Health, 2005a) (Annex 4) 
 
The DoH has produced quantified estimates of the generic economic adjustments (point 2 in Box 2), 
which are made on a global basis across all HRGs in all schemes (Table 2).  Specific adjustments are 
provider-specific and made on a scheme-by-scheme basis.  These adjustments are made for the 
The evaluation covers four themes: 
1. Assessment: requirement-by-requirement examination of the bid 
a. Performance 
i. Service offered (as stated by Bidder) 
ii. Service expected (highest level of service in which Assessor has confidence) 
iii. Service options (additional to the main proposal) 
b. Costings 
i. Effective prices (set of prices risk-adjusted to reflect various revenue/activity 
guarantee and referral rates scenarios) 
ii. NHS equivalent cost (see Box 2) 
c. Risk 
i. Financial (robustness) 
ii. Legal (risk of failure to reach contract finalisation) 
iii. Service delivery (e.g. failure to achieve patient referral rates) 
d. Timings (how proposed commencement date relates to target)  
2. Consolidation: aggregation of assessment results to give summaries for each of the four domains 
3. Bid differentiation analysis: further investigations undertaken to improve differentiation between bids (if 
required) 
4. Approval: (by the CD Central Clinical Procurement Programme Executive) to proceed to convergence. 
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purposes of evaluating the Value for Money of the bid; they do not represent actual changes to the 
tariff paid to providers by PCTs. 
 
 
Box 2: NHS Equivalent Cost Methodology (Phase 2) 
 
NHS Tariff as baseline 
1. Adjustment for patient pathway, so that entry/exit points are matched and the patient cohort is similar  
a. To reflect the cost PCTs would pay for services outside of the Tariff procedure for additional 
services such as physiotherapy 
b. Where a provider is delivering all, or a discrete part, of the case mix as day case only, a 
downward adjustment is made to reflect the reduced cost. 
2. Adjustment for economic conditions (see Table 2) 
a. Generic economic adjustments: tax, CNST 
b. Cost-base adjustment: provider-specific factors * 
i. payments made on behalf of the provider;  
ii. costs of complying with CfH;  
iii. capital charges incurred by NHS bodies for ISTCs;  
iv. specific risk taken by ISTC from the NHS;  
v. patient transport costs, where these provided by the NHS for clinical reasons 
3. Adjustment for geographic cost differences: application of MFF to: 
a. HRG tariff for main procedure plus  
b. pathway adjustment plus 
c. economic adjustments 
4. Adjustment for Tariff inflation 
5. Adjustment to Net Present Value (if appropriate) 
¾ NHS Equivalent Cost  
 
VfM = (bid price ± NHS equivalent cost) x 100 
NHS equivalent cost 
 
Sources: Department of Health. Independent Sector Procurement Programme - Wave 2 NHS Equivalent Cost Methodology. 
London: Commercial Directorate, 2005 (Department of Health, 2005a); Department of Health. Independent Sector Programme 
Phase 2: Electives.  Full Business case for scheme X. 2007 (Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement 
Programme team, 2007).   
* we understand from the DoH that the use of cost-base adjustments has not, in practice, been applied to phase 2  
 
 
The VfM methodology takes no account of factors such as profit, risk transfer, contract management 
costs, residual value or some capital charges (where these relate to ISTCs located on NHS-owned 
sites) (Department of Health, 2005a).  However, bidders involving a Public Sector Relevant 
Organisation are required to adjust their bids to take account of any potential cross subsidisation 
(Department of Health, Unpublished, Department of Health, 2006e).  Some contracts may include 
provision for Residual Value (RV) payment, especially if the asset is newly acquired. RV may be 
taken into account in the VfM assessment if the RV is not deemed to be fair.  Where no NHS tariff 
exists (e.g. for diagnostics or CATS), an independent cost review assesses VfM and the price is 
confirmed with PCTs.  Sensitivity analyses are undertaken to explore the risk of under-referrals 
(relative to contracted volumes); changes to the retail price index; and varying tariff inflation rates 
(Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 2007). 
 
The Department of Health estimates that the ISTC programme under Wave 1 was about 11.2% above 
the NHS Equivalent Cost, whereas VfM under Phase 2 is expected to be 10.2% under NHS 
Equivalent Cost (Department of Health, 2007b).  
  
2.2 Payment terms 
 
There have been three contract types for IS providers with varying payment terms (Table 3).   
 
Contracts for Wave 1 IS providers included a revenue stream that was guaranteed for five years and 
VHWWOHG RQ D µ7DNH RU 3D\¶ EDVLV PHDQLQJ WKDW D PLQLPXP OHYHO RI UHYHQXH µ0LQLPXP 7DNH¶ LV
guaranteed to Providers in return for delivering the contracted services: in sum, Wave 1 provider 
revenues are underwritten by the PCTs (Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement 
Programme team, 2007).  Providers and PCTs may agree substitute procedures equivalent to those 
procedures set out in the original contracted casemix, in order to provide additional flexibility for PCTs 
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and help them manage changing local healthcare requirements during the life of the contract 
(Department of Health, 2006b).  
 
Table 3: Payment terms for ISTC providers, by contract type 
Contract 
type 
Price determinant Comment 
Wave 1 
ISTCs 
Price § tariff + provider-specific 
adjustment; Guaranteed volume 
Tariff adjustment justified as reward to early entrants for signing 
up. Activity guaranteed so that IS providers could secure funding 
from banks 
Phase 2 
ISTCs 
Price § tariff + care pathway 
amounts + MFF + GFV + other 
net deficits (contracted 
revenues less PCT payments) 
In addition to the standard HRG tariff, PCTs may make a 
payment to reflect the actual pathway procedures used where 
these differ from the tariff procedure (e.g. outpatient 
appointments or physiotherapy services).  MFF payable is based 
on both tariff and care pathway amount. 
The Guaranteed Fixed Value (GFV) is contractually payable by 
the SoS for Health where PCTs fail to meet referral 
FRPPLWPHQWV,WLVEDVHGRQO\RQ,6SURYLGHUIL[HGFRVWVµ%DVH
&RVW¶DQGLVSD\DEOHRQDUHGXFLQJEDVLVRYHUWKHFRQWUDFWWHUP 
Finally, the SoS pays any remaining shortfall in the contracted 
revenues, such as CNST payments and VAT.   
IS-ECN Price= tariff Introduced because more activity was being undertaken on a 
spot contract basis, which was hard to track centrally.  
ECN is capped at £200m 
Sources:  
Street A. Interview with David Lighterness, Commercial Directorate, 23/4/07 (Street, 2007). 
Department of Health. Independent Sector Programme Phase 2: Electives.  Full Business case for scheme X. 2007 
(Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 2007) 
 
Under Phase 2, provider prices are calculated by bidders and based on expected costs.  Those 
meeting the VfM criterion outlined above are candidates for approval and the contract price is agreed 
by negotiation between the DoH and provider.  The payment mechanism for Phase 2 is as follows 
(Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 2007): 
 
 PCTs pay the NHS tariff price for activity and any additional care pathways actually provided 
E\WKH,63URYLGHU7KLVµ3&73D\PHQW¶LVSDLGLQWRDFHQWUDO'oH Clearing Account and then 
distributed to providers.   
 The DoH is responsible for meeting the contract payments due.  Therefore, the SoS for 
Health benefits from, or funds, the differences arising from the PCT Payment and the IS 
Provider contract prices (the µ'XDO7DULII¶ 
a. The MFF, paid from the DoH clearing account 
b. 7KH*XDUDQWHHG)L[HG9DOXH¶*)9DSURSRUWLRQRIWKHFRQWUDFWHGSULFHIRU
JXDUDQWHHGFRQWUDFWHGYROXPHV7KLVLVIXQGHGIURPDµ5LVN3RRO¶VXUSOXVHVIURPWKH
clearing account)  
c. Other factors that are implicit in the contract price but excluded from the PCT 
payment. These are also centrally funded from the Risk Pool and include CNST 
contribution, economic adjustments (tax, VAT) and cost base adjustments.     
 Performance Indicators (Immediate DeducWLRQ3HUIRUPDQFH,QGLFDWRUµ,'3,¶KDYHEHHQ
introduced into the ESA (Electives Services Agreement).  These are a range of non-clinical 
performance indicators, breach of which will result in instant deductions from payments due to 
the Provider. 
 
Because the PCTs are not signatories to the contract they have no obligation to make referrals ± and 
hence payments ± at the contracted volumes.  PCTs therefore have less incentive to refer up to 
contracted levels.  
 
The third contractual type has been introduced tRFRXQWHUWKHJURZLQJWUHQGWRZDUGµVSRWSXUFKDVLQJ¶
as patients increasingly H[HUFLVHFKRLFH7UDGLWLRQDOO\ WKH'R+KDVSDLGKLVWRULFDO µVSRW-SXUFKDVLQJ¶
rates of between 40% and 100% above NHS Tariff (Barron et al., 2006a)(Ev 147);(Barron and House 
of Commons Health Committee, 2006). Instead of spot purchasing, the Extended Choice Networks 
allows specification of payment terms in advance. To be a member of the ECN, existing IS providers 
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± those established under Phase 2 ± must be registered with the Healthcare Commission (HCC); fulfil 
the IM&T requirements; report specific data; be approved by the CNST administrator; and meet 
agreed service standards (Department of Health, 2006f).   
 
The ECN operates under µSXUH¶PbR, where providers are paid the fixed tariff. In the next section of 
this report we consider whether it is indeed appropriate to apply the same tariff to both NHS and IS 
providers or whether PbR arrangements should be moderated to account for ownership type.  
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3. Plurality and PbR 
 
3.1 The grounds for making differentiated payments between IS and NHS providers 
 
In general, there are three grounds on which the independent sector might be subject to differing 
financial arrangements than NHS providers under a fixed pricing regime: 
 
1. To encourage entry and participation by IS providers; 
2. Because NHS and IS providers face different unavoidable costs; 
3. Because NHS and IS providers are delivering different services. 
 
First, the government may think it necessary to pay a premium for participation if NHS and IS 
providers face different barriers to entry. These arrangements are not likely to persist once entry has 
been achieved and hence do not have implications for the design of PbR.  
 
Entry premium payments might reflect start-up costs associated with entering the market, such as 
investment in facilities and IT and staff recruitment, and recognise that initial levels of activity may be 
insufficient to cover these costs. This is of particular concern given that market entry is being 
encouraged to address excess demand in an area, evidenced by waiting lists. This may limit the 
amount of activity that IS providers are able to attract away from existing NHS providers. The 
premium might be weighted in favour of early entrants, and phased out as providers became 
established. Such premiums were paid to Wave 1 IS providers.  
 
That said, premiums are not the only mechanism by which participation can be encouraged.  An 
alternative would be for the Department of Health to offer guaranteed payments in recognition that 
initial levels of activity may be lower than expected for reasons that are not fully within the control of 
IS providers. In the current climate, the most obvious reason is because GP referral patterns are slow 
to change which, in part, may be due to delayed take-up of Choose & Book. Guaranteed payments 
reduce the exposure of IS providers to financial risk if referrals are not forthcoming. These 
arrangements have been introduced for Wave 1 IS providers (with revenues underwritten by the 
PCTs) and for Phase 2 providers (under the GFV).  However, there is no entitlement to a guaranteed 
level of income or volume of demand for services provided under the ECN (Department of Health, 
2006f) and we understand that no further significant central procurement of IS activity is planned. 
 
The second justification of differential payments is that NHS and IS providers may face different 
operating constraints that are beyond their control (i.e. unavoidable) which impact on their costs of 
production. An objective of the Department of Health should be to design incentives for providers to 
strive for efficiency, allowing for the different operating constraints that they face. The implications of 
these constraints are that, for providers that fully efficient, either they face different production 
possibility frontiers or they face different costs of attaining the same production possibility frontier. 
Broadly, these unavoidable constraints fall into two categories: 
 
 Regulatory constraints, such as different tax regimes; 
 Production process constraints, which impact on the costs of inputs  
 
Table 4 lists the potential constraining factors that we have identified. The degree to which the cost 
consequences of these constraints should be compensated for through the payment systems 
depends on the extent to which they are unavoidable. Some constraints, such as the tax regime, 
PLJKW EH FRPSOHWHO\ EH\RQG WKH SURYLGHU¶V FRQWURO ,W PD\ EH SRVVLEOH IRU SURYLGHUV WR OLPLW WKHLU
exposure to other constraining factors, such as the amount of pension contributions for which they are 
liable. 
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Table 4: Taxonomy of unavoidable factors potentially effecting cost differentials between NHS and IS 
providers 
Category of Factor Factors  Topics included 
Regulatory regime Corporation tax  
 VAT  
 Monitoring and performance management 
regime  
1. registration and inspection 
2. reporting requirements 
 Nature / history of contracts with NHS 
commissioners 
1. contractual arrangements  
2. payment timing 
Production 
process 
Cost of capital  1. ease of access  
2. cost of access 
 Costs of labour 
 
1. recruitment costs 
2. rates of pay  
3. pension contributions 
 Geographical differences in input prices ± 
Market Forces Factor 
 
 Economies of scale and scope  
 NHS monopsony power ± access to cheaper 
inputs 
1. contributions to the NHS Litigation 
Authority (CNST) 
2. NHS PASA 
3. CfH 
4. other arms length bodies 
 Production of other outputs/services 1. R&D 
2. teaching  
3. training 
Differences in 
casemix 
Casemix Ability to engage in patient selection 
 - exclusion criteria 
 - quantitative analysis 
 
In sections 4 to 5, we identify and examine the nature of each constraining factor on NHS and IS 
providers, and recommend how these might be addressed to ensure competitive neutrality. To this 
end, we ask two questions: 
 
1. What is the differential impact of each unavoidable factor on NHS and IS providers? 
2. Should these unavoidable factors be accounted for within a fixed pricing regime and, if so, 
how? 
 
Third, the NHS and IS providers may treat different types of patients, and the classification system 
XVHGWRGHILQHD³XQLW´RIVHUYLFHPD\EHLQVXIILFLHQWO\UHILQHGWRLGHQWLI\WKHVHGLIIHUHQFHV7KLVZRXOG
not be a problem if differences were random, where it is a matter of chance whether any particular 
patient is more or less expensive than the average patient in the service category to which they are 
classified. With sufficiently large volumes, these differences cancel out. Problems arise if the 
differences across providers are systematic, with one type of provider more likely to treat low-cost 
patients and another treating more high-cost patients. 
 
Section 6 considers whether there is evidence of systematic differences in the type of activities 
undertaken by NHS and IS providers that are not recognised by the definitions of services (HRGs) on 
which payments are based. There are two elements to this analysis. First, we consider the extent to 
which explicit exclusion criteria have been adopted by IS providers. Second, we undertake empirical 
analysis of HES data to identify differences in patients in specific HRGs across IS providers, NHS 
treatments centres and NHS hospitals.  
 
3.2 The form of compensating payments 
 
Reimbursement for the treatment of NHS patients is under PbR arrangements whereby a fixed 
national price (tariff) is paid for a patient having a particular type of service. For the moment, we 
assume that these services are well-defined (we return to this in section 6). These prices are currently 
calculated as the average of Reference Costs reported on a mandatory basis by all NHS providers. If 
tariffs are to continue to be based on average cost, consideration should be given to asking IS 
providers to make Reference Cost returns as well. 
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There are several potentially unavoidable factors that give rise to some providers facing different 
costs to other providers. For instance, NHS providers face different factor prices because of local 
market conditions, which are corrected by means of the Market Forces Factor (MFF). Similar 
constraints may apply to IS providers.  
 
There may be further unavoidable factors that are related to the ownership status of the provider ± i.e. 
whether it is an NHS or IS provider. Failure to account for the unavoidable cost factors through the 
reimbursement mechanism would mean that NHS and IS providers are not competing on an equal 
basis. There are two broad approaches to refining PbR arrangements in order to compensate 
providers for differences in the unavoidable costs that they face. 
 
1. Price adjustment. This involves allowing price to vary in line with the collective influence of 
the unavoidable factors.  
 
2. Specific payments. This would involve making specific payments (charges or rebates) to 
compensate for the influence of each specific unavoidable cost factor. 
 
In Technical Appendix 1 we demonstrate formally that these approaches provide equivalent 
incentives to providers, and that equivalence holds under different assumptions about the form of the 
production function. 
 
3.3 Price adjustment 
 
The first option is make an adjustment to the tariffs (prices) for each HRG to reflect the differential 
costs faced by NHS and IS providers (Department of Health, 2005a). There are two key problems 
with using this approach under a fixed pricing regime.  
 
First, taken to its extreme, price-adjustment entails that prices are provider-specific. In other words, 
this fundamentally undermines the integrity of a fixed price regime. 
 
Suppose there are two providers, an NHS provider (k=1) and IS provider (k=2). Under a system of 
fixed national tariffs, the activity related revenue (R) of a provider k takes the form: 
 
k j jk
J
R p Q  
where jp  is the national tariff for service j and jkQ is the amount of activity of service j provided by 
provider k. Here the difference in revenue received by providers is solely a function of the amount and 
mix of activity performed ± not of the unit price. 
 
If differential prices are offered according to the ownership status of the provider, the revenue function 
becomes: 
 
k jk jk
J
R p Q  
In a system with only two providers, this is equivalent to provider specific pricing ± which, by 
definition, is at odds with a fixed pricing regime. 
 
Second, and consequently, price adjustment distorts purchasing behaviour toward providers with 
lower adjusted prices. This is demonstrated formally in Technical Appendix 2. We show that this 
distortion holds irrespective of whether compensation is made by adjusting prices or by making 
specific payments via PCTs. This is undesirable given that the intention is to remove the influence of 
XQDYRLGDEOHFRVWGLIIHUHQFHVIURPWKHSXUFKDVHU¶VGHFLVLRQ 
 
3.4 Specific payments 
 
The alternative is to make payments directly to each provider, in addition to their activity related 
payments. The size of these specific payments is related to the extent to which the provider displays 
the factor in question.  There are two key advantages of specific payments.  First, the payment regime 
is consistent across all provider types, with payments made according to cost-specific factors, rather 
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than other provider characteristics (such as ownership status). It would also allow consistency with 
MFF adjustments, provided that current arrangements are retained (see discussion in section 3.5). 
 
Second, the basis for making specific payments can be specific to each factor, set out in a 
transparent fashion, and easily updated on a periodic basis. 
 
Under a system of specific payments, the provider revenue function would become: 
 
k j jk k
J
R p Q Z  
Where kZ  is a vector of payments to provider k for each unavoidable cost factor. The tariff jp  would 
be reduced by a proportion  reflecting the share of total funds to be distributed on the basis of 
activity and that funded through direct payments. The bulk of this report is devoted to determining 
what payments should be included in this vector. 
 
There are two ways in which these compensatory payments can be made to providers: 
 
1. Specific payments can be made directly by the Department of Health to the provider. This 
would entail top-slicing the sum of money that is allocated to PCTs through the resource 
allocation formula. 
2. The PCT could be instructed to µtop-up¶ the price paid for services to each specific provider 
according to the extent to which they are subject to each unavoidable factor. 
 
Both approaches require calculation of how much money is to be disbursed on the basis of specific 
payments and how much on the basis of activity. But we believe that direct payments by the 
Department of Health have the advantage of greater transparency and lower transaction costs. This 
type of arrangement is consistent with international practice (Street et al., 2007, Aballea et al., 2006). 
 
There are two disadvantages with the second approach. First, as already mentioned and 
demonstrated in Technical Appendix 2, payments made via PCTs risk distorting their purchasing 
behaviour. Second, there is also a risk of µgaming¶ if PCTs are allocated funds on the basis of 
predicted rather than actual flows. There must be some means to ensure that once adjustment 
monies have been received, the PCT spends them as anticipated rather than seeing them as a 
potential source of cost saving, realised by referring fewer patients than expected to providers with 
high adjusted prices. 
 
3.5 The Market Forces Factor 
 
As mentioned, the cost influences of unavoidable factors faced by NHS providers are currently 
corrected by means of the Market Forces Factor. We believe that any form of compensatory 
payments that are made on the basis of ownership type should be consistent with how MFF payments 
are made at present, so these deserve consideration at this point. 
 
At present, the MFF corrections under Payment by Results take the form of specific payments to 
providers made directly by the Department of Health: 
 
The MFF adjustment is paid directly from DoH to providers although the money is 
top-VOLFHGIURP3&7DOORFDWLRQVWRµQHXWUDOLVH¶WKHLPSDFW on PCT budgets of patients 
exercising choice of provider. So, PCTs pay the same tariff regardless of the location 
of the provider but the provider receives the equivalent of tariff adjusted by the MFF 
(Department of Health, 2006c)(§3.61) 
 
We believe this arrangement should be retained, and to serve as the model for any payments that are 
made in order to ensure a fair playing field. 
 
+RZHYHUWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+HDOWKLVFRQVLGHULQJ³UHYHUWLQJWRWKHSRVLWLRn where PCTs pay the tariff 
[ 0))´ 7KH 'R+ VXJJHVW WKDW WKLV ZRXOG LQWURGXFH JUHDWHU VLPSOLFLW\ DQG WUDQVSDUHQF\ LQ WKH
payment system, introduce more effective efficiency incentives around non-elective services, and 
better align incentives for PCTs in commissioning services (Department of Health, 2006c)(§3.72). 
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However, the basis on which these claims are made is not laid out. We believe the reverse to be the 
case. 
 
 The information requirements for calculating MFF (and any other) payments are the same, 
irrespective of whether payments are made directly to providers or indirectly via PCTs. 
 Making price adjustments (e.g. LQ WKH IRUP µWDULII [ 0))¶ LV VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG RQO\ ZKHQ WKH
extent of exposure is proportional to activity. For many unavoidable costs this is unlikely to be 
the case, so forcing these into an activity-based pricing adjustment would be a complicated 
undertaking. Exposure to unavoidable costs should be quantified on the basis of their cost 
drivers and compensated accordingly. 
 A system of direct payments is more transparent than one in which each HRG price has to be 
DGMXVWHGDFFRUGLQJWRHDFKSURYLGHU¶VH[SRVXUHWRWKHFROOHFWLYHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHXQDYRLGDEOH
factors. Rather than transparency, this promises opacity because the resulting adjusted price 
cannot easily be disentangled by third parties. For an example of the transparency of specific 
payments, see the current funding arrangements for Victorian hospitals, where the size of 
each grant to each hospital is reported.6 
 ,W LV QRW DSSDUHQW ZK\ WKH 'R+ EHOLHYHV ZK\ µWDULII [ 0))¶ ZRXOG LQWURGXFH more effective 
efficiency incentives around non-elective ± or indeed any types of ± services. We 
demonstrate formally (Technical Appendix 1) that price DGMXVWPHQW HJ µSULFH [ 0))¶ DQG
specific payments provide equivalent incentives to providers. 
 5DWKHU WKDQ EHWWHU DOLJQLQJ LQFHQWLYHV IRU 3&7V µWDULII [ 0))¶ LV OLNHO\ WR GLVWRUW 3&7
commissioning behaviour. If implemented, price adjustment would be specific to each 
provider, taking the form k . This would mean that, for hospital k, the actual unit payment 
would differ from the national price, so the price paid for service j provided by hospital k would 
be k jp . It is easy to see that this leads to a breakdown of the fixed pricing regime, by 
introducing provider specific prices equivalent to jk k jp p . Essentially, local pricing would 
have been re-introduced by the back door. As we have demonstrated (Technical Appendix 2), 
this risks distorting PCT behaviour on the fairly benign assumption that they would respond to 
price signals. 
 
For these reasons, we believe that the current system under which the DoH makes direct MFF 
payments to providers should be retained, and extended should other specific payments be merited to 
ensure a fair playing field.  
 
3.6 Summary 
 
7KLVVHFWLRQKDVH[SORUHGWKHJURXQGVRQZKLFKGLIIHUHQWLDWHGSD\PHQWVPLJKWEHPDGH:KLOHµHQWU\
SUHPLXPV¶PDGHEHMXVWLILHGWRHQFRXUDJe market entry, these do not imply that changes need to be 
made to the funding regime. 
 
Ongoing differentiated payments are justified on the grounds that providers face different operating 
constraints, which imply that efficient providers will incur different costs in providing the same 
services. 
 
Under Payment by Results, financial compensation for these unavoidable factors should be made in 
the form specific compensatory payments. The form of these payments will vary according to the 
factor under consideration and the amount will be provider specific. This is in line with international 
practice and has advantages of simplicity and transparency compared to price adjustment. 
 
Ownership status is not necessarily a sound basis for making differentiated adjustments. Instead, 
provider-specific adjustments should be related to each constraining factor according to the degree to 
ZKLFKWKHIDFWRULPSDFWVHDFKSURYLGHU¶VFRVWV2IFRXUVHWKHDYHUDJHQHWHIIHFWRIWKHVHIDFWRUVPD\
differ significantly between IS and NHS providers, but this will be because of the association of these 
factors with ownership type. 
 
                                                 
6
 http://www.health.vic.gov.au/pfg/pfg0708/pfg0708.pdf, accessed 3/12/07 
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Payments should be made directly by the Department of Health, rather than via PCTs so that 
purchasing behaviour is not distorted. 
 
If tariffs are to continue to be based on average costs, consideration should be given to extending the 
Reference Cost collection to IS providers so that the costs incurred by these providers can inform the 
price. This is particularly important for services where a large proportion of activity is undertaken by IS 
providers.  
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4. Regulatory factors 
 
4.1 Corporation tax 
 
Currently, both for-profit and not-for profit IS providers with corporate status are required to pay 
corporation tax, with the tax rate varying by profit level.  From April 2008, the main rate fell to 28%.7  
Asymmetric tax rules between the public and private sectors can be considered a form of state aid 
equivalent to an indirect subsidy (Office of Fair Trading, 2004). To reflect this taxation asymmetry, the 
NHSPN (Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 2007a) has suggested that the IS tariff should be 
upwardly adjusted by 5%.  The approach currently used by the Commercial Directorate when 
evaluating the private sector bids is akin to a form of price adjustment.  PwC (Department of Health, 
2005a) has recommended that the size of the adjustment to the price should vary according to the 
extent of capital development: 
 
 4% adjustment in the case of new build 
 2% adjustment if there is negligible capital expenditure 
 
We begin our assessment with a review of the current rates of corporation tax, which are reported in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Levels of corporation tax 
Rates limits and fractions Financial year starting 
01/04/2006 
Financial year starting 
01/04/2007 
    
Main rate of corporation tax* 30% 30% 
6PDOOFRPSDQLHV¶UDWH6&5 19% 20% 
0DUJLQDO VPDOO FRPSDQLHV¶ UHOLHI 06&5
lower limit *** 
£300,000 £300,000 
MSCR upper limit *** £1,500,000 £1,500,000 
MSCR fraction  11/400 1/40 
Special rate for unit trusts and open-ended 
investment companies 
20% 20% 
* The 30% rate applies to the whole profit. The main rate of corporation tax applies when profits (including ring fence profits) 
are at a rate exceeding £1,500,000, or where there is no claim to another rate, or where another rate does not apply. 
 
** SCR can be claimed by qualifying companies with profits at an annual rate not exceeding £300,000. 
)RUFRPSDQLHVZLWKULQJIHQFHSURILWVWKHVPDOOFRPSDQLHV¶UDWHRIWD[RQWKRVHSURILWVUHPDLQVDWDQGWKH06&5IUDFWLRQ
11/400 for financial year starting 1 April 2007. Ring fence profits mean the income and gains from oil extraction activities or oil 
rights in the UK and UK Continental Shelf. 
 
*** in effect, profits within these bands are charged at a marginal rate of tax of 32.75% 
 
Sources:  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/corp.htm, accessed 26/11/07 
http://www.ukincorp.co.uk/s-A5-uk-corporation-tax.html, accessed 26/11/07 
 
In principle, there are three grounds on which differential tax exemptions might be granted: 
 
1. Taxation subsidies might be provided to public providers to compensate them for difficulties in 
raising capital (Hansmann, 1981). However, this is probably best dealt with directly through 
harmonisation of arrangements regarding capital funding. We shall return to this issue in 
section 5.2. 
2. Public and not-for-profit providers are constrained to reinvest any surpluses they make 
whereas for-profit providers are able to distribute profits among shareholders, justified as a 
return on investment.  
3. Public providers have to meet broader social objectives, such as guaranteeing universal 
access, which are not required of IS providers.  
 
Given that corporation tax is levied as a proportion of profits, it does not distort decisions about how to 
organise production because a compan\¶s aim to maximise profits is not affected by the imposition of 
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a tax on profits.  However, it could impact upon IS investment decisions, because corporation tax 
lowers the returns to private investment, and this may induce lower levels of investment in delivering 
care to NHS patients than is desirable. But whether this makes any practical difference depends on 
the gains that might be made from alternative use of the investment funds. This alternative is likely to 
be in an area that is also subject to corporation tax. If that is the case, current arrangements with 
respect to corporation tax are non-distortionary. If, however, IS providers are to be exempt from 
paying corporation tax on their NHS activities, this would introduce investments distortions by 
increasing the returns from NHS-related activities relative to alternative investment opportunities. 
 
The position of for-profit IS providers is that they have obligations to their shareholders but are 
otherwise unconstrained regarding how profits are spent.  However, some IS providers, such as 
BUPA8 or the Nuffield hospitals, are not-for-profit companies.  BUPA is a company limited by 
guarantee which means it has no share capital.  A company limited by guarantee has members, 
rather than shareholders. The members of the company guarantee/undertake to contribute a 
predetermined sum to the liabilities of the company which become due in the event of the company 
being wound up.  This means that its profits are not distributed to its members but are retained to be 
used for the purposes of the guarantee.  The company cannot distribute its profits to its members, and 
is therefore eligible to apply for charitable status, but it may instead choose to retain its corporate 
status (as BUPA has done).  If there are any surpluses, a charity will not be charged corporation tax, 
while a non-charitable company limited by guarantee may be.9  Publicly available BUPA accounts for 
2006 confirm that the company did indeed pay tax on these surpluses and that it reinvested taxed 
surpluses in the company (BUPA, 2007).   
 
To be granted charitable status, an organisation is required under the Charities Act (2006) to 
demonstrate that it has charitable purposes which are for the public benefit; guidance on what this 
involves for fee-charging organisations, such as healthcare providers, is expected later in 2008.10  
Some IS not-for-profit healthcare providers already have charitable status.  For example, the London 
clinic,11 a leading private hospital, receives an estimated £4 million in tax breaks thanks to its 
charitable status.12 Our understanding is that not-for-profit providers that have elected to retain their 
corporate status could apply for charitable status.  Therefore, the payment of corporation tax is a 
choice ± is not unavoidable ± and so does not require an adjustment to tariff or a lump sum 
compensation payment.   
 
In summary, then, corporation tax is unlikely to distort either investment or production decisions, and 
IS providers can avoid corporation tax by adopting charitable status. This implies that, even though 
some IS providers are liable for corporation tax, this does not constitute grounds for special 
arrangements to be made to the PbR funding regime. 
 
Factor Recommendation 
Corporation tax No change.  
 
4.2 VAT 
 
In common with NHS providers, IS providers do not have to pay VAT in the provision of clinical 
services to NHS patients.  However, NHS providers can claim back VAT on certain contracted-out 
services (e.g. catering, childcare, laundry, purchasing and procurement services) whereas IS 
providers cannot reclaim this cost (Department of Health, Unpublished, CBI and Serco Institute, 2006, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b)7KLVKDV OHDG WRFKDUJHVRI ³PDMRU LQFRQVLVWHQFLHV´ZLWK ,6
providers facing higher levels of irrecoverable VAT than the NHS (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 
2005a).  
 
Based on audited figures from members of the NHS Partners Network covering the last three years, 
the NHSPN estimate that VAT charged to IS providers adds about 6% to the price (Kendall and NHS 
Partners Network, 2007b).  In a report published in July 2005, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
                                                 
8
 In autumn 2007, BUPA sold 25 hospitals to a private equity firm.  BUPA is therefore no longer an IS provider for NHS patients. 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/health/article2441744.ece, accessed 12/12/07 
9
 http://www.ukincorp.co.uk/s-18-uk-guarantee-company-formation.html, accessed 26/11/07 
10
 http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/news/pbnewsindex.asp, accessed 04/12/07 
11
 http://www.thelondonclinic.co.uk/patients/about_the_london_clinic/our_charitable_status.aspx, accessed 04/12/07 
12
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2004/aug/06/hospitals.health, accessed 04/12/07 
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recommended that the DoH request data from the Treasury on VAT reclaimed by Trusts to inform 
their estimate (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005a).  In assessing value for money, the DoH uses a 
figure of 3.5% above tariff to take account of the cost differential (see Table 2).  This figure appears to 
be based on a subsequent analysis by PwC to which we do not have access (Department of Health, 
2005a).13 
 
Current policy by the Department of Health states that if irrecoverable VAT were to be incurred, then 
³WKHUHZLOOEHQRUHYLVLRQWRWKH6HUYLFH&KDUJHRUDQ\DGGLWLRQDODPRXQWSD\DEOHIRU WKH$SSRLQWHG
6HUYLFHV´ (Department of Health, 2006f).  However, under Phase 2 of the ISTC programme, VAT 
charges are taken into account in the assessment of whether the IS bidder price represents value for 
money.   
 
The application of differential VAT rules by ownership type is anti-competitive. As such, efforts should 
be made to ensure that NHS and IS face a level playing field by allowing for this exogenous 
imposition on IS providers.  There are three main options for adjusting for VAT liabilities: 
 
1. Harmonisation of tax rules. 
2. Adjust the tariff to reflect differential VAT rules. 
3. Make specific compensatory payments to IS providers. 
 
The simplest way to achieve tax neutrality is by harmonization of tax rules by enabling IS providers to 
reclaim VAT on contracted out services where these relate to care for NHS patients. This approach 
would level the playing field at the source of the problem, without introducing potential inefficiencies 
and obviates the need for adjustments to tariff (both actual adjustments and those undertaken as part 
of the VfM procurement exercise). This would require approval from HM Treasury. 
 
The information demands of the second option are substantial. In order to quantify the impact of VAT 
upon tariff, we would need information for each HRG on the mean amount of VAT incurred by IS 
providers that relates to services on which the NHS is VAT-exempt (catering, laundry, purchasing and 
procurement services etc). A percentage increase in tariff that would compensate IS providers for this 
factor could then be estimated. IS hospital accounting systems would almost certainly include some 
figures on VAT but access to this information is likely to be limited. Even if data were available, the 
imposition of VAT is unlikely to be reported separately by service and (even less likely) allocated 
down to HRG level. The alternative is to use estimates based on commercial data, such as those 
provided by the NHS Partners Network (Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 2007a). However, if the 
data underpinning these estimates are not transparent, they should not be used to inform quantified 
estimates.  
 
The third approach requires less information, as a global (rather than HRG-specific) re-payment to 
cover VAT can be made. The size of the re-payment would need to be based on audited accounts, 
and would require the Department of Health to work with IS providers to assess their VAT liability in 
providing services to NHS patients. 
 
Factor Recommendation 
VAT (on contracted out 
services) 
LT: seek VAT exemption for IS providers in their provision of NHS services 
ST: work with IS providers to assess current VAT liability in providing services to 
NHS patients 
 
4.3 Monitoring and performance management regime 
 
7KH &%, DQG WKH 6HUFR ,QVWLWXWH KDYH DGYRFDWHG µUHJXODWLRQ QHXWUDOLW\¶ ZLWK SXEOLF RUJDQLVDWLRQV
subject to the same regulatory environment as their private and voluntary sector competitors (CBI and 
Serco Institute, 2006)  $W SUHVHQW LW LV DUJXHG WKDW WKHUH DUH ³PDMRU LQFRQVLVWHQFLHV LQ WKH ZD\ LQ
ZKLFK JRYHUQPHQW UHJXODWLRQ« >DSSOLHV@ WR SXEOLF SULYDWH DQG YROXQWDU\ SURYLGHUV´ (CBI and Serco 
Institute, 2006).  The Health and Social Care Bill proposes that the same requirements apply to all 
providers whether in the public or independent sectors (Department of Health, 2007a), to be overseen 
by a single regulator, the Care Quality Commission. It is anticipated that these requirements will be 
fully implemented by April 2010.  
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Currently, there are two key areas of difference in the monitoring and performance management 
regimes that NHS and IS providers face: 
 
1. Registration and inspection requirements 
2. Reporting requirements 
 
4.3.1 Registration and inspection requirements 
 
Registration of providers acts as a barrier to entry to the health care market, and is justified on the 
grounds that patients are not well-enough placed to assess the quality of care and the adequacy of 
treatment.  
 
,6DQG1+6SURYLGHUVFXUUHQWO\IDFH³VXEVWDQWLDOO\GLIIHUHQW´PDUNHWHQWU\UHTXLUHPHQWVDQGWKHUHDUH
significant differences in the licensing regulations faced (Department of Health, Unpublished).  There 
are two reasons for these differentials: 
 
1. Unlike NHS providers, IS providers have to pay registration fees to the Healthcare 
Commission 
2. IS providers have to satisfy higher minimum standards and face more stringent inspection 
regimes. 
 
IS providers are legally required to be registered with the Healthcare Commission (HCC) (Healthcare 
Commission, 2007b). The government requires the HCC to recover the full cost of registration and 
this has precipitated recent increases in fees charged. While IS organisations have to pay these fees, 
NHS providers do not.  
 
The registration process requires IS providers to comply with national minimum standards (Healthcare 
Commission, 2007a). These standards are ³more prescriptive´ than those faced by the NHS 
(Department of Health, Unpublished) ,Q WKH 1+6 DVVHVVPHQW LV EDVHG RQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
µVWDQGDUGV IRU EHWWHU KHDOWK¶ FRUH VWDQGDUGV ZKLFK DOO 1+6 SURYLGHUV DUH H[SHFWHG WR PHHW DQG
developmental standards, which are designed to stimulate improvement. ISTCs are privately owned 
and managed and, as such, are registered and inspected as providers of independent healthcare, 
XVLQJ WKH µQDWLRQDOPLQLPXPVWDQGDUGV¶+RZHYHU DV WKH\JHQHUDOO\ SURYLGHVHUYLFHVH[FOXVLYHO\ WR
NHS patients, their sponsors (PCTs) are responsible for ensuring that they provide care in line with 
the standards for better health (Healthcare Commission, 2007a).  Therefore, in effect ISTCs need to 
comply with the same standards as those of NHS providers and with the ³PRUHSUHVFULSWLYH´ national 
minimum standards (Department of Health, Unpublished).   
 
This implies that IS providers face higher entry costs than their NHS counterparts. The NHS Partners 
Network estimates that annual inspections by regulatory bodies, including the HCC, CNST, HSE and 
Commercial Directorate, add about 2% to annual costs.  Costs may be higher depending on 
pharmacy and sterilization standards expected in the independent provider context.  Reporting 
requirements from regulatory bodies such as the HCC, CD, HSE, Royal Colleges, NPSA, SHAs and 
PCTs are estimated to add a further 1% additional cost per annum (Kendall and NHS Partners 
Network, 2007b). 1+6SURYLGHUVDOVRLQFXUFRVWVDULVLQJIURPWKHLUµDQQXDOKHDOWKFKHFN¶XQGHUtaken 
by the Healthcare Commission, estimated to range from £48k to £95k depending on organisational 
size (Department of Health, 2007a).  
 
While these costs can be considered exogenous, they do not imply that they should be compensated 
through a differentially higher price paid to IS providers under PbR. These costs reflect fixed costs of 
market entry and continued participation, but do not vary by the level of activity. As such, if these are 
to be compensated, this should be through a premium for participation (section 3.1) rather than by a 
price adjustment. In due course, registration and inspection regimes are to be standardised, and this 
is the most appropriate way to ensure equal treatment of providers (Department of Health, 2007a). 
 
4.3.2 Reporting requirements 
 
NHS providers are required to provide activity data for Hospital Episodes Statistics. From April 2006, 
the HCC required the IS to produce the same dataset as the public sector. This potentially raises a 
fair playing field issue as IS providers incur investment costs (IT systems and resources) in order to 
Establishing a fair playing field for payment by results  17 
provide this information (Department of Health, Unpublished).  In addition, there may be training 
requirements for IS staff to use new software and to ensure accurate coding.  Reflecting on the poor 
quality of reporting amongst some IS providers, the HCC has recommended that the Information 
Centre for Health and Social Care takes a more active role, providing guidance in the use of the key 
national systems for submitting data and tools to support IS providers (Healthcare Commission, 
2007a). However, if this recommendation were taken forward, it is unclear whether IS providers would 
be charged for this service.  
 
Although provision of HES data is costly to IS providers, NHS providers are also having to make 
greater investments in IT systems and improvements to their coding procedures as a consequence of 
the requirement for accurate patient-level data under PbR. Studies estimate that the increased 
administrative burden of PbR is in the order of £100k per hospital per annum, much of which is driven 
by higher costs of data collection (Audit Commission, 2005, Marini and Street, 2007). This implies that 
there may be little difference between NHS and IS providers in the costs of providing HES data. 
 
In addition to providing HES data, other regulatory bodies such as the Commercial Directorate (e.g. 
key performance indicators), Health and Safety Executive, Royal Colleges, National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA), SHAs and PCTs require data from IS providers (Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 
2007b).  For example, IS providers are mandated to report information for the National Joint Registry 
data set on hip and knee replacements, and are charged to do so. In contrast, reporting is not 
mandatory for NHS providers and no charge is made (Healthcare Commission, 2007a). Reporting of 
serious untoward incidents by NHS providers should be made to SHAs and to the NPSA via 
electronic links.  For IS providers, these data are reportable to the HCC, the Sponsor, the Commercial 
Directorate and the NPSA (for which there is currently no electronic access for IS bodies)(Healthcare 
Commission, 2007a).   
 
But while IS providers have different reporting requirements imposed upon them, this does not imply a 
higher burden overall. This is because NHS providers are required to provide information returns to 
the DoH which are not required from IS providers ± such as the Reference Cost returns.  
 
On balance, therefore, it is unclear that different reporting requirements systematically favour one 
group of providers over another. Rather than attempting to estimate and compensate for the cost of 
differential reporting requirements, it would preferable to standardise arrangements where 
appropriate. This should happen with the adoption of the current Health and Social Care Bill. 
 
Factor Recommendation 
Monitoring and 
performance 
management regime  
Registration/monitoring: address as part of market entry negotiations not activity-
based payment arrangements. Legislation has proposed to standardise 
requirements 
Reporting: standardise requirements 
 
4.4 Contracting issues 
 
4.4.1 Contractual process  
 
The bidding process for Wave 1 ISTCs and Phase 2 ISTCs has been costly. The NHS Partners 
Network provided us with an estimate of an average of £2m per site (for bidding and commissioning), 
suggesting that this adds around 10% to the price of an average 5 year contract (Kendall and NHS 
Partners Network, 2007b). However, these procurement phases have been concluded, replaced by 
ECN arrangements under which IS providers are reimbursed on the basis of the tariff.  
 
Under ECN arrangements, IS and NHS providers are likely to face similar costs of contracting, and 
the tariff allows for these costs. NHS providers have large contracting departments and the costs 
incurred by these departments are taken into account in the estimation of reference costs on which 
the tariff is based (Department of Health, 2007c)(§7.5.7).  
We recommend that differential payments should not be made under PbR to reflect contracting costs. 
This recommendation is based on the following: 
 
1. Contracting costs are not fully exogenous ± organisations have discretion over how their 
contracting functions are organised; 
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2. It is not apparent that contracting costs differ according to ownership type under ECN 
arrangements; 
3. Any form of compensation for contracting costs incurred would distort efficient contracting 
behaviour. 
 
4.4.2 Payment timing 
 
&XUUHQWO\ WKH SD\PHQW WHUPV IRU SXEOLF DQG LQGHSHQGHQW VHFWRU ERGLHV GLIIHU ³VXEVWDQWLDOO\´
(Department of Health, Unpublished). While NHS providers are paid a given amount at the same time 
each month, IS providers are required to submit invoices, for which there is a 30-day settlement 
period (Department of Health, Unpublished). ,QDGGLWLRQLWLVXQFOHDUKRZZKHWKHURUZKHQµXQFRGHG¶
activity reported in HES for NHS patients by IS providers is reimbursed. 
 
Differential timing of payment might favour some providers over others. However, this can be resolved 
quite easily either by  
 
1. Synchronising payment timing for all providers; or 
2. Allowing interest to be charged by those providers that receive late payment. 
 
Supposing that IS providers are paid later than NHS providers, interest would be calculated as 
follows: 
 
( )(1 ) IS NHSd dj jp Q r  
 
The IS provider should be paid for HRG j the tariff jp  times the number of patients treated jQ  
capitalized at daily interest rate r for the number of extra days corresponding to the delay between the 
date the IS provider is paid ( )ISd  and the date the NHS provider is paid ( )NHSd . 
 
Obviously, synchronisation of payment timing is likely to be the more cost-effective solution in the 
longer term.  
 
Factor Recommendation 
Contracting issues Contractual arrangements: no adjustment 
Ensure that IS providers make accurate HES returns 
Synchronise payment timing 
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5. Production process factors 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this section we consider a number of influences that have the potential to give rise to differences in 
the costs of producing health care between the NHS and the independent sector. We consider the 
following influences in turn: 
 
1. Costs of capital 
2. Costs of labour 
3. Geographical variation in input prices 
4. Economies of scale and scope 
5. Access to cheaper inputs 
6. Production of non-patient related outputs 
 
5.2 Cost of capital 
 
Prior to the 1990s, capital ± assets with a life of more than one year ± was FRQVLGHUHGDµIUHHJRRG¶LQ
the NHS and other public services (Gaffney et al., 1999).  To ensure that balance sheets reflected the 
YDOXHRIWKHFDSLWDOLQYHVWHGLQDWUXVWWKHµSXEOLFGLYLGHQGFDSLWDO¶3'&was introduced (Palmer and 
King's Fund, 2006).  The PDC appears as a liability on trusts balance sheets; however, the PDC is not 
a real debt but rather a type of equity stake.14  All NHS trusts pay an annual payment to the Treasury, 
called the dividend on PDC, calculated as a fixed percentage of the WUXVW¶VQHWIL[HGDVVHWV.  However, 
because tariffs are based on the average of both recurrent and capital costs, the tariff tends to 
systematically under-fund new capital stock (Palmer and King's Fund, 2006). New hospitals ± or those 
with significant new capital programmes ± are likely to have higher-than-average capital costs 
compared to older hospitals whose historic capital costs may be largely written off.  To ensure the 
YDOXHRIWKHFDSLWDOUHIOHFWVPDUNHWYDOXHVDOO1+6KRVSLWDOVDUHµUHYDOXHG¶HYHU\ILYH\HDUVDQGWKLV
revaluation appears as a liability on the balance sheet and also in the expenses (as depreciation).  As 
the tariff reflects both the PDC dividend and the depreciation paid by trusts, IS providers receive a 
µFDSLWDO FRVW¶ FRPSRQHQW DV SDUW RI WKH WDULII  +RZHYHU XQOLNH 1+6 7UXVWV ,6 SURYLGHUV PDNH QR
corresponding dividend payment to HM Treasury.  
 
There appears to be a difference between NHS organisations and IS providers over accounting 
processes.  Correspondence from the NHSPN suggests that, in order to comply with HCC 
regulations, IS providers are required to depreciate assets at a faster rate than NHS providers and the 
NHSPN estimates that this adds 2 to 3% to tariff (Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 2007b).  If this 
is the case, then it would be worthwhile harmonising relevant accounting guidance across sectors. 
 
In addition to the general problem of how best to account for capital legacies, there are differences in 
the costs faced by NHS and IS providers of financing capital. Capital is typically financed in one of two 
ways: debt, where providers borrow from public or commercial lenders; and equity, where capital is 
raised by stakeholders who expect a reward for their investment in the organisation 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  This section considers two important aspects of the cost of 
capital: first, the ease of access to debt or equity; and second, the cost of accessing debt (the interest 
rate) or equity (the rate of return).   
 
5.2.1 Ease of access to capital 
 
Debt funding is important ± and often critical ± for the capital requirements of a business (Department 
of Health, Unpublished).  Several factors determine the costs of capital providers incur (Table 6).  
Among the public hospitals in the NHS, we distinguish between those who have Foundation status 
and those who do not.  Compared to standard public hospitals, Foundation hospitals have more 
flexibility in decision-making, including greater discretion over investment. 
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Table 6: The costs of capital: differences between and within types of provider 
  Public sector: NHS Trusts Public sector: 
Foundation Trusts 
Private sector 
Access to 
finance 
 Regulated by SHA 
PFI 
Non-PFI:  
(1) DH capital allocation 
(2) Surpluses 
Regulated by Monitor 
PFI 
Non-PFI:  
(1) DH capital 
allocation  
(2) Self-raised debt 
(3) FT Financing 
Facility  
(4) Surpluses 
Commercial options 
including reinvestment 
of surpluses/ profits 
Financing 
implications 
Maintenance 
of assets 
PFI: contracts or leases 
Non-PFI: Trust responsibility 
PFI: contracts or 
leases 
Non-PFI: Trust 
responsibility 
Provider responsibility 
 Depreciation PFI: within contract 
Non-PFI: depends on 
remaining asset lifetime / 
market value (periodic 
revaluation) 
PFI: within contract 
Non-PFI: depends on 
remaining asset 
lifetime / market value 
(periodic revaluation) 
Depends on 
remaining asset 
lifetime / market value 
 Servicing of 
debt 
PFI: within contract (8%) 
Non-PFI:  
(1) PDC (6% net assets) 
(2) Not applicable 
PFI: within contract 
(8%) 
Non-PFI:  
(1) PDC (6% net 
assets) 
(2) Interest on debt 
(3) Fixed % increment 
above the National 
Loan Fund rate 
(4) Not applicable  
Interest on debt 
Commercial rate of 
return (dividend on 
equity) 
Revenue 
implications 
 Non-PFI /PFI: tariff includes 
average of current 
expenditure on all above 
components.  PFI schemes 
may have greater financial 
costs that are incurred by a 
proportion of Trusts.  These 
Trusts are locked into long-
term lease, with non-
negotiable payments 
representing an exogenous 
cost.  As a result, PFI Trust 
costs are likely to be higher 
than tariff. 
Under PFI contracts, Trusts 
can no longer close wards, 
postpone routine 
maintenance etc.  Trusts that 
do not have PFI contracts 
have more flexibility to defer 
expenditure.   
As for NHS Trusts, but 
may have more choice 
over whether to opt for 
PFI.  Interest 
payments may be 
higher than 6% 
If provider has 
undertaken major new 
capital build, tariff ± 
based on average 
costs ± will not fully 
cover cost.  However, 
providers may be able 
to transfer assets to 
the NHS or to sell 
them. 
PBC: Prudential Borrowing Code; PDC: public dividend capital; PFI: Private Finance Initiative  
Sources: (Monitor, 2005, PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b, Pollock et al., 2002, Gaffney et al., 1999) 
 
Historically, the UK government ± facilitated by the NHS Bank ± has provided funds to NHS Trusts 
who have therefore not needed to raise debt for their operations (Department of Health, 2005b, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  Since 1997, most new major capital investments for the NHS 
have been financed under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  Under PFI, private consortia design, 
build and, sometimes, manage new projects.  Contracts typically last for 30 years, during which time 
the building is leased by the NHS Trust.15  Hospitals pay annual charges averaging between 8 per 
cent and 11 per cent of their income to these private consortia (Gaffney et al., 1999, Shaoul et al., 
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 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Procurementandproposals/Publicprivatepartnership/Privatefinanceinitiative/index.htm, accessed 
11/10/07 
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2008, Pollock et al., 2002).  These payments cover the cost of leasing the new facilities and of 
procuring non-clinical services (Shaoul et al., 2008).  PFI may give rise to budgetary inflexibilities as 
KRVSLWDOV DUH µORFNHG LQWR¶ ORQJ-term contracts which offer contractors little incentive for efficiency 
(National Audit Office, 2008, Shaoul et al., 2008). 
 
Both NHSTs and FTs make use of the private finance initiative (PFI).  In addition, NHS Foundation 
Trusts (FTs) have been granted greater financial and operational freedoms as part of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\RIHDUQHGDXWRQRP\7KLVPHDQVWKDWFTs have more discretion than traditional 
NHS Trusts over how they manage their capital positions and they can borrow subject to the 
Prudential Borrowing Code (PBC).  Set out by Monitor, the independent regulator of FTs, the PBC is 
intended to assist FTs to ³PDLQWDLQ prudent capital positions relative to their revenues and costs´
(Monitor, 2005).  Nonetheless, FTs do not have full freedom to borrow to a commercially optimal level 
because the PBC sets a borrowing limit determined by various financial ratios (Monitor, 2005).  This 
limit, known as the Prudential Borrowing Limit (PBL)LVVSHFLILHGLQHDFK)7¶VWHUPVRIDXWKRULVDWLRQ
and is reviewed at least annually.  The PBL covers both the maximum amount of long-term 
borrowing,16 and the amount of any approved working capital facility.17  As private sector providers 
are not subject to such limitations, FTs could be considered disadvantaged in competition against the 
private sector.   
 
In addition to the limits on borrowing embodied in the PBC, FTs may also find it difficult to borrow from 
the commercial sector because lenders cannot adequately judge their creditworthiness and may have 
concerns about the impact of reforms such as PbR (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  It seems 
unlikely that FT assets can constitute an adequate security for loans from commercial lenders 
(Hansmann, 1981).  
 
In view of the problems of ease of access to commercial lending, the DoH has set up the FTFF (FT 
)LQDQFLQJ)DFLOLW\WRHVWDEOLVKµDUP¶VOHQJWK¶OHQGLQJWHUPVIRUFRPPHUFLDODFWLYLWLHVThe FTFF offers 
a rate that is a fixed percentage increment above the National Loan Fund (NLF) rate, although there 
is scope for this rate to be revised if it is deemed to be non-competitive.  Core activities related to 
protected assets, where competition with the private sector is not envisaged, continue to be funded at 
a lower rate still based on NLF (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  Therefore, when comparing 
WKH)7V¶IXWXUHILQDQFLQJFRVWVIRUDFWLYLWLHVRSHQWRFRPSHWLWLRQ³WKLVZLOOLQSULQFLSOHQRWEHDVXEVLG\
so long as the activity has been correctly identified in the lending process as commercial so that the 
UHOHYDQW UDWHV DSSO\´ (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  The PBC also authorises loans in 
respect of working capital requirements.  Such short term lending is not available from the DoH and 
will therefore be sourced from the private sector.  Consequently, loans for working capital do not 
represent any additional State subsidy. 
 
5.2.2 Cost of accessing capital 
 
Regarding debt funding for activities that are in competition with the private sector (such as services 
provided by ISTCs), FTs may borrow at a rate equal to the NLF rate plus a variable increment.  One 
source reports this increment to be 3% (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  As this rate can be 
modified if it is deemed anti-competitive, it appears that measures for securing a level playing field 
already exist and there is therefore no requirement for further adjustments to payment arrangements.   
 
Regarding equity, IS providers are required by their stakeholders to make a commercial rate of return 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005a) which typically ranges from 5.5% to 15%, depending on the 
level of risk (CBI and Serco Institute, 2006).  Although there are similar expectations on public sector 
organisations that are in competition with the private sector (CBI and Serco Institute, 2006), FT are 
required to generate a return of just 3.5% on PDC (adjusted for the cost of whatever debt they raise) 
which appears to be lower than a standard private sector comparator (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 
2005a). 
 
The methods that can be used to calculate the rate of returns vary considerably in their complexity 
and level of precision (Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office, 1998).  Weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) is an approach that takes into account the cost and market values of 
                                                 
16
  Long-WHUPERUURZLQJH[FOXGHV3),DQG3XEOLF'LYLGHQG&DSLWDO3'&ZKLFKDUHERWKFODVVLILHGDVµRIIEDODQFHVKHHW¶DQG
are therefore not subject to the PBL 
17
 Working capital facility is a short-term borrowing facility used by FTs for cash flow purposes 
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both debt and equity.  Alternatively, iIPDQDJHUVDUH DEOH WRHVWLPDWH WKH EXVLQHVV¶VPDUNHW ULVND
target rate of return set using a broad-banding approach may be appropriate. This method includes 
two components: a base cost of capital set at the long term bond rate (the risk free rate), and a 
premium for each level of market risk (see Table 7) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2005). 
 
Table 7: Typical rate of return targets for low, medium and high risk businesses 
Market risk of the business Nominal pre-tax target at a long 
term bond rate of 5% 
 
Nominal pre-tax target expressed 
as a premium over the long term 
bond 
Low risk  8 Bond plus 3 percentage points 
Medium (average) risk 10 Bond plus 5 percentage points 
High risk 12 Bond plus 7 percentage points 
Source: Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office. Rate of Return Issues. Canberra: CCNCO, 1998, p.11 
 
3ULFH:DWHUKRXVH&RRSHUVXVHG:$&&IRUPXODWRHVWLPDWHDQµDGHTXDWH¶UDWHRIUHWXUQRQFDSLWDOIRU
private organisations, i.e. a return sufficient to ensure that providers of capital will not direct their 
capital into alternative investments of equivalent risk (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005a). Based 
on the WACC methodology, a private organisation such as an ISTC would be expected to make a 
return on capital of 6.1% in order to satisfy investors (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  The 
difference between the estimated commercial rate of return of 6.1% and the NHS rate of 3.5%, 
multiplied by the value of capital, would be the effective subsidy of NHS hospital costs if the 3.5% is 
not considered a reasonable return on equity (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  
 
5.2.3 Implications for Payment by Results 
 
A level playing field requires that there is neutrality between private and public sectors in terms of 
both access to capital and the cost of capital.   
 
Access to capital 
In terms of access to capital, NHS and IS providers have a range of options: both NHS trusts and FTs 
have access to PFI; FTs have additional capacity to raise loans subject to their PBL; for-profit IS 
providers can access equity and loans; and NHS trusts, for-profit and not-for-profit IS providers can 
reinvest surpluses.  As government policy is that NHS Trusts will, over time, evolve to Foundation 
status, there appears to be no need for the playing field to be adjusted further.  Equally, it appears 
that there are arrangements to ensure that the cost of servicing debt (loans) can be competitively 
neutral. We have, however, been unable to establish whether this is the case in practice.   
 
Cost of capital 
As the PbR tariff is based on national average costs, it will only partially compensate hospitals for PFI 
payments because only a fraction of public providers incur PFI charges.  Therefore, tariff will 
systematically underfund providers who incur this type of capital cost.  Whether providers can avoid 
these costs depends on the nature of their contracts.  Private providers, who do not operate under 
public service obligations, may be able to transfer ownership of facilities such as newly built treatment 
centres to the NHS (Gainsbury, 2008).  However, the scope for public hospitals to terminate PFI 
contracts is limited and generates unavoidable affordability pressures (Pollock et al., 2002).  Although 
there is central financial support for the first few years of PFI operation (Department of Health, 
2006d)(§118), affordability pressures could prove unsustainable in the longer term.  In consequence, 
the possibility of a systematic and critical difference between public and private providers with respect 
to the nature of these fixed costs cannot be ruled out.   
 
Besides PFI, providers face a range of options that appear, in part, to depend on whether they are 
NHS trusts, FTs, not-for-profit or for-profit.  Therefore, it is very difficult to establish with any degree of 
confidence what the current arrangements are, what rates apply and, consequently, whether or not 
the playing field is fair.  This matter requires further detailed investigation by specialists in this area. 
 
Potential solutions 
If PbR systematically underfunds NHS trusts and Foundation Trusts who have PFI contractual 
obligations, then affordability pressures could prove unsustainable in the longer term.  As capital costs 
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are fixed and do not vary with the level of activity, adjustments to the PbR tariff are inappropriate.  
Non treatment-related payments could be made to compensate providers for the shortfall between 
provider income and cost.  One option would be to extend central financial support ± currently offered 
on only a short-term basis ± to address affordability gaps, to ensure public providers are not forced 
into reducing exposure to capital repayments that could adversely affect patient care.    
 
With regard to non-PFI debt, the potential options to achieve neutrality relating to the cost of debt 
include (Department of Health, Unpublished):   
 
1. Change the lending rate for FTs so it is equivalent to that available to the independent 
sector 
2. Change the target rate of return on capital for FTs so that this is equivalent to commercial 
rates 
3. Achieve debt neutrality by calculating the difference in the actual cost of borrowing (cost 
of debt) and the cost a business would incur if it were borrowing as a non-government 
entity (benchmark cost of debt) and neutralise in one of two ways: 
a. pay a debt neutrality charge to central government; or· 
b. factor into tariff /payment mechanism 
 
It appears that option 1 already exists: the interest rate charged by government to FTs can be 
modified if it is deemed anti-competitive.  Option 2 may be feasible if it is possible to limit this to 
contestable services provided by FTs.  However, it is not clear whether increasing the target rate of 
return to commercial levels would be possible unless the limitations imposed by the PBC on the debt-
equity ratio were also relaxed. Pursuing this option would, however, imply greater risk for tax payers 
and ultimately may threaten the capacity of NHS providers to offer a comprehensive range of 
services.  As such, relaxation of the debt equity ratio for FTs may not be in the public interest.  
PriceWaterhouseCoopers have estimated option 3 in relation to the rate of return (see above).  The 
advantage of a debt neutrality charge is that a lump sum could be estimated on a provider-specific 
basis.  Factoring the charge into an IS tariff may not be sufficiently sensitive to provider differences in 
the magnitude of debt and would therefore risk creating allocative inefficiency.  
 
Factor Recommendation 
Cost of capital Harmonise relevant accounting guidelines across sectors 
Access to capital: no adjustment needed 
Cost of borrowing:  
PFI issues: confirm that PFI represents a potentially serious financial risk to NHSTs 
and FTs.  Identify the magnitude of the problem and make specific payments to 
compensate for these.  Consider taking legal advice on the nature of these contracts 
which appear inflexible.    
Non-PFI issues: Providers face a range of options, so it is unclear whether the 
playing field is fair. This matter requires further detailed investigation by relevant 
specialists.  
 
5.3 Costs of labour 
 
There are three main types of cost differential with respect to labour costs:  
 
1. recruitment costs,  
2. pay levels,  
3. and pension provision costs.   
 
5.3.1 Recruitment costs 
 
The principal reason why recruitment costs have differed between NHS and IS providers is that IS 
SURYLGHUVKDYH EHHQVXEMHFW WR µDGGLWLRQDOLW\¶ UXOHV LPSRsed by the Department of Health when the 
procurement programme first commenced. 7KH DGGLWLRQDOLW\ SULQFLSOH ZDV LQWURGXFHG WR ³FRQVHUYH
NHS clinical skills and encourage the independent sector to increase its capacity to help meet NHS 
DFFHVVDQGZDLWLQJWLPHVWDUJHWV´(Department of Health, 2006a).   
 
For Wave 1 ISTCs, additionality was applied in the strictest sense: private providers were prohibited 
from employing persons who had worked in the past 6 months for the NHS.  In Phase 2, the principle 
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of additionality was relaxed so that it applied only to a defined list of shortage professions, such as 
orthopaedics and anaesthetics.18  Anyone on the shortage list could sell their non-contracted hours to 
the IS, provided that the proper discussions took place and relevant safety issues were resolved 
(Department of Health, Unpublished).  
 
Additionality poses serious restrictions on competition. Indeed, it allows NHS providers to recruit the 
best professionals foreclosing private providers from access to essential inputs (Motta, 2004)(p.362). 
Access to these inputs is crucial in an environment where quality competition dictates profitability and 
therefore ability to enter and remain in the market.  In sectors where there is a shortage of 
professional labour, the negative effect of this restraint on contestability will be especially high. 
 
7KHSULQFLSOHRIDGGLWLRQDOLW\KDVOHGWRDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHZDYH,67&V³ZHUHRYHUZKHOPLQJly staffed 
E\RYHUVHDVFOLQLFLDQV´ (Barron and House of Commons Health Committee, 2006).  This places an 
RQXVRQ,67&V³WRHQVXUHWKDWWKHVWDIIWKH\HPSOR\DUHFRPSHWHQW´(Healthcare Commission, 2007a). 
A review by the House of Commons Select Committee on Health in 2UHFRPPHQGHGWKDW³,67&V
use the same appointment procedures as the NHS.  In addition, ISTC clinical appointments for 
overseas doctors should incorporate a standardised, independent assessment system based on 
FRPSHWHQF\´ (Barron and House of Commons Health Committee, 2006).  Recruitment costs 
associated with employing overseas clinicians are therefore likely to be higher than those of 
employing UK resident clinicians. However, because both NHS and IS employers recruit many staff 
from overseas, to all intents and purposes, they are in the same situation.  
 
5.3.2 Rates of pay 
 
Although the additionaOLW\ UXOH ZDV UHOD[HG LQ 3KDVH  VR WKDW LW DSSOLHG RQO\ WR FHUWDLQ µVKRUWDJH¶
specialities, it seems that ISTCs will continue to be mainly staffed by overseas clinicians.  There is 
DQHFGRWDOHYLGHQFHWKDW³WKHFRVW-base of UK doctors is not competitive; iW LV WRRKLJK´DQGWKDW WKH
financial viability of ISTCs depends on their ability to employ non-NHS staff (Barron and House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2006)(§86).  The NHSNP estimate that independent operators pay 
about 10% more to attract the same level of staff which is about 3-4% of the overall tariff (Kendall and 
NHS Partners Network, 2007b). 
 
However, it is not clear that rates of pay are necessarily higher in the independent sector. Particular 
concerns have been raised about differential pay for consultant anaesthetists: in the NHS, these 
doctors are paid on the same scale as other consultants whereas IS providers have applied the 
SUDFWLFHW\SLFDORISULYDWHKRVSLWDOVE\ZKLFK³FRQVXOWDQWVXUJHRQVDUHSDLGWZo-and-a-half times the 
fee per case that consultant anaesthetists reFHLYH´ (Barron and House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2006)(§87).  
 
Regulation (or de-regulation) of employment terms would help ensure a level playing field.  Indeed, 
the DoH has given an assurance that if NHS staff were to be seconded into ISTCs then their NHS 
terms and conditions in respect to pay and pensions would be unchanged.  However, the DoH has 
also QRWHG WKDW ³WKHUH LVQR UHTXLUHPHQW WR LPSRVHREOLJDWLRQVRQ WKHSULYDWH VHFWRU WRHQJDJHDQ\
medical workforce on identical terms to the NHS, so Agenda for Change does noWDSSO\´(Barron et 
al., 2006a).19  For non-contracted hours, the DoH considers that market forces would determine pay 
rates: rates would be negotiated by individual providers, who would need to offer pay competitive with 
that in the NHS to attract and retain staff (Department of Health, 2006a). 
 
Recently NHS providers have been able to exercise greater flexibility over terms and conditions. An 
example of where this has been made possible is with the implementation of the new consultant 
contract ± even though few providers have fully exploited these opportunities (National Audit Office, 
2007). 
 
On balance, therefore, it seems that both IS and NHS providers enjoy flexibility over rates of pay. 
Consequently, pay cannot be considered an exogenous constraint on providers, so no corrective 
action via payment arrangements is merited. 
 
                                                 
18
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmhealth/uc991/uc99102.htm (Q62), accessed 12/09/07 
19
 Ev 106, Mr Bleddyn Rees, General Counsel, Commercial Directorate 
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5.3.3 Pension contributions 
 
Representation has been made by the NHS partners¶ network to claim that the independent sector 
has to pay higher contributions in terms of pensions, as reported below.   
 
Pensions are probably the single greatest discrepancy between sectors in financial terms.  The reason for this is 
that independent sector providers have to account for the future retirement costs of their employees whereas 
NHS providers only account for the costs of current retirees. 
Source: (Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 2007a) 
 
Pension costs across sectors might differ because of differences in: 
 
1. The type of scheme 
2. The participation rate (enrolment) 
3. The contribution rate 
4. Subsidisation of administrative costs 
 
5.3.3.1 Type of scheme 
 
As pointed out in the NHS Partners Network letter (Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 2007a), NHS 
staff are enrolled under a µpay-as-you go¶ (PAYG) scheme, while staff working in the independent 
sector tend to be enrolled under a µfully-funded pension¶ (FFP) scheme. 
 
The former scheme is based on redistribution across generations. Under PAYG current workers pay 
the pensions of those currently retired. The FFP scheme is based on contributions. Under FFP future 
pensions are covered by current contributions. PAYG schemes tend to more redistributive, with 
people on lower salaries (eg nurses) being better off than they would be under a FFP schemes ± 
while the opposite is true for people on higher salaries (e.g. doctors). 
 
Which system is more generous, for given contributions? The answer depends on three factors. 
Define g as the growth rate of the economy, n as the growth rate of the population and  r  as the real 
interest rate. Feldstein (1995, 2005) shows that PAYG is superior if g n r  (Feldstein, 1995, 
Feldstein, 2005b, Feldstein, 2005a). This condition is intuitive. If the population and economy are 
growing quickly, then the income of current workers will be higher and their future pensions will also 
be high. 
 
In contrast, if interest rates are high but growth rates of economy and population are low, then current 
workers will not be so wealthy. Current workers would be better off investing their contributions in the 
financial markets/pension funds, where they can obtain an interest rate of r . 
 
Given that neither scheme is obviously superior to the other and that the choice of which scheme to 
offer is not exogenous to the provider, it would be unwise to make an adjustment according to the 
type of scheme. 
 
5.3.3.2 Participation rate 
 
In the NHS, the vast majority of employees are covered by the NHS pension scheme (a small 
proportion decides not to participate).  However, IS employees are much less likely to be enrolled in a 
pension scheme through their employer. There are two ways in which an IS provider might influence 
enrolment. First, while an IS provider may be mandated to offer such a scheme to all new employees, 
they may be under no obligation to encourage enrolment or to facilitate access to the scheme. In 
theory, organisations could informally discourage enrolment, for example by suggesting that 
alternative private pension provision would be in employeHV¶EHVWLQWHUHVWV6HFRQGLIDQIS provider 
employs staff on a part-time basis (e.g. a clinician who also works in the NHS and so contributes to an 
1+6SHQVLRQ WKHHPSOR\HHPD\FKRRVHQRW WRFRQWULEXWH WRWKH LQGHSHQGHQWVHFWRURUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
scheme. If either type of behaviour occurs, there are grounds for believing that the participation rate is 
lower for IS than NHS providers. 
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5.3.3.3 Contribution rate 
 
7KHHPSOR\HUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH1+6SHQVLRQVFKHPHDPRXQWVWRRIVDODU\, with employees 
contributing 6% of salary. Employer contributions to independent sector schemes appear to vary 
considerably. A report by PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that in contracted-out defined-benefit 
schemes the most common rates lie between 10% and 15% of earnings (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
LLP, 2005b). 
 
There is little rationale for compensating organisations on the basis of their contribution rates, as 
these are not outside the IS provider¶V FRQWURO $Q\ SULFH DGMXVWPHQW WKURXJK 3E5 ZRXOG LQWURGXFH
distortions into decisions about which pension scheme to offer to prospective employees. 
 
5.3.3.4 Administrative subsidy 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers note that the NHS Pension Scheme is subsidised by the Department of 
Health, principally to cover administration costs (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b). In contrast 
the administrative costs of other schemes are borne directly by the contributors.  
 
The subsidy is not substantial however.  The annual administrative costs of the NHS Pension Scheme 
in 2004 were £19.05m (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  Spread across 1.2 million NHS 
employees (Hawe, 2007), this amounts to £16 per employee. 
 
 
Factor Disadvantage Recommendation 
Costs of labour Neither Recruitment: relax additionality rules 
Pay levels: no adjustment 
Pension provision: no adjustment 
 
5.4 Geographical variation in input prices - Market Forces Factor 
 
Under Payment by Results, in addition to their activity-related payments, all NHS providers receive 
SD\PHQWV GLUHFWO\ IURP WKH 'R+ WR FRPSHQVDWH IRU ³XQDYRLGDEOH FRVW GLIIHUHQFHV LQ GHOLYHULQJ
VHUYLFHV LQGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRI WKHFRXQWU\´ (Department of Health, 2006c)(§3.59). The Market Forces 
Factor (MFF) is designed to take account of local market conditions, which are supposed to impact on 
the price of factor inputs, notably labour. The fundamental reason that NHS hospitals in England are 
eligible for the MFF is that they cannot locate where they wish ± NHS hospitals operate in an 
historical context and are charged with serving their local population. In effect, NHS hospitals face 
locational constraints on their production costs that are outside their control. They cannot simply 
chose to operate in another part of the country where the price of factor inputs might be lower. 
 
Representatives of the independent sector have argued that the MFF is a threat to competitive 
neutrality and requires refinement. There are three main issues to consider: 
 
1. Is the basis for the calculation of the MFF sound?  
2. Should IS providers be eligible for MFF? 
3. How should MFF payments be made? 
 
The first question is beyond the remit of the current report and is the subject of a separate review by 
the DoH. However, representatives of the IS have raised concerns about the calculation: 
³,QGHSHQGHQWSURYLGHUVZLWKQDWLRQDOIRRWSULQWVHJ1XIILHOG+RVSLWDOVKDYHDOVRFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH
MFF system embeds a cost variation that is far too great ± in their experience working across many 
areas costs do not vary as much as MFF suggests, making it far easier to provide services 
VXVWDLQDEO\ LQ DUHDV ZLWK KLJK 0)) DQG YHU\ GLIILFXOW LQGHHG WR RSHUDWH LQ DUHDV ZLWK ORZ 0))´
(Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 2007a). These concerns might be addressed as part of the 
review. 
 
As regards the second question, IS providers appear to be subject to similar locational constraints 
that face NHS providers. Given that the entry of new providers depends on local needs (one of the 
criteria to access the bids of potential providers is µneed¶ as determined by PCTs and SHAs) IS 
providers are only allowed to enter the market when there is a local lack of capacity. This suggests 
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that IS providers are indeed constrained in where they locate and, as such, ought to be eligible for 
MFF. If IS providers are thought to be less constrained than NHS providers in where they locate, MFF 
payments might be reduced proportionately. This would require a judgement to be made about how 
restricted IS providers are, and would probably need to be negotiated between the Department of 
Health and each IS provider on a case by case basis. 
 
We addressed the third question in section 3.5 and repeat our recommendation that payments should 
be made directly by the DoH rather than via PCTs. This would avoid the distortions to purchasing 
behaviour that currently appear to exist, as concerns raised by the NHSPN illustrate. 
 
The Market Forces Factor (MFF) is the biggest short-term threat to an effective fair market under Choice, and we 
believe that the mechanism for paying MFF should be changed as soon as possible. MFF was introduced to 
allow for regional variations in cost whilst discouraging PCTs from commissioning on price. Unfortunately, this is 
not working. PCTs pay or receive balancing payments at the end of the year which reflect the actual MFFs spent 
against plan, and as such PCTs know that procuring from a provider with a low MFF will save them money. 
Further, the exclusion of the independent sector from the centrally-administered mechanism, obliging PCTs to 
pay upfront, provides a powerful disincentive for commissioners to use independent sector providers. Paying the 
MFF to independent providers up front will at least damage cash flow and can result in PCTs not being 
compensated for the MFF payments made (if work done exceeds plan). We have already seen examples of 
PCTs refusing to commission independent providers if MFF is included in the price, and commissioning based on 
price.  
Source: (Kendall and NHS Partners Network, 2007a) 
 
Factor Recommendation 
Geographical differences 
in input prices ± Market 
Forces Factor 
Review the current basis for calculating MFF, taking into account its appropriateness 
to IS providers 
Make MFF payments to both NHS and IS providers, paid directly by DoH, after 
consideration of the locational constraints faced by IS providers 
5.5 Economies of scale and scope 
 
The development of treatment centres is predicated on the belief that they will be able to deliver care 
at lower unit cost than if it were provided in traditional hospital settings. In effect, a treatment centre 
can be thought of as analogous to a production line, where lower costs derive from two sources: 
 
 Economies of scale, whereby the unit cost of treatment falls as volume increases. These 
economies generally result from high fixed costs being spread over a larger activity base. 
 Specialisation (or diseconomies of scope), where it is cheaper to concentrate on providing a 
limited set of activities, rather than a diverse range of services 
 
But while it may be possible to transfer some activities from hospital settings to treatment centres, 
where they can be undertaken at lower unit cost, this may have adverse consequences on the costs 
of the activity that remains within hospitals. The sources of rising costs are the mirror image of those 
that drive lower costs in treatment centres: 
 
 Reduced capacity to exploit economies of scale, because the activity base in hospitals is 
reduced. 
 Reduced capacity to benefit from economies of scope, with less scope for subsidisation of 
complex, costly activities by routine µbread and butter¶ activities that have been transferred to 
treatment centres. 
 
A systematic review of papers published before 1996 found that economies of scale were fully 
exploited in acute hospitals with 100-200 beds, and that diseconomies were evident in hospitals with 
300-600 beds (Aletras, 1999). Despite this evidence, policy over the last ten years has been to 
encourage hospitals to merge, the consequence being that the average size of an NHS hospital has 
increased from 663 beds in 1994/5 to 770 beds in 2004/5. If the review findings still hold, this would 
imply hospitals are operating under diseconomies of scale.  
 
Measuring economies of scope in health care is challenging, partly because there are no precise 
definitions of specialties/departments and also because it is difficult to establish the nature of the 
linkages between them. Economies of scope arise when it is less costly to produce a range of 
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services in combination rather than in isolation. So, for instance, if a hospital has an accident & 
emergency department, it would be cheaper for it also to have a trauma & orthopaedics department, 
instead of sending A&E patients requiring such care elsewhere. But in health care, there may be 
gains from specialisation, particularly in terms of patient outcome (Ferguson et al., 1997).  
 
Of particular concern in the NHS is the mix between elective and emergency activity. Emergency 
activity is subject to a high degree of unpredictability on a daily basis. This means that, if emergency 
care is managed separately from other activities, facilities cannot be used at full capacity. For 
instance, Bagust et al estimate a substantial risk that there is no bed available for patient requiring 
emergency admission once bed occupancy rates exceed 85% (Bagust et al., 1999).  But joint 
management of emergency and elective cases allows economies of scope to be exploited because 
there is a reduced requirement to hold stand-by capacity. Instead capacity is freed-up by cancelling 
admissions for an elective patient on those days where there is excess pressure to admit an 
emergency patient. In effect, hospitals are able to hold less stand-by capacity because they transfer 
the risk of beds being unavailable to elective patients ± who may then remain on the waiting list for 
longer. However, NHS hospitals have been less able to employ this strategy because of the pressure 
to reduce waiting times. This has meant that, indeed, NHS hospitals have had to hold more stand-by 
capacity to deal with emergency cases than was the case in the past. 
 
There are three strategies to deal with the cost implications associated with economies of scale and 
scope: 
 
1. Differentiate the price according to setting. This has been adopted in the US, where 
procedures undertaken in TCs attract a considerably lower price than those performed in 
hospitals. 
2. Pay a higher tariff for emergency activity, to reflect the high costs associated with holding 
µVWDQG-E\¶FDSDFLW\ 
3. Use µtwo-part tariffs¶, consisting of a block payment plus a payment per unit of activity. Such 
payments have been devised to fund A&E departments, in recognition of their high fixed costs 
and volatile activity base. 
 
The first option has been adopted in the US, where different payments are made for treatment 
conducted in Ambulatory Surgical Centres (ASCs) ± which are analogous to treatment centres in 
England specialising in relatively few elective procedures ± than for treatment in acute hospitals: 
 
The history of US payments for hospitals, hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) 
and other inpatient and outpatient providers highlights the effects of payment system 
reforms on health care delivery.  Contrary to many expectations, when DRG 
payments to hospitals were first implemented by the Medicare program in 1983, they 
did more than just reduced hospital lengths of stay; the larger immediate effect was a 
shift in treatment settings from inpatient treatment (paid through DRGs) into 
outpatient settings ... Between 2004 and 2007, ASC payment levels were cut 
dramatically, in many cases by 50% to 75% relative to HOPD levels (Ellis and Vidal-
Fernández, 2007). 
 
Table 8 shows that the differential prices across settings can be substantial, despite being for 
ostensibly similar activities. Typically treatment in ASCs attracts payment that is around a tenth of that 
paid for treatment in hospital. It is unclear whether these differential payments are based solely on 
production costs.  
 
The drawback of introducing differential payments for the same treatment conducted in different 
settings is that it will undermine incentives to encourage providers to transfer care to the most cost-
effective setting. 
 
The second option of making differentiated payments for emergency and elective cases is already a 
feature of PbR. Moreover, if costs of emergency care increase as a consequence of having to hold 
more stand-by capacity available this will be reflected in the Reference Costs and in the future tariff.  
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Table 8: US Medicare payments for ten procedures in four settings, for 2008 in US$ 
HCPCS and Short Descriptor 
Acute Care 
Hospital Hospital Outpatient 
Ambulatory Surgery 
Center 
Physician's 
Office  
Payment classification system used MS-DRG  APG ASC RBRVS  
Payment is for: hospital only full fee full fee full fee 
 
54150 Circumcision    -                  $1,277                      $333                $136   
45378 Diagnostic colonoscopy    -                     543                      446                248   
37785 Ligate/divide/excise vein       
   (Varicose vein procedure)          $13,927                  1,513                      510                199   
28445 Treat ankle fracture           13,294                  2,312                      510   -   
42260 Repair nose to lip fistula        
   (Intermediate nose procedure)           6,892                  1,425                      630                382   
49500 Repair of inguinal hernia           8,338                  1,794                      630   -   
66985 Insert lens prosthesis             6,597                  1,451                      826   -   
   (extraction and insertion of lens)      
26531 Revise knuckle with implant          10,115                  2,903                      995   -   
66982 Cataract surgery, complex             6,597                  1,451                      973   -   
43653 Laparoscopy, gastrostomy         11,531                  2,678                   1,339   -   
Source: (Ellis and Vidal-Fernández, 2007). 
 
As regards the third option, two-part tariffs are being introduced for funding of A&E departments (and 
minor injuries units) in England. This funding arrangement is particularly suitable for services where 
capacity has to be held on stand-by to meet highly variable demand. In this context, two-part tariffs 
allow for better risk sharing between purchaser and provider.  Arrangements for A&E departments are 
based on a 80:20 fixed:variable funding model, in which a grant covers 80% of (fixed) costs and 20% 
of revenue is related to (variable) activity up to a planned level (Department of Health, 2007d). (In 
DFWXDOIDFWDµWKUHe-SDUWWDULII¶LVEHLQJDGRSWHGEHFDXVH for activity above the planned level the A&E 
department is paid the full A&E tariff.) 
  
This revenue function for A&E departments is illustrated below. Here FC represents the fixed grant, 
and &Ö A Ep is the national A&E tariff. Only 20% of the tariff is paid up to the level of planned activity Q , 
and  the full tariff is paid for activity beyond that planned. This means that the revenue function has a 
steeper slope beyond the planned level of activity. Consideration should be given to extending two-
part tariff arrangements to other services where stand-by capacity is required, so that access can be 
assured when needs arise. 
 
Number of Patients
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Figure 1: Revenue function for English A&E departments 
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Factor Recommendation 
Economies of scale and 
scope 
Continue with separate payments for emergency and elective patients 
Consider extending use of two-part tariffs 
 
5.6 NHS monopsony power ± access to cheaper inputs 
 
NHS providers benefit from being part of the larger NHS. This benefit is realised through various 
forms of collective action, of most relevance here being the ability to act as a monopsony purchaser of 
various inputs into the production process. A monopsony (single) purchaser is able to negotiate lower 
prices from suppliers than would be obtained by purchasers negotiating on an individual basis.  The 
principal areas of benefit are in the purchase of VHUYLFHV IURP DUP¶V OHQJWK ERGLHV (Department of 
Health, 2004): 
 
 insurance against clinical negligence claims, through the NHS Litigation Authority 
 supplies through the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA) 
 IT services through NHS Connecting for Health (CfH). 
 
5.6.1 NHS Litigation Authority 
 
NHS organisations make contributions to the NHS Litigation Authority for the Clinical Negligence 
Scheme for Trusts (CNST) which covers medical malpractice claims.  Equivalent coverage provided 
by CNST is estimated to be considerably less expensive than clinical negligence insurance from the 
private insurance sector: 
 
It has been estimated in the particular context of a comparison of clinical negligence 
insurance costs included in the IS-7&ELGVZLWK&167«WKDWWKHFRVWRISURYLGLQJVLPLODU
cover in the private sector would be approximately 16.7 times the cost of procuring this 
cover through CNST (taking into account run-off should the scheme be terminated).  The 
CNST study therefore implies that the Trusts, relative to private sector operators, are 
benefiting from an excess subsidy equivalent to approximately 15.720 times the CNST 
SD\PHQWVVWDWHGLQWKH7UXVW¶VDFFRXQWVDOWKRXJKLWLVUHFRJQLVHGWKDWWKLVHVWLPDWHZDV
based on a limited survey and that the results are likely to have been have been 
LQIOXHQFHGE\SULYDWHLQVXUHUV¶ODFNRIIDPLOLDULW\ZLWK1+6FOLnical negligence risk profiles 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b). 
 
Enrolment in the CNST is voluntary but all NHS trusts are currently members.  At present IS providers 
cannot join the scheme directly but contributions relating to their care of NHS patients are made on 
their behalf by the referring health authority (http://www.nhsla.com/Claims/Schemes/CNST/) 
(Department of Health, 2005a). The contributions are funded by the DoH to the PCT through D³dual 
tariff´ arrangement (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b). This ensures that the benefits of 
collective NHS action extend to IS providers and, hence, that a fair playing field exists.  
 
Looking ahead, provision has been made in the recent Health and Social Care Bill to extend eligibility 
for CNST to include non-NHS providers of NHS care (Department of Health, 2007a). Once 
implemented, this will ensure that IS providers are able to take advantage of this indemnity scheme (if 
they wish to) and will eliminate the administrative burden currently borne by PCTs in having to 
arrange indemnity on behalf of their contractors. 
 
5.6.2 NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency 
 
NHS PASA handles the procurement of national contracts for a range of supplies and services to 
NHS bodies including IT services and maintenance contracts, staffing and a range of medical and non 
medical supplies.  PwC estimates that collective purchasing yields cost savings to the NHS of 9.6%.  
Although IS providers may access NHS PASA services when treating NHS patients, it is unclear 
whether they are charged for this service (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).   
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Establishing a fair playing field for payment by results  31 
It is not apparent, however, that the ability to benefit from collective purchasing represents a 
competitive advantage that requires correction through payment arrangements. Indeed IS providers 
may themselves benefit indirectly from the bargaining power exerted by the NHS, if this reduces 
prices for the health sector as whole. Nor are IS providers precluded from joining forces to negotiate 
on a collective basis if they wish to do so. As such, we do not believe that the existence of the NHS 
PASA provides grounds for making compensating payments to IS providers.  
 
5.6.3 Connecting for Health: IM&T 
 
Launched in 2002, the NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT) aims to secure a fast, reliable IT 
infrastructure over a 10-year period.21  As well as improving patient safety,22 the programme seeks to 
support patient choice by allowing easy access to appointments systems and the introduction of 
electronic patient records (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  NHS Connecting for Health (CfH) 
was established in April 2005 as a single national IT provider for the NHS and is responsible for 
delivering NPfIT (NHS Connecting for Health, 2005).   
 
CfH is responsible for substantial levels of central expenditure on the programme, including the costs 
of contracting, paying for centrally managed projects and providing new computer systems for NHS 
organisations (National Audit Office, 2006).  Local NHS organisations are responsible for 
implementation costs of NPfIT, but the magnitude of this cost is unknown because CfH does not 
systematically monitor local IT spending (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007).  
In contrast, ,6SURYLGHUVRI1+6VHUYLFHVDUH³ERWKUHTXLUHGDQGDXWKRULVHGWR link with core NHS CfH 
systems´23 at their own expense.  For example, under Phase 2 IS Providers must fully integrate their 
systems with those of the NHS and must be capable of fully supporting Choose and Book (the NHS 
on-line Booking System) (Department of Health and Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 
2007).  7KH 'R+ UXOHV JRYHUQLQJ WKH (&1 VWDWH WKDW ³WKH 3URYLGHU VKDOO DW LWs own cost, be solely 
responsible for implementing and maintaining up to date the IM&T Services«and ensuring that the 
,0	7 6HUYLFHV DUH SURYLGHG LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH VWDQGDUGV VSHFLILHG´ (Department of Health, 
2006f).  This includes cost of compliance with changes to NHS technical or data standards such as 
those issued by the Information Standards Board, Data Set Changes Notices and new NPfIT 
compliance requirements (Department of Health, 2006f). By subsidising NHS but not IS providers, the 
&I+SURJUDPPHFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDIRUPRIµVWDWHDLG¶WKDWPD\QRWEHFRPSHWLWLYHO\QHXWUDO(CBI and 
Serco Institute, 2006).  
 
Existing ISTC contracts require full integration with NHS IM&T systems (Department of Health and 
Central Clinical Procurement Programme team, 2007) and therefore IS providers have accepted the 
cost of this responsibility as a condition for market entry, perhaps compensated partly through the 
participation premium paid to Wave 1 ISTCs. This would suggest that no retrospective adjustment 
need be made.  
 
However, if future large-scale IT programmes are introduced then competition law requires that NHS 
and IS providers are subsidised on an equivalent basis. If so, then there are three potential options for 
achieving neutrality (Department of Health, Unpublished):  
 
1. Provide infrastructure to make the same IM&T available to IS providers  
2. Calculate costs incurred by the IS in providing the same information and reflect this in the 
tariff 
3. &KDUJHSXEOLFVHFWRUERGLHVDµFRVWQHXWUDOLW\FKDUJH¶ WRUHIOHFWWKHEHQHILWGHULYHGIURP
accessing this information  
 
If future large-scale initiatives similar to NPfIT were to be initiated after 2008, it could therefore be 
argued that IS providers should then be reimbursed for the IT infrastructure costs (where these relate 
to care of NHS patients) (Option 1).   
 
Option 2 involves adjusting the tariff paid to IS providers to reflect the additional costs of developing 
IM&T.  These costs would vary by provider, so an increment to tariff would, at best, compensate 
                                                 
21
 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Policyandguidance/Informationpolicy/NationalITprogramme/index.htm, accessed 13/09/07 
22
 http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/, accessed 13/09/07 
23
 http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/implementation/docs/implementation_guide_appendices.pdf, 
accessed 13/09/07 
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providers incurring average IT costs.  The differential tariff would also contravene stated policy 
objectives, in particular the aim that patient choice is based on quality and not cost considerations.   
 
Option 3, charging NHS providers for accessing information, would help to level the playing field by 
reflecting the subsidy received.  The administrative costs of implementing such a policy would need to 
EHFRQVLGHUHG WKH µSD\HU¶ RI GDWDVKDUHGEHWZHHQSULPDU\DQGVHFRQGDU\FDUH LQWHrfaces clarified, 
WKH SURSRUWLRQ RI FRVW DWWULEXWDEOH WR µFRQWHVWDEOH¶ VHUYLFHV24 identified and the risk of unintended 
FRQVHTXHQFHV WDNHQ LQWR DFFRXQW  $Q DOWHUQDWLYH HTXLYDOHQW DSSURDFK ZRXOG EH WR µWRS-VOLFH¶ 1+6
provider budgets by an amount equal to the subsidy received for contestable services. 
  
5.6.4 Other Arms Length Bodies 
 
In their study, PwC identified a subset of 16 Arms Length Bodies (excluding the Litigation Authority 
and PASA) that were thought WR LPSDFW 1+6 RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ RSHUDWLQJ FRVWV 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b).  PwC state that these ALBs represent a subsidy to each 
NHS organisation. To calculate the size of this subsidy, total operating costs of these ALBs were 
weighted by the number of employees within each NHS body (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b) 
(Table 9).  Total subsidies ± including those from ALBs ± were then presented as a mark up relative 
WRWKH1+67UXVW¶VFRVWEDVHLELG7DEOH2QDYHUDJHWKHmark up ranged from 7% to 15%.  
 
However, we cannot determine on what grounds the existence of the identified ALBs can be 
considered to impact on the operations of NHS providers. Nor is it apparent whether dealings with 
ALBs represent a subsidy or administrative burden to NHS organisations.  As such, we do not believe 
that any corrections to PbR payments need to be made because of the existence of ALBs. 
 
Factor Recommendation 
Access to cheaper inputs NHS LA: resolved once current Health and Social Bill enacted  
NHS PASA: no adjustment 
NHS CfH: no retrospective compensation but harmonise arrangements across NHS 
and IS for future IT programmes 
ALBs: no adjustment 
 
5.7 Production of other outputs/services: R&D, teaching and training 
 
Hospitals produce services in addition to their patient-related activities.  The three main outputs are: 
 
1. research & development; 
2. teaching (training for qualification); 
3. training (continuing professional development). 
 
5.7.1 Research & development 
 
The national R&D budget is approximately £1bn per year.  In addition to a share of this funding, 
Foundation Trusts may also receive grants from State funded Research Councils, such as MRC; or 
from PCTs; or from medical schools (Department of Health, Unpublished).  ISTCs currently receive no 
central R&D funding ± because they do not undertake R&D.  There is no reason why encouragement 
should not be given to IS providers to bid for R&D contracts. 
 
5.7.2 Teaching (training for qualification) 
 
The burden of teaching (i.e. training necessary for qualification) is currently borne by the NHS, and 
funded centrally by the DoH.  The Multi-Professional Education and Training (MPET) fund is worth 
approximately £3.4bn annually.  As many newly qualified professionals move into the private sector, 
centrally-funded teaching costs could therefore be considered a ³subsidisation by the State of the 
costs of private healthcare providers´ (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b)(page 43).  In ISTCs, 
this effect may be diminished if there is a high proportion of overseas staff.  
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 µ&RQWHVWDEOHVHUYLFHV¶DUHWhose provided by the NHS that are open to contestability or in competition with IS provision (such 
DVVHUYLFHVSURYLGHGXQGHUµ&KRRVHDQG%RRN¶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ISTCs were considered to present ideal training grounds for junior doctors, providing experience of 
straightforward elective case-loads (Healthcare Commission, 2007a, Department of Health, 2006b).  
Although Wave 1 ISTCs were not contractually obliged to train staff, the DoH did establish training 
contracts with a small number of ISTCs (Barron et al., 2006a, Healthcare Commission, 2007a).  
ISTCs in Phase 2 (which are expected to be operational in 200825) will be required to provide clinical 
WUDLQLQJ³DQGDPD[LPXPRIRIDQ,67&¶VWRWDODFWLYLW\PXVWEHRIIHUHGIRU WUDLQLQJ´(Healthcare 
Commission, 2007a).  It appears that the cost of this training is to be funded from the tariff (Barron et 
al., 2006a)(page 217).  Nonetheless, bidders are required to account for the costs of teaching when 
estimating bid price: 
 
Bidders should price their Bids on the assumption that the training of NHS staff within the 
ISTC is >VLF@QRWEHUHTXLUHG6FHQDULR$%LGGHUVDUHKRZHYHUUHTXLUHGWRLQGLFDWH«
the pricing implications if training were to be required at a future date (Scenario B).  The 
implications of the provision of training should be reflected as a percentage mark-up to 
be applied to Unit Prices at the HRG level (Department of Health and Central Clinical 
Procurement Programme team, 2006)(Annex 1).  
 
This requirement suggests that training should be incorporated into the HRG price, despite teaching 
costs not being included in the NHS tariff (Department of Health, 2005a). We do not agree: the costs 
of teaching should be identified and funded separately to the costs of patient-related care because 
education represents a distinct form of output. 
 
5.7.3 Training 
 
In contrast, training for professional development is funded locally (by the provider) in both NHS and 
IS organisations.  As the tariff is based on average NHS reference costs, training costs are likely to be 
reflected in the tariff.  However, cross subsidisation between centrally-provided funds for teaching and 
local training expenditure may arise, which would mean that the tariff does not reflect full training 
costs (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2005b). 
  
 
5.7.4 Implications for Payment by Results 
 
We do not believe that the costs of teaching, training or R&D should be incorporated in the form of an 
adjustment to tariff.  Under PbR, the tariff reflects payment for the provision of care to particular types 
of patient.  R&D, teaching and training are different types of output, which need to be funded 
separately and transparently.  
 
Access to these funding streams need not be restricted to NHS providers. In the same way that 
efforts have been made to encourage IS providers to undertake more training for qualification, there 
may be opportunities to access to R&D funding.  The nature of ISTC business, where case-mix and 
service scope are more focussed than those of NHS Trusts, potentially offers suitable settings for 
clinical research (e.g. trials of a new artificial hip joint or of a new cataract lens). 
 
There may also be cross-subsidisation between patient-related activities and the provision of R&D 
and training. However, this is best dealt with by ensuring that R&D, teaching and training is fully-
funded and spending is audited properly.  It should not be the role of an activity-based funding regime 
to correct for inadequacies in funding arrangements for other services. 
 
Factor Recommendation 
Provision of other outputs Ensure transparent, separate and full funding of R&D, teaching and training services 
 
                                                 
25
 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/Browsable/DH_5699684, 
accessed 03/09/07 
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6. Differences in casemix 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Under a system of fixed price reimbursement such as PbR, it may be profitable for hospitals to 
engage in patient selection. This involves identifying and favouring those patients who are likely to 
cost less to treat than the amount the hospital will be reimbursed. There is substantial evidence that 
hospitals in the United States engaged in patient selection in response to the introduction of the 
prospective payment system for Medicare patients (Ellis, 1998).  More recent research suggest that, 
although this problem persists, it can be remedied by adjustments to the payment system (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, 2005, Cromwell et al., 2005, United States General Accounting 
Office, 2003a, United States General Accounting Office, 2003b).  
 
The ability of hospitals to engage in patient selection can be ameliorated in various ways: 
 
 By forcing hospitals to accept µall comers¶. In the US, hospitals can exercise discretion about 
who they accept for treatment. In England, NHS hospitals are not able to exercise such 
discretion. 
 By ensuring limited heterogeneity in costs within each payment category (Healthcare 
Resource Group). This might involve expanding the number of HRGs. 
 
Although NHS hospitals cannot engage in patient selection, IS and NHS treatment centres 
organisations may be able to do so.  This may be because treatment centres may have more 
GLVFUHWLRQ LQVHOHFWLQJSDWLHQWVZLWK ORZHUH[SHFWHGFRVWV DSUDFWLFHNQRZQDV µFUHDP-VNLPPLQJ¶RU
µFKHUU\SLFNLQJ¶DQGLQGHFOLQLQJWUHDWPHQWWRSDWLHQWVZLWKKLJKH[SHFWHGFRVWVNQRZQDVµGXPSLQJ¶
If treatment centres engage in such practices, their patients would have costs that tend to be lower 
than average of all patients categorised to the same HRG.  
 
In this section we first consider the extent to which explicit exclusion criteria have been adopted by IS 
providers.  Then we undertake empirical analysis of HES data to identify differences in patients in 
specific HRGs across IS providers, NHS treatment centres and NHS hospitals. 
 
6.2 Exclusion criteria 
 
Exclusion criteria are a good example of direct selection by IS providers (Table 9). Selection occurs 
across several dimensions, such as age, risk of further complications, and self-care indicators (e.g. 
body index), and are mostly focused on the avoidance of costly or risky patients, i.e., patients with 
actual or potential high severity or suffering from multiple severe diagnoses.  It may be that NHS 
treatment centres also apply exclusion criteria, and, if so, these criteria should be made transparent.  
 
These exclusion criteria are provider-specific and generally determined locally.  These criteria specify 
a list of circumstances under which a provider may refuse a referral.  Although administrative errors 
and/or inaccuracies such as inappropriate referrals are included in the lists of exclusion criteria, others 
enable providers to refuse patients on the basis of medical characteristics.  The rationale for some 
criteria is clear (e.g. provision of MRI to patients with a cardiac pacemaker or metallic implants), but 
the rationale for other criteria, such as the exclusion of patients with a history of myocardial infarction 
within the previous 6 months, is less obvious.  These latter criteria can be, as before, grouped using 
the typology described above and mostly comprise the ability to refuse referrals of, generally, high-
risk and/or high-cost patients but also to refuse to supply specific types of treatment.  It is arguable 
ZKHWKHU WKLV LV HYLGHQFH RI µFUHDP VNLPPLQJ¶ RU ZKHWKHU LV LW Jood clinical practice that reflects 
provider capability.  Whatever the motivation, the result is that ISTC case mix provision for a given 
procedure is likely to be less severe than the case mix for the NHS. 
 
The HRG system is unable (and probably never will be able) to finely differentiate between the types 
of patient treated in each setting. The release of version 4 HRGs may address this problem at least 
partially.  If it not possible to refine HRGs sufficiently, there are two ways that differences in casemix 
might be dealt with: 
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1. Set an across-the-board lower tariff for activity conducted in treatment centres (whether these 
be NHS or IS TCs) than the tariff for activity conducted in the inpatient setting. 
2. Allow the lower price to be provider-specific, varying to the extent to which exclusion criteria 
are adopted. 
 
We recommend option 2, because this more closely aligns incentives (price) with behaviour (the 
decision to adopt particular exclusion criteria). Note that, if exclusion criteria are also in place for NHS 
TCs, similar pricing arrangements to those applying to ISTCs should be adopted. 
 
Factor Recommendation 
Exclusion criteria Price adjustment to HRG-tariff to reflect direct selection of less costly patients.  
Regular review of the HRG system may be desirable. Any exclusion criteria 
operated by NHS TCs should be made transparent. 
 
 
6.3 Empirical analysis of HES data  
 
In this section we consider whether IS providers treat less complex patients within any given HRG 
than NHS providers. If so, there is an argument that HRG-tariff payments should be adjusted 
downwards for IS providers so that equal payments are made for equivalent work. 
 
Our analysis uses Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for 2005/6 and 2006/7. HES comprise individual 
patient records ± defined as a Finished Consultant Episode (FCE) ± about every NHS patient treated 
as a day case or inpatient in England. We analyse first FCEs these being the first episodes in a spell. 
A spell may encompass multiple FCEs if the patient has been under the care of more than one 
consultant during their hospital stay. For the treatments we consider it is very rare for there to be 
multiple episodes in the spell, so first FCEs and spells are, to all intents, equivalent. Each patient 
record includes a number of data µILHOGV¶ FRQWDLQLQJ GHPRJUDSKLF HJ DJH JHQGHU DQG FOLQLFDO
information (e.g. diagnosis, procedures performed). All NHS trusts routinely provide HES data for 
every inpatient and day case patient they treat. 
 
IS providers are contractually obliged to submit HES data for the NHS patients they treat. Despite this 
obligation, the HES data provided by IS providers may be of lower quality than NHS data, primarily 
because of IS provider inexperience in providing data in this format. Lower data quality may take two 
forms. First, IS providers may fail to make HES returns for all the NHS patients they treat. Therefore, 
HES undercounts the activity that has been undertaken by IS providers. Second, for those patients 
that are included in HES, the data provided by IS providers may not be completely accurate, perhaps 
because some fields are poorly coded. 
 
In view of the possibility of lower quality data, instead of simply comparing NHS patients with IS 
patients, we make three sets of comparisons: 
 
 between patients treated in IS providers and NHS hospitals, where it is expected that both 
casemix and coding practice will differ, making it difficult to establish the primary reason for 
observed differences; 
 between patients treated in IS providers and NHS treatment centres, where it is expected that 
casemix will be similar; 
 between patients treated in NHS treatment centres and NHS hospitals, where coding is 
expected to be similar, but casemix is likely to differ. 
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Table 9: Exclusion criteria applied by ISTC providers 
Type of 
contract / 
service 
agreement 
Social issues Clinical issues, 
physical health 
Clinical issues, 
mental health 
Demographic 
issues 
Administrative / 
other 
Scope of care 
pathway 
Notes 
Independent 
sector treatment 
centre (ISTC) 
contracts  
 Lack of 
necessary social 
support, e.g. no 
carer /escort 
available at 
discharge 
 Patient does 
not have 24-hr 
telephone 
access 
 Previous DNA  
 Patients 
detained by HM 
Prison service 
 ASA score 
 Obesity 
 Concomitant 
medications / 
interventions 
 Dyskinesia 
 Unstable disease  
 MRSA 
 Recent MI 
 Previous 
anaesthetic 
problems 
 Risk (perceived / 
actual) of patient 
violence 
 Known drug / 
alcohol dependency 
 Psychiatric illness 
/ dementia / 
learning difficulties 
 Age   Patient data 
incomplete / 
inaccurate  
 Referral involves 
exceeding Annual 
Take or Quarterly 
Capacity Limit Value 
 Patient has failed to 
provide necessary 
consents to allow IS 
contact with NHS 
Parties 
 Treatment outside 
scope of service  
 GP /specialist 
assessment 
indicated 
 Unsuitable for day 
case 
 Likely to need ITU 
facilities 
 Urgent / 2-week 
cancer wait 
 Trauma-related 
injuries 
 Contracts are locally 
negotiated and vary 
widely 
 Large numbers of 
clinical conditions 
cited as exclusions 
 As data are 
confidential, key 
issues reported and 
selected examples 
given 
Extended choice 
network (ECN) 
 
 Patients with 
incapacitating 
disease that is a 
constant threat to 
life. 
 Patients with ASA 
score=3 (unless 
suitable intensive 
care facilities 
available) 
 Patients with ASA 
score>3 
 Patients who have 
an unstable mental 
condition and are 
receiving 
psychiatric 
treatment 
 Patients under 
18 years of age 
 
 no clinically 
urgent procedures 
 no services 
relating to 
maternity care, 
termination of 
pregnancy or 
cosmetic surgery 
 IVF treatment 
outside HFEA/ 
local guidelines  
 Service level criteria 
for all ECN partners, 
covering Procedure 
Exclusion Group and 
Patient Exclusion 
Group. 
Notes: ASA: American Society of Anaesthesiologists physical status grade (see below); BMI: body mass index; ITU: intensive therapy unit; DNA: did not attend 
Sources: (Department of Health, Unpublished, Department of Health, 2006f) 
ASA 1: Healthy patient. Localised surgical pathology with no systemic disturbance; ASA 2: Mild / moderate systemic disturbance (surgical pathology or other disease process); ASA 3: Severe 
systemic disturbance from any cause; ASA 4: Life threatening systemic disorder. Severe activity limitation; ASA 5: Moribund patient with little chance of survival. 
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Table 10: summary of comparisons made in the quantitative analysis  
Comparison Casemix Coding  
IS and NHS hospitals Differs Differs Not possible to disentangle casemix and 
coding effects 
IS and NHS TCs Same Differs Differences due to coding 
NHS TCs and NHS hospitals Differs Same Differences due to casemix 
 
Table 10 summarises the comparisons made to discern whether observed differences in HRG activity 
can be explained by casemix or coding differences. If we observe less complex casemix in NHS TCs 
compared to NHS hospitals, and can assume that IS providers and NHS TCs treat a similar casemix, 
this would imply that a higher HRG payment should be made for patients treated in NHS hospitals 
than in the other settings.  
 
6.3.1 Methodology 
 
Our approach takes three steps: 
 
1. Identify NHS TCs and IS providers.  
2. Identify a subset of HRGs that accounts for the top 30 by volume of elective activity within 
NHS and IS treatment centres.  
3. For each high volume HRG, compare indicators of within-HRG complexity for treatment 
centres and other hospitals.  
 
7KH+(6ILHOGµSURW\SH¶LGHQWLILHVWKHW\SHRISURYLGHUHJ1+6KRVSLWDO1+67&,6SURYLGHUIRUHDFK
FCE.  We suspect this field may not always be accurately coded, underestimating the amount of 
activity at IS providers and NHS TCs.  We supplement the identification of IS and NHS TC sites with 
information from the National Administrative Codes Service (NACS) and a survey of SHAs asking for 
the names and locations of all the IS providers and NHS TCs in their area (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Summary of data sources used to identify IS and NHS treatment centres 
Data source Description IS TCs NHS TCs 
HES (1) Healthcare provider type 
± protype 
protype= INDSITETC 
or IS 
protype= TRUSTSITETC 
National Administrative 
Codes Service (2) 
Lists of NHS and IS 
providers 
file: ephpsite.csv  NACS 
codes starting with N 
file: ts.csv NACS codes 
starting with R, ending in 
7&RUZLWK³7UHDWPent 
&HQWUH´LQQDPH 
Survey of SHAs List of provider names 
and locations 
  
(1) http://www.hesonline.org.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentServer?siteID=1937&categoryID=87 
(2) http://www.nhs.uk/nacs/data.aspx 
 
In the case of disagreement between the identification criteria, the IS identifier dominates. Thus, for 
H[DPSOH³ST MARY'S NHS TREATMENT CENTRE´LVFRQVLGHUHGDQ,6 provider because its NACS 
SURYLGHU FRGH LV ³17´ 7KH SURW\SH IRU  SDWLHQWV WUHDWHG DW WKH ³.,''(50,167(5
75($70(17&(175(5:37&´WDNHVDYDOXHRI³758676,7(7&´VRWKHVHSDWLHQWVDUHFRQVLGHUHG
to have been treated at an NHS TC. However, for 1,749 patients treated at this provider, the protype 
ILHOGWDNHVDYDOXHRI³,1'6,7(7&RU ,6´VRWKis sub-sample of patients is considered to have been 
treated at an IS facility.  
 
Applying these identification criteria, we identified 103 IS providers and 11 NHS treatment centres in 
2005/6; and 71 IS providers and 12 NHS treatment centres in 2006/7 where HES records at least one 
patient as having been treated. Many of these IS providers report low volumes of activity ± in 2005/6, 
77 IS providers report fewer than 200 FCEs and 38 report fewer than 30 FCEs. Volumes increased in 
2006/7 but, even then, 38 IS providers report fewer than 200 FCEs and 19 report fewer than 30 
FCEs. 
 
High volume HRGs were identified by combining activity data for both NHS treatment centres and IS 
providers, and then ranking these by combined volume. The characteristics of all elective patients 
categorised in these high volume HRGs were then compared according to the setting in which their 
treatment took place: whether it was in an NHS hospital, NHS TC or IS provider. 
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Our indicators of complexity are age; waiting time; day case rates; length of stay; number of 
diagnoses; number of operations; and deprivation (the latter for 2006/7 only). The interpretation of 
these indicators is provided in the Table 12 below. Age, number of diagnoses, number of procedures 
and deprivation are likely to be better indicators than the others, for which interpretation is less 
straightforward. Statistical comparisons are judged at p<0.01, given that multiple comparisons are 
being performed. 
 
Table 12: Indicators of complexity used in the analysis 
Indicator Interpretation 
Age Older patients likely to have above average care requirements 
Waiting time Patients with longer waiting times may be in worse health state than average when finally 
admitted.  Alternatively, these patients may have been in relatively better health and so 
been accorded a lower clinical priority.  
Length of stay Lower length of stay may indicate lower complexity; or it may be a marker for greater 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOHIILFLHQF\ LWPD\DOVR VXJJHVW LQDSSURSULDWHO\HDUO\GLVFKDUJH WKH ³TXLFNHU
DQGVLFNHU´DUJXPHQW 
Day case As with Length of Stay, treatment on a day case basis may indicate lower complexity or it 
may be a marker for greater organisational efficiency (perhaps achieved by specific 
exclusion criteria).  
Diagnoses Patients with a higher number of diagnoses are likely to have above average care 
requirements 
Procedures Patients undergoing more procedures are likely to have more complicated conditions and 
above average post-surgical care requirements 
Deprivation Patients from areas with higher income deprivation may have above average care 
requirements and it may be more difficult to arrange timely discharge  
 
Results are presented using Forest plots which are commonly used in meta-analysis to compare 
results across different clinical trials. In this case, rather than clinical trials, our comparisons are 
across different HRGs. For each outcome of interest, the figures plot the weighted mean difference 
(represented as a square) and 99% confidence interval (horizontal line through each square) in the 
characteristics of patients treated in alternative settings. Confidence intervals are calculated assuming 
WKDWSDWLHQWVDUHD UDQGRPVDPSOH IURPDQXQGHUO\LQJSRSXODWLRQ:HDOVR UHSRUW D µSRROHGHIIHFW¶
which provides an indication of the weighted mean difference in the outcome of interest across all 
HRGs. Each figure also reports the mean and confidence interval values.  
 
6.3.2 Results 
 
Table 13 shows the number of elective FCEs undertaken in each setting. In 2006/7, 80,000 FCEs 
were performed by NHS TCs and almost 66,000 by IS providers. Our process for identifying IS 
providers in HES allowed us to capture more IS activity than had been achieved by the Healthcare 
Commission in their examination of ISTCs, as reported in the final row of the table (Healthcare 
Commission, 2007a). 
 
Table 13: Number of elective FCEs and proportion of uncoded data 
provider type 2005/6 2006/7 
 FCEs % U codes No 
providers 
FCEs % U codes No 
providers 
NHS hospitals 6,777,767 0.8  6,715,113 1.5  
NHS TCs 60,633 2.8 11 80,017 1.8 12 
IS Providers 31,021 68.0 103 65,835 59.2 71 
IS Providers HCC study 20,670 79.0  44,830 
(Q1-Q3 only) 
59.0  
Note: FCEs are the first episodes of a spell. 
 
As expected, we found coding of HES fields by IS providers to be poor. A large proportion of activity is 
assigned to an unclassified Healthcare Resource Group (U code), the primary reason being that the 
SDWLHQW¶VGLDJQRVLV LVQRW UHFRUGHG  ,6SURYLGHUVKDYH LPSURYHG WKHLUFRGLQJRYHU WLPHEXt even in 
2006/7, 59% of FCEs were not assigned to a specific HRG. The Healthcare Commission reports a 
similar percentage of unclassified activity (Healthcare Commission, 2007a). Activity that is 
unclassified to a HRG is excluded from further analysis, which means that findings using 2006/7 data 
are based on just 41% of IS activity reported in HES. 
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Poor coding is not ubiquitous across all IS providers. Some providers have all of their activity 
classified to U codes and others achieve similar levels of coding to NHS providers. For instance, only 
1.0% of FCEs at Shepton Mallet Treatment Centre (NTC01) are unclassified, compared to 94.4% of 
those treated at the Greater Manchester Surgical Centre (NT7). For a number of providers, all of their 
activity is unclassified to a HRG. Figure 2 shows coding performance of IS providers who are ranked 
as the top 25 by volume of activity.  
 
 
NACS Organisation Name NACS/HES 
site code Volume % of U-Codes 
Shepton Mallet NHS Treatment Centre NTC01 10031 1.0 
Greater Manchester Surgical Centre NT714 5654 94.4 
Barlborough NHS Treatment Centre NT502 4098 100.0 
The Midlands NHS Treatment Centre NTA03 3922 100.0 
Eccleshill NHS Treatment Centre NTA01 3243 55.8 
Peninsula NHS Treatment Centre NT501 3201 100.0 
 NT331 3150 4.6 
Bodmin NHS Treatment Centre NT825 2766 99.9 
 ECC* 2523 100.0 
Mid Kent NHS Treatment Centre NT503 2310 100.0 
St Mary'S NHS Treatment Centre NT603 2286 0.0 
Nations Healthcare (Northampton) Ltd NTA02 2062 86.9 
Kidderminster Treatment Centre RWPTC* 1749 0.2 
Clifton Park NHS Treatment Centre NT829 1564 100.0 
Cobalt NHS Treatment Centre NT830 1408 99.9 
Capio New Hall Hospital NHS Treatment Centre NT808 1402 96.0 
Will Adams NHS Treatment Centre NT602 1271 0.0 
Blakelands NHS Treatment Centre NT832 1240 100.0 
Capio Reading Hospital NHS Treatment Centre NT802 1146 99.9 
Boston NHS Treatment Centre NT828 1126 100.0 
Sussex Orthopaedic NHS Treatment Centre NT604 936 0.4 
Preston Business Centre - Sharoe Green NT718 915 0.0 
Gainsborough NHS Treatment Centre NT827 806 100.0 
North East London NHS Treatment Centre NT506 777 100.0 
Horton NHS Treatment Centre NT826 672 99.7 
*Patients treated at two providers are included despite their not having an 'N' site code. This is because, for these 
patients, the 'protype' field indicated 'IS' or 'ISTC' 
 
Figure 2: HES coding accuracy by IS provider (2006/7)  
 
 
Table 14 shows the thirty HRGs that account for the largest volumes of activity across NHS treatment 
centres and IS providers in 2005/6 and 2006/7. As would be expected, most HRGs in the µtop 30¶ in 
2005/6 also appear in the list for 2006/7. For some HRGs, there are relatively low volumes of activity 
in either NHS TCs or IS TCs. Where this is the case, the small sample size means that it will not be 
possible to reliably identify differences between providers in the types of patients treated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40   CHE Research Paper 39 
 
 
Table 147KHµWRS¶+5*VWKDWDFFRXQWIRUWKHODUJHVWYROXPHVRIDFWLYLW\LQWUHDWPHQWcentres 
NHS 
hospitals NHS TCs IS TCs
NHS 
hospitals NHS TCs IS TCs
A07 Intermediate Pain Procedures 106,572      2,217        34             109,821    2,727        20             
B13 Phakoemulsification Cataract Extraction and Insertion of Lens 269,488      2,317        127           254,523    2,503        976           
B15 Other Lens Surgery Low Complexity 14,991      7               5,728        
C22 Intermediate Nose Procedures 29,875        267           271           
C55 Minor Ear Procedures 45,443      725           42             
C58 Intermediate Mouth or Throat Procedures 256,490      1,708        547           247,937    2,909        427           
E14 Cardiac Catheterisation and Angiography without complications 100,743      467           66             98,511      483           472           
F06 Diagnostic Procedures, Oesophagus and Stomach 322,106      4,381        676           332,149    6,768        1,636        
F35 Large Intestine - Endoscopic or Intermediate Procedures 281,304      4,000        370           306,553    6,084        1,454        
F54 Inflammatory Bowel Disease - Endoscopic or Int Procs <70 w/o cc 41,907        725           50             45,354      1,032        109           
F73 Inguinal Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs >69 or w cc 24,101        513           95             23,492      576           298           
F74 Inguinal Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs <70 w/o cc 56,510        1,277        323           53,270      1,526        1,073        
F93 Anus - Intermediate Procedures <70 w/o cc 18,965        404           125           18,340      532           196           
F95 Anus - Minor Procedures <70 w/o cc 19,756        394           110           
G14 Cholecystectomy <70 w/o cc 32,177        567           160           32,723      555           311           
H04 Primary Knee Replacement 51,390        2,846        542           51,351      2,577        892           
H10 Arthroscopies 109,535      4,626        494           104,077    4,861        1,623        
H12 Foot Procedures - Category 2 20,005        731           151           19,200      706           499           
H13 Hand Procedures - Category 1 59,274        2,212        360           53,546      2,508        1,168        
H14 Hand Procedures - Category 2 15,885        434           133           
H17 Soft Tissue or Other Bone Procedures - Category 1 <70 w/o cc 34,755        993           120           34,473      1,148        503           
H22 Minor Procedures to the Musculoskeletal System 48,879        1,070        15             50,114      1,868        209           
H80 Primary Hip Replacement Cemented 31,677        1,337        345           29,917      1,046        774           
H81 Primary Hip Replacement Uncemented 10,080        741           86             12,366      959           97             
J37 Minor Skin Procedures - Category 1 w/o cc 176,849      2,320        348           159,382    3,054        1,641        
L19 Bladder Intermediate Endoscopic Procedure w/o cc 24,768        508           23             
L20 Bladder Minor Endoscopic Procedure w cc 50,113        594           53             57,288      928           2               
L21 Bladder Minor Endoscopic Procedure w/o cc 202,279      3,372        439           193,612    4,022        130           
L39 Penis Minor Open Procedure <70 w/o cc 28,048        516           48             26,542      670           61             
L48 Renal Replacement Therapy w/o cc 676,267    2,021        
M05 Upper Genital Tract Minor Procedures 112,825      1,709        66             105,657    2,155        106           
M06 Upper Genital Tract Intermediate Procedures 75,131        1,003        35             67,696      1,089        27             
Q11 Varicose Vein Procedures 35,448        916           46             32,582      828           17             
2005/06 2006/07
 
 
Figures 3 to 41 (see Appendix) show the comparisons for each indicator of casemix complexity 
across settings for each HRG for 2005/6 and 2006/7.  As a guide to interpretation, consider 
comparisons of the age of patients treated in NHS hospitals and NHS TCs (Figure 3). For HRG A07 
(Intermediate pain procedures), patients treated in NHS TCs were 3.2 years older than those treated 
in NHS hospitals (actual mean 58.3 years compared to 55.1 years). This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level ± the confidence interval does not overlap zero. This is true for the majority 
of HRGs in this figure, implying that NHS TCs are treating an older population than NHS hospitals.  
 
As a summary of the analyses, those HRGs for which there are statistically significant differences 
between types of providers are identified for each indicator of casemix complexity (Table 15).   
 
Table 15: Summary of main direction of findings across HRGs 
 2005/6 2006/7 
Age NHS TC > NHS hosp 
NHS TC > IS Prov 
NHS TC > NHS hosp 
Waiting time IS Prov > NHS hosp 
IS Prov > NHS TC 
No overall differences 
Length of stay NHS hosp > NHS TC  
NHS hosp > IS Prov  
NHS hosp > NHS TC  
NHS hosp > IS Prov 
IS Prov > NHS TC 
Day case NHS TC > NHS hosp 
NHS TC > IS Prov 
NHS TC > NHS hosp 
IS Prov > NHS hosp 
NHS TC > IS Prov 
Diagnoses NHS hosp > NHS TC  
NHS hosp > IS Prov  
NHS hosp > IS Prov  
NHS TC > IS Prov 
Procedures No overall differences NHS hosp > IS Prov 
NHS TC > IS Prov 
Income deprivation n/a NHS hosp > NHS TC 
NHS hosp > IS Prov 
NHS TC > IS Prov 
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Our analysis suggests the following overall results: 
 
1. Age. Patients treated at NHS TCs tend to be older than those treated at NHS hospitals or IS 
providers. Although this difference is statistically significant, the magnitude of the difference is 
small and its clinical importance is unclear.  The overall difference between NHS TCs and IS 
providers was no longer significant in 2006/7. 
2. Waiting time. In 2005/6, patients treated in IS providers generally experienced longer waiting 
times prior to admission than patients admitted to NHS hospitals and NHS TCs. This is 
unsurprising given that a major rationale for IS involvement was to reduce waiting times. By 
2006/7, overall differences in waiting times between providers had decreased and were no 
longer significant.  
3. Length of stay. As would be expected, patients at both NHS TCs and IS providers tend to 
have a shorter length of stay than those treated at NHS hospitals.  
4. Day case rates. By design, more activity in TCs is conducted on a day case basis than it is in 
NHS hospitals, as the data demonstrate. Overall, NHS TCs tend to treat a higher proportion 
of patients on a day case basis than do IS providers. 
5. Number of diagnoses. In 2005/6, patients at NHS TCs and IS providers had fewer 
diagnoses recorded than those treated at NHS hospitals. By 2006/7, the difference between 
NHS hospitals and NHS TCs was no longer significant. However, more diagnoses were 
recorded in NHS hospital and NHS TCs than IS providers. These observed differences may 
reflect either poor coding of diagnoses or patient selection by IS providers. 
6. Number of procedures. Although there are significant differences for particular HRGs, in 
2005/6 there was no discernible overall difference in the number of procedures recorded 
across different provider settings. In 2006/7, patients treated by IS providers were recorded 
as having fewer procedures than those treated in the NHS, which may be due to poor coding 
or patient selection.  
7. Deprivation. Patients treated by NHS hospitals are more likely to come from income-
deprived areas than those treated by either NHS TCs or IS providers. However, there was a 
non-significant trend for ISTCs to treat a slightly higher proportion of patients from deprived 
areas than NHS TC providers. 
 
Orthopaedic HRGs (prefixed by H) 
 
The main statistically significant differences observed between providers were in orthopaedic HRGs.  
Patients in NHS hospitals had significantly longer lengths of stay, more co-mordidities (diagnoses) 
and more procedures than those treated in the other settings. This is despite patients in NHS 
hospitals tending to be younger than those treated in TCs and having experienced a shorter waiting 
time prior to admission.  
 
Diagnostic HRGs (F06, F35, F54, L19-21) 
 
Patients attending NHS TCs for diagnostic reasons were more likely to be older than patients in NHS 
hospitals, who in turn were older than patients in IS providers. More diagnoses were recorded for 
patients treated in NHS hospitals than at NHS TCs or IS providers. However, more procedures were 
recorded for patients treated by NHS TCs and IS providers than those treated in NHS hospitals. This 
may be because many patients in NHS hospitals have diagnostic procedures as part of a wider 
treatment course and are allocated to more resource intensive HRGs. 
 
6.3.3 Summary 
 
Our analysis finds evidence of differences between patients treated in hospitals and TCs even though 
they are classified to the same HRG.  NHS hospitals tend to treat patients with more diagnoses and 
procedures and from more deprived areas than patients treated in treatment centres ± suggesting that 
the former group are more complex. While patients treated in the hospital setting tend to be younger 
on average, they represent a wider age range than those treated in TCs. If these differences in patient 
characteristics lead to differences in treatment costs, then either the classification system needs 
refining or differential payments might be made according to the treatment setting. 
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In future, the introduction of Version 4 HRGs may overcome any perception of differences in casemix 
across settings, with its finer granularity allowing more precise definitions of service type than is 
currently the case. 
 
Inevitably the analysis is constrained by the quality of the data contained in HES. There are clear 
areas where improvements should be made, notably in the coding of provider type and, for many IS 
providers, in general coding completeness.  
 
Factor Recommendation 
Casemix The evidence suggests there are casemix differences between patients treated in 
hospitals and treatment centres.  Whether these differences reflect differences in the 
cost of provision needs to be established.   
Improve the quality of HES data submitted by IS providers and NHS TC reporting in 
the provider code field. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
A key element of the reform agenda for the health service has been to encourage a plurality of 
provision for NHS patients and so improve the quality of care.  In introducing plurality, the Department 
RI+HDOWKLVFRPPLWWHGWRHVWDEOLVKLQJDµIDLUSOD\LQJILHOG¶. This means that the objective of competitive 
QHXWUDOLW\DFURVV1+6DQG,QGHSHQGHQW6HFWRU,6SURYLGHUVRI1+6VHUYLFHVµD level SOD\LQJILHOG¶
is tempered by the obligation upon the public sector to act in the public interest.   
 
This fair playing field must be supported by the system of reimbursement ± called Payment by Results 
(PbR) ± that is being implemented to fund NHS patients.  PbR is a prospective payment system in 
which prices for treating particular types of patients are fixed in advance by the Department of Health 
rather than being negotiated locally.  As prices are fixed, any competition between providers should 
be on the basis of the quality of services, rather than their cost.   
 
Within this context, we were asked to consider the following issues: 
 
 establish which factors drive significantly different cost structures for the different types of 
organisation; 
 on a quantified basis, produce a  set of weighted factors that any new tariff system would 
need to take into account (the work should quantify factors but should not produce a revised 
tariff); 
 identify potentially perverse incentives either with the current system or with the proposed 
solution;  
 identify any anticipated changes in the economic factors over time; 
 consider whether it is appropriate to apply the Market Forces Factor (MFF) to organisations 
outside the NHS; and 
 consider the implications of casemix differences in a separate, but related, phase of work. 
 
Which factors drive significantly different cost structures? 
 
The factors of relevance are operating constraints that are beyond provider control (i.e. unavoidable) 
and which impact on their costs of production. We have identified and examined the nature of each 
potential constraining factor on NHS and IS providers, and recommend how these might be 
addressed to ensure a fair playing field. To this end, we ask two questions: 
 
 What is the differential impact of each unavoidable factor on NHS and IS providers? 
 How should these unavoidable factors be accounted for within a fixed pricing regime? 
 
Each factor investigated is listed in Table 16, together with a summary of how these might be 
addressed ± if at all ± under a PbR regime. 
 
Quantification of these factors 
 
Our analysis allows us to categorise each factor into one of five classes: 
 
 Those factors which are not unavoidable ± these are not exogenous constraints and do not 
imply an unfair or uneven playing field. As such no correction is required under PbR. 
Examples are corporation tax and pension contributions. No quantification of these factors is 
necessary. 
 Those factors which are unavoidable, but where correction is best made through 
standardisation of regulatory arrangements, rather than by financial compensation. Examples 
are inspection regimes and access to the indemnity arrangements (NHS Litigation Authority). 
Again no quantification is necessary. 
 Those factors that require specific payments to be made. We recommend only four types of 
specific payments ± VAT, MFF, capital costs for PFI and payments for R&D, teaching and 
training. These payments will be provider-specific, and will depend on what VAT is incurred in 
providing NHS care, where the provider is located, the net additional cost of PFI payments, 
and how much R&D, teaching and training is undertaken. VAT reimbursement requires 
access to audited accounts, which are unavailable. The DoH already has the relevant 
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information to calculate MFF entitlements. The tariff reflects a proportion of average PFI 
costs, actual payments above this level will vary by provider.  At present, IS providers 
undertake little R&D, teaching and training. If IS providers are to engage in such activities in 
future, payments should be made on the same basis as they are to NHS providers. 
 Those factors that are best handled by introducing two-part tariffs, so that there is better risk 
sharing between providers and purchasers in the context of demand volatility. The 
requirement upon the NHS to have capacity available on stand-by necessitates such 
arrangements. The form of such arrangements needs to be assessed on a service by service 
basis. 
 Those factors that entail price adjustment ± this being the adoption of exclusion criteria for 
services conducted in treatment centres. As these exclusion criteria are provider-specific, a 
provider-specific reduction in tariff should be negotiated that reflects the number and type of 
exclusion criteria. Quantification would need to be based on what the DoH is willing to 
penalise IS providers for adopting such criteria and what IS providers are willing to accept by 
way of a penalty. This best way to determine willingness to pay of the parties is through 
negotiation. 
 
Table 16: Summary of recommendations 
Factor Recommendation 
Regulatory constraints 
Corporation tax No change. 
VAT (on contracted out 
services) 
LT: seek VAT exemption for IS providers in their provision of NHS services 
ST: work with IS providers to assess current VAT liability in providing services to 
NHS patients 
Monitoring and 
performance 
management regime  
Registration/monitoring: address as part of market entry negotiations not activity-
based payment arrangements. Legislation has proposed to standardise 
requirements 
Reporting: standardise requirements 
Contracting issues Contractual arrangements: no adjustment 
Ensure that IS providers make accurate HES returns 
Synchronise payment timing 
Production process constraints 
Cost of capital Harmonise relevant accounting guidelines across sectors 
Access to capital: no adjustment needed 
Cost of borrowing: Providers face a range of options, so it is unclear whether the 
playing field is fair. This matter requires further detailed investigation by relevant 
specialists.  PFI: identify the magnitude of the problem and make specific payments 
to compensate for these.  Consider taking legal advice on the nature of these 
contracts which appear inflexible.   
Costs of labour Recruitment: relax additionality rules 
Pay levels: no adjustment 
Pension provision: no adjustment 
Geographical differences 
in input prices ± Market 
Forces Factor 
Review the current basis for calculating MFF, taking into account its 
appropriateness to IS providers 
Make MFF payments to both NHS and IS providers, paid directly by DoH, after 
consideration of the locational constraints faced by IS providers 
Economies of scale and 
scope 
Continue with separate payments for emergency and elective patients 
Consider extending use of two-part tariffs 
Access to cheaper inputs NHS LA: resolved once current Health and Social Bill enacted  
NHS PASA: no adjustment 
NHS CfH: no retrospective compensation but harmonise arrangements across NHS 
and IS for future IT programmes 
ALBs: no adjustment 
Provision of other outputs Ensure transparent, separate and full funding of R&D, teaching and training 
services 
Type of service / treatment 
Exclusion criteria Price adjustment to HRG-tariff to reflect direct selection of less costly patients.  
Regular review of the HRG system may be desirable. Any exclusion criteria 
operated by NHS TCs should be made transparent. 
Casemix The evidence suggests there are casemix differences for hospitals and treatment 
centres.  Whether these differences reflect differences in the cost of provision needs 
to be established.   
Improve the quality of HES data submitted by IS providers and NHS TC reporting in 
the provider code field. 
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Identify potentially perverse incentives either with the current system or with the proposed 
solution 
 
Financial arrangements under PbR can be modified in two ways if there is evidence that providers 
face different unavoidable costs or provide different services: 
 
 Price adjustment. This involves allowing price to vary in line with the collective influence of 
the unavoidable factors or to be adjusted to reflect inaccurate service descriptions.  
 Specific payments. This would involve making specific payments (charges or rebates) to 
compensate for the influence of each specific unavoidable cost factor. 
 
Price adjustment to correct for unavoidable constraints is not recommended because it undermines 
the integrity of a fixed pricing regime and distorts purchasing behaviour.  
 
Specific payments for unavoidable costs have the advantage of greater transparency and allow 
adjustments to be factor-specific rather than based on provider characteristics, such as ownership 
type.  The form of these payments will vary according to the factor under consideration and the 
amount will be provider specific. 
 
Where there is evidence that different types of service are being provided and this is not accurately 
reflected by the classification system used to define services, price adjustment is recommended. 
 
Identify any anticipated changes in the economic factors over time 
 
A number of factors that currently give rise to an unfair playing field will be addressed through 
changes to legislation, once the current Health and Social Care Bill is enacted. The adoption of 
version 4 HRGs is anticipated to ameliorate concerns about the ability of the current version of HRGs 
to accurately describe casemix differences. 
 
Consider whether it is appropriate to apply the Market Forces Factor (MFF) to organisations 
outside the NHS 
 
We believe current arrangements ± whereby the MFF adjustment is paid directly from DoH to 
providers with the money being top-sliced from PCT allocations ± should be retained. We believe that 
the proposal to revert to the position where PCTs pay the µtariff x MFF¶ is ill-founded, and disagree 
with claims that this would introduce greater simplicity and transparency in the payment system, 
introduce more effective efficiency incentives around non-elective services, and better align incentives 
for PCTs in commissioning services (Department of Health, 2006c)(§3.72).  
 
Our position is based on the following arguments: 
 
 The information requirements for calculating MFF (and any other) payments are the same, 
irrespective of whether payments are made directly to providers or indirectly via PCTs. 
 0DNLQJ SULFH DGMXVWPHQWV HJ LQ WKH IRUP µWDULII [ 0))¶ LV VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG RQO\ ZKHQ WKH
extent of exposure is proportional to activity. For many unavoidable costs this is unlikely to be 
the case, so forcing these into an activity-based pricing adjustment would be a complicated 
undertaking. Exposure to unavoidable costs should be quantified on the basis of their cost 
drivers and compensated accordingly. 
 A system of direct payments is more transparent than one in which each HRG price has to be 
DGMXVWHGDFFRUGLQJWRHDFKSURYLGHU¶VH[SRVXUHWRWKHFROOHFWLYHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHXQDYRLGDEOH
factors. Rather than transparency, this promises opacity because the resulting adjusted price 
cannot easily be disentangled by third parties.  
 It is not apparent why the DoH believes that µWDULII [ 0))¶ ZRXOG LQWURGXFH more effective 
efficiency incentives around non-elective ± or indeed any types of ± services. We 
demonstrate formally (Technical Appendix 1) that price adjustment (e.g. µSULFH [0))¶DQG
specific payments provide equivalent incentives to providers. 
 5DWKHU WKDQ EHWWHU DOLJQLQJ LQFHQWLYHV IRU 3&7V µWDULII [ 0))¶ LV likely to distort PCT 
commissioning behaviour. We demonstrate (Technical Appendix 2) that this risks distorting 
PCT behaviour on the fairly benign assumption that they would respond to price signals. 
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If IS providers are subject to similar locational constraints that face NHS providers, they ought also to 
be eligible for MFF payments. If IS providers are thought to be less constrained than NHS providers in 
where they locate, MFF payments might be reduced proportionately. This would require a judgement 
to be made about how restricted IS providers are, and would probably need to be negotiated between 
the Department of Health and each IS provider on a case by case basis.  
 
Consider the implications of casemix differences 
 
A justification for differential payments between NHS and IS providers is that they treat different types 
of patients, and the classification system used to define a µunit¶ of service is insufficiently refined to 
identify these differences. This would not be a problem if differences were random, where it is a 
matter of chance whether any particular patient is more or less expensive than the average patient in 
the service category to which they are classified. With sufficiently large volumes, these differences 
cancel out. Problems arise if the differences across providers are systematic, with one type of 
provider more likely to treat low-cost patients and another treating more high-cost patients. 
 
We analyse this in two ways. First, we consider the extent to which explicit exclusion criteria have 
been adopted by IS providers. Second, we undertake empirical analysis of HES data to identify 
differences in patients in specific HRGs across IS providers, NHS treatments centres and NHS 
hospitals.  
 
IS providers have adopted exclusion criteria that are provider-specific and generally determined 
locally.  These criteria specify a list of circumstances under which a provider may refuse a referral.  
This implies that ISTC case mix provision for a given procedure is likely to be less severe than the 
case mix for the NHS. 
 
The HRG system is likely to be unable to differentiate accurately between the types of patient treated 
in each setting. Consequently we recommend that IS (and NHS TCs that adopt exclusion criteria) are 
penalised by being paid a lower price for the services they provide. This price reduction will be 
provider-specific, varying to the extent to which exclusion criteria are adopted. 
 
Our analysis of HES finds evidence to suggest systematic differences in casemix indicators across 
treatment settings. NHS hospitals tend to treat patients with more diagnoses and procedures and 
from more deprived areas than patients treated in treatment centres ± suggesting that the former 
group are more complex. While patients treated in the hospital setting tend to be younger on average, 
they represent a wider age range than those treated in TCs. If these differences in patient 
characteristics lead to differences in treatment costs, then either the classification system needs 
refining or differential payments might be made according to the treatment setting. 
 
In future, the introduction of Version 4 HRGs may overcome any perception of differences in casemix 
across settings, with its finer granularity allowing more precise definitions of service type than is 
currently the case. 
 
Inevitably the analysis is constrained by the quality of the data contained in HES. There are clear 
areas where improvements should be made, notably in the coding of provider type by NHS 
organisations and, for many IS providers, in general coding completeness.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Differentiated payments under PbR are justified on the grounds that providers face different operating 
constraints, which imply that efficient providers will incur different costs in providing the same 
services.  
 
Ownership status is not necessarily a sound basis for making differentiated adjustments for 
unavoidable factors. Instead, provider-specific adjustments should be related to each constraining 
IDFWRU DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK WKH IDFWRU LPSDFWV HDFK SURYLGHU¶V FRVts. Of course, the 
average net effect of these factors may differ significantly between IS and NHS providers, but this will 
be because of the association of these factors with ownership type. 
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These specific payments should be made directly by the Department of Health, rather than via PCTs 
so that purchasing behaviour is not distorted. 
 
Both the exclusion criteria and the analysis of HES data imply that casemix is less complex in 
treatment centres than in NHS hospitals. We recommend that IS (and NHS TCs that adopt exclusion 
criteria) are paid a lower price for the services they provide when exclusion criteria are in place. This 
price reduction will be provider-specific, varying to the extent to which exclusion criteria are adopted. 
 
If tariffs are to continue to be based on average costs, consideration should be given to extending the 
Reference Cost collection to IS providers so that the costs incurred by these providers can inform the 
price. This is particularly important for services where a large proportion of activity is undertaken by IS 
providers.  
 
Efforts should also be made by IS providers to improve the completeness and quality of their HES 
returns. 
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Appendix 1 
 
This appendix presents a diagrammatic summary of findings from the HES analysis.  For each group 
of patients treated by each of the three categories of provider (NHS treatment centres; IS providers; 
all other NHS hospitals), six (for 2005/6) or seven (for 2006/7) indicators of complexity were tested for 
each HRG (see Table 12 for further details): 
 
1. Age in years (05/6 and 06/7) (Figure 3 to Figure 8) 
2. Inpatient waiting time in days (05/6 and 06/7) (Figure 9 to Figure 14) 
3. Length of stay in days (05/6 and 06/7) (Figure 15 to Figure 20) 
4. Proportion of day cases (05/6 and 06/7) (Figure 21to Figure 26) 
5. Number of diagnoses (05/6 and 06/7) (Figure 30 to Figure 32) 
6. Number of operations (05/6 and 06/7) (Figure 33 to Figure 38) 
7. IMD score (proportion living in income deprivation) (06/7 only) (Figure 39 to Figure 41) 
 
The pooled estimates are based on the weighted mean difference (WMD) statistic.  The WMD, or 
µGLIIHUHQFHLQPHDQV¶, is a standard statistic that measures the absolute difference between the mean 
value in two groups.  It is appropriate as a summary statistic in meta-analysis when outcome 
measurements in all trials are made on the same scale.  In this case, where patients are grouped by 
HRGs rather than trials, each indicator was assessed using a common scale (HJµDJH¶DVVHVVHGLQ
µyears¶IRUHDFK+5*DQGIRUHDFKSURYLGHU) and so the WMD is suitable for describing these data.  In 
addition, the WMD DOORZVWKHJUDSKVWREHODEHOHGXVLQJWKHµQDWXUDO¶VFDOH7KHUHIRUHLQWKHFDVHRI
WKH LQGLFDWRU µDJH¶ WKH [-axis is in years.  The y-axis shows where the mean difference (difference 
between the means) between the two groups is zero.  For each indicator, the figures plot and report 
the mean difference (represented as a square) and 99% confidence interval (horizontal line through 
each square); where a confidence interval crosses the y-axis (i.e. spans zero), the difference in effect 
is not significant at the 1% level.  The 1% level was selected in preference to an alpha of 5% to reflect 
multiple testing on the same groups of patients, which increases the chance of spuriously finding a 
µVLJQLILFDQW¶UHVXOW 
 
Confidence intervals are calculated assuming that patients are a random sample from an underlying 
SRSXODWLRQ:HDOVRUHSRUWDµSRROHGHIIHFW¶ZKLFKSURYLGHVDQLQGLFDWLRQRIWKHeffect size across all 
HRGs.  However, as there is a great deal of heterogeneity (variation) between patients in different 
HRGs, the pooled effect is highly indicative and should not be over-interpreted.  
 
Figures are presented by HRG, with 2005/6 and 2006/7 results given on facing pages to facilitate 
comparison. Figures were constructed using RevMan 4.2 software (Review Manager (RevMan) 
[Computer program], 2003). 
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Figure 3: Forest plot for differences in patient age 
(yrs): NHS Treatment centres vs. NHS hospitals 
(2005/6) 
Figure 4: Forest plot for differences in patient age 
(yrs): NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6) 
Figure 5: Forest plot for differences in patient age 
(yrs): NHS Treatment centres vs. IS providers 
(2005/6) 
Comparison: 01 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres                                          
Outcome: 01 Age                                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.49 3.21 [2.36, 4.06]        
B13                 3.59 0.10 [-0.41, 0.61]       
C22                 2.49 0.54 [-2.15, 3.23]       
C58                 3.38 -2.66 [-3.78, -1.54]      
E14                 3.31 3.17 [1.92, 4.42]        
F06                 3.56 3.31 [2.70, 3.92]        
F35                 3.56 2.11 [1.48, 2.74]        
F54                 3.28 2.91 [1.58, 4.24]        
F73                 3.45 0.53 [-0.42, 1.48]       
F74                 3.41 2.00 [0.96, 3.04]        
F93                 3.04 1.68 [-0.09, 3.45]       
F95                 3.09 -0.04 [-1.71, 1.63]       
G14                 3.23 0.43 [-1.00, 1.86]       
H04                 3.60 0.41 [-0.04, 0.86]       
H10                 3.57 1.87 [1.28, 2.46]        
H12                 3.26 3.41 [2.04, 4.78]        
H13                 3.48 0.31 [-0.57, 1.19]       
H14                 3.10 2.85 [1.20, 4.50]        
H17                 3.35 3.64 [2.47, 4.81]        
H22                 3.35 2.97 [1.79, 4.15]        
H80                 3.52 0.23 [-0.52, 0.98]       
H81                 3.43 2.39 [1.39, 3.39]        
J37                 3.42 0.58 [-0.44, 1.60]       
L19                 3.07 0.89 [-0.83, 2.61]       
L20                 3.34 0.41 [-0.78, 1.60]       
L21                 3.55 2.23 [1.58, 2.88]        
L39                 2.81 4.80 [2.65, 6.95]        
M05                 3.49 5.28 [4.44, 6.12]        
M06                 3.43 2.80 [1.79, 3.81]        
Q11                 3.35 1.01 [-0.17, 2.19]       
-10 -5 0 5 10
NHS hospitals older NHS TCs older
 
Comparison: 02 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6)                      
Outcome: 01 Age                                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 2.07 5.38 [-1.61, 12.37]      
B13                 3.62 0.41 [-2.11, 2.93]       
C22                 3.70 -0.77 [-3.02, 1.48]       
C58                 3.84 -2.00 [-3.78, -0.22]      
E14                 3.40 0.30 [-2.88, 3.48]       
F06                 3.90 -4.61 [-6.15, -3.07]      
F35                 3.73 -8.29 [-10.46, -6.12]     
F54                 2.72 -0.94 [-5.94, 4.06]       
F73                 3.77 1.84 [-0.18, 3.86]       
F74                 3.80 3.18 [1.26, 5.10]        
F93                 3.48 2.60 [-0.34, 5.54]       
F95                 3.40 -1.23 [-4.38, 1.92]       
G14                 3.64 1.40 [-1.07, 3.87]       
H04                 4.00 -1.14 [-2.11, -0.17]      
H10                 3.87 0.69 [-0.97, 2.35]       
H12                 3.42 1.38 [-1.74, 4.50]       
H13                 3.76 -0.90 [-2.98, 1.18]       
H14                 3.55 2.96 [0.21, 5.71]        
H17                 3.32 3.05 [-0.34, 6.44]       
H22                 1.72 -9.61 [-17.92, -1.30]     
H80                 3.94 -0.62 [-1.96, 0.72]       
H81                 3.63 1.56 [-0.93, 4.05]       
J37                 3.65 -3.43 [-5.86, -1.00]      
L19                 1.14 -9.45 [-20.81, 1.91]      
L20                 3.06 0.38 [-3.71, 4.47]       
L21                 3.78 -3.80 [-5.78, -1.82]      
L39                 2.60 12.87 [7.53, 18.21]       
M05                 3.47 -2.09 [-5.05, 0.87]       
M06                 3.42 -2.29 [-5.40, 0.82]       
Q11                 2.61 0.70 [-4.63, 6.03]       
-10 -5 0 5 10
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Comparison: 03 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2005/6)              
Outcome: 01 Age                                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 2.32 2.17 [-4.87, 9.21]       
B13                 3.63 0.31 [-2.26, 2.88]       
C22                 3.38 -1.31 [-4.80, 2.18]       
C58                 3.74 0.66 [-1.44, 2.76]       
E14                 3.40 -2.87 [-6.29, 0.55]       
F06                 3.82 -7.92 [-9.57, -6.27]      
F35                 3.70 -10.40 [-12.66, -8.14]     
F54                 2.87 -3.85 [-9.02, 1.32]       
F73                 3.71 1.31 [-0.91, 3.53]       
F74                 3.72 1.18 [-0.99, 3.35]       
F93                 3.40 0.92 [-2.49, 4.33]       
F95                 3.36 -1.19 [-4.75, 2.37]       
G14                 3.56 0.97 [-1.87, 3.81]       
H04                 3.91 -1.55 [-2.61, -0.49]      
H10                 3.80 -1.18 [-2.94, 0.58]       
H12                 3.41 -2.03 [-5.41, 1.35]       
H13                 3.71 -1.21 [-3.45, 1.03]       
H14                 3.47 0.11 [-3.06, 3.28]       
H17                 3.36 -0.59 [-4.17, 2.99]       
H22                 1.97 -12.58 [-20.97, -4.19]     
H80                 3.85 -0.85 [-2.37, 0.67]       
H81                 3.61 -0.83 [-3.48, 1.82]       
J37                 3.61 -4.01 [-6.64, -1.38]      
L19                 1.37 -10.34 [-21.82, 1.14]      
L20                 3.15 -0.03 [-4.28, 4.22]       
L21                 3.74 -6.03 [-8.11, -3.95]      
L39                 2.70 8.07 [2.33, 13.81]       
M05                 3.50 -7.37 [-10.45, -4.29]     
M06                 3.45 -5.09 [-8.35, -1.83]      
Q11                 2.78 -0.31 [-5.76, 5.14]       
-10 -5 0 5 10
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Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 1.78;  
99% confidence interval 1.02 to 2.53 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.29; 
99% confidence interval -1.72 to 1.14 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -2.02; 
99% confidence interval -3.68 to -0.36 
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Figure 6: Forest plot for differences in patient age 
(yrs): NHS Treatment centres vs. NHS hospitals 
(2006/7) 
Figure 7: Forest plot for differences in patient age 
(yrs): NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7) 
Figure 8: Forest plot for differences in patient age 
(yrs): NHS Treatment centres vs. IS providers 
(2006/7) 
Comparison: 04 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2006/7)                                 
Outcome: 01 Age                                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.68 3.30 [2.53, 4.07]        
B13                 3.77 1.03 [0.53, 1.53]        
B15                 0.36 0.19 [-11.85, 12.23]     
C55                 2.67 0.57 [-2.00, 3.14]       
C58                 3.64 -2.11 [-3.01, -1.21]      
E14                 3.47 3.73 [2.47, 4.99]        
F06                 3.77 2.06 [1.55, 2.57]        
F35                 3.76 1.01 [0.47, 1.55]        
F54                 3.51 1.50 [0.33, 2.67]        
F73                 3.51 -1.61 [-2.78, -0.44]      
F74                 3.60 1.63 [0.65, 2.61]        
F93                 3.29 0.37 [-1.21, 1.95]       
G14                 3.37 0.86 [-0.58, 2.30]       
H04                 3.77 0.31 [-0.17, 0.79]       
H10                 3.74 2.54 [1.95, 3.13]        
H12                 3.41 4.14 [2.78, 5.50]        
H13                 3.65 0.73 [-0.13, 1.59]       
H17                 3.55 3.02 [1.93, 4.11]        
H22                 3.65 4.35 [3.48, 5.22]        
H80                 3.69 1.79 [1.03, 2.55]        
H81                 3.62 2.02 [1.07, 2.97]        
J37                 3.62 -0.86 [-1.80, 0.08]       
L20                 3.56 -0.14 [-1.21, 0.93]       
L21                 3.74 1.70 [1.09, 2.31]        
L39                 3.15 4.66 [2.85, 6.47]        
L48                 3.69 -0.95 [-1.72, -0.18]      
M05                 3.70 3.72 [2.99, 4.45]        
M06                 3.61 2.74 [1.77, 3.71]        
Q11                 3.47 0.06 [-1.19, 1.31]       
-10 -5 0 5 10
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Comparison: 05 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7)                      
Outcome: 01 Age                                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 1.61 0.76 [-7.50, 9.02]       
B13                 4.29 -0.02 [-0.82, 0.78]       
B15                 4.33 2.11 [1.64, 2.58]        
C55                 1.33 14.20 [4.67, 23.73]       
C58                 3.99 -6.98 [-8.91, -5.05]      
E14                 4.19 -0.22 [-1.48, 1.04]       
F06                 4.25 -3.65 [-4.64, -2.66]      
F35                 4.25 -4.67 [-5.69, -3.65]      
F54                 3.37 -3.95 [-7.36, -0.54]      
F73                 4.30 1.52 [0.77, 2.27]        
F74                 4.24 3.03 [2.00, 4.06]        
F93                 3.74 1.67 [-0.90, 4.24]       
G14                 3.99 3.05 [1.14, 4.96]        
H04                 4.29 0.22 [-0.56, 1.00]       
H10                 4.26 1.96 [1.01, 2.91]        
H12                 4.11 2.89 [1.34, 4.44]        
H13                 4.20 0.15 [-1.05, 1.35]       
H17                 4.04 4.52 [2.76, 6.28]        
H22                 3.73 3.38 [0.78, 5.98]        
H80                 4.29 -0.58 [-1.40, 0.24]       
H81                 3.91 2.83 [0.70, 4.96]        
J37                 4.21 -1.75 [-2.93, -0.57]      
L20                 0.72 -8.63 [-22.80, 5.54]      
L21                 3.19 -5.61 [-9.43, -1.79]      
L39                 3.02 6.64 [2.44, 10.84]       
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.67 -1.62 [-4.36, 1.12]       
M06                 2.96 0.13 [-4.21, 4.47]       
Q11                 1.52 -3.45 [-12.06, 5.16]      
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Comparison: 06 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2006/7)              
Outcome: 01 Age                                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 1.83 -2.54 [-10.83, 5.75]      
B13                 4.41 -1.05 [-1.99, -0.11]      
B15                 1.11 1.92 [-10.12, 13.96]     
C55                 1.47 13.63 [3.78, 23.48]       
C58                 4.11 -4.87 [-6.99, -2.75]      
E14                 4.21 -3.95 [-5.73, -2.17]      
F06                 4.38 -5.71 [-6.81, -4.61]      
F35                 4.37 -5.68 [-6.83, -4.53]      
F54                 3.53 -5.45 [-9.04, -1.86]      
F73                 4.32 3.13 [1.76, 4.50]        
F74                 4.32 1.40 [0.00, 2.80]        
F93                 3.78 1.30 [-1.69, 4.29]       
G14                 4.02 2.19 [-0.19, 4.57]       
H04                 4.42 -0.09 [-0.99, 0.81]       
H10                 4.38 -0.58 [-1.68, 0.52]       
H12                 4.14 -1.25 [-3.26, 0.76]       
H13                 4.30 -0.58 [-2.03, 0.87]       
H17                 4.13 1.50 [-0.54, 3.54]       
H22                 3.89 -0.97 [-3.69, 1.75]       
H80                 4.38 -2.37 [-3.46, -1.28]      
H81                 4.04 0.81 [-1.49, 3.11]       
J37                 4.29 -0.89 [-2.38, 0.60]       
L20                 0.85 -8.49 [-22.70, 5.72]      
L21                 3.42 -7.31 [-11.18, -3.44]     
L39                 3.13 1.98 [-2.58, 6.54]       
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.85 -5.34 [-8.16, -2.52]      
M06                 3.18 -2.61 [-7.05, 1.83]       
Q11                 1.73 -3.51 [-12.20, 5.18]      
-10 -5 0 5 10
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Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 1.50; 
 99% confidence interval 0.74 to 2.26 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.291; 
99% confidence interval -1.03 to 1.60 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -1.401; 
99% confidence interval -2.86 to 0.06 
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Figure 9: Forest plot for differences in inpatient 
waiting time (days): NHS hospitals vs. NHS 
Treatment centres (2005/6) 
Figure 10: Forest plot for differences in inpatient 
waiting time (days): NHS hospitals vs. IS providers 
(2005/6) 
Figure 11: Forest plot for differences in inpatient 
waiting time (days): NHS Treatment centres vs. IS 
providers (2005/6) 
NHS hospitals longer NHS TC longer
Comparison: 01 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2005/6)                                 
Outcome: 05 Inpatient waiting time                                       
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.41 1.88 [-2.81, 6.57]       
B13                 3.44 17.69 [15.65, 19.73]      
C22                 3.21 0.53 [-12.90, 13.96]     
C58                 3.40 26.97 [21.58, 32.36]      
E14                 3.35 16.64 [8.13, 25.15]       
F06                 3.39 45.48 [39.06, 51.90]      
F35                 3.12 56.45 [40.64, 72.26]      
F54                 3.15 20.36 [5.14, 35.58]       
F73                 3.24 14.97 [2.67, 27.27]       
F74                 3.38 11.47 [4.61, 18.33]       
F93                 3.29 -2.53 [-13.33, 8.27]      
F95                 3.27 3.31 [-8.09, 14.71]      
G14                 3.31 8.72 [-1.10, 18.54]      
H04                 3.39 -25.31 [-31.32, -19.30]    
H10                 3.43 -24.09 [-27.65, -20.53]    
H12                 3.29 -57.54 [-68.14, -46.94]    
H13                 3.41 -7.06 [-12.25, -1.87]     
H14                 3.14 2.52 [-12.96, 18.00]     
H17                 3.34 -0.02 [-8.57, 8.53]       
H22                 3.40 8.43 [2.54, 14.32]       
H80                 3.38 -8.58 [-15.58, -1.58]     
H81                 3.28 -49.63 [-60.69, -38.57]    
J37                 3.41 23.95 [19.09, 28.81]      
L19                 3.31 1.59 [-8.40, 11.58]      
L20                 3.34 -22.92 [-31.59, -14.25]    
L21                 3.41 4.64 [-0.45, 9.73]       
L39                 3.34 7.20 [-1.39, 15.79]      
M05                 3.43 -3.44 [-6.42, -0.46]      
M06                 3.41 -2.67 [-7.74, 2.40]       
Q11                 3.33 24.59 [15.35, 33.83]      
-100 -50 0 50 100
 
Comparison: 02 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6)                      
Outcome: 05 Inpatient waiting time                                       
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.49 3.05 [-15.02, 21.12]     
B13                 3.33 34.90 [-2.81, 72.61]      
C22                 3.49 123.59 [104.53, 142.65]    
C58                 3.51 116.57 [103.15, 129.99]    
E14                 3.50 51.32 [34.23, 68.41]      
F06                 3.51 23.55 [9.80, 37.30]       
F35                 3.33 -14.10 [-51.50, 23.30]     
F54                 3.25 -3.77 [-48.04, 40.50]     
F73                 3.38 116.13 [83.46, 148.80]     
F74                 3.46 100.87 [78.43, 123.31]     
F93                 3.43 101.27 [74.72, 127.82]     
F95                 3.40 97.18 [67.00, 127.36]     
G14                 3.41 108.28 [79.36, 137.20]     
H04                 3.52 -50.26 [-63.26, -37.26]    
H10                 3.51 20.77 [6.80, 34.74]       
H12                 3.36 60.92 [26.13, 95.71]      
H13                 3.51 12.33 [-2.69, 27.35]      
H14                 3.42 29.60 [1.47, 57.73]       
H17                 3.47 67.88 [45.61, 90.15]      
H22                 2.09 119.01 [-4.77, 242.79]     
H80                 3.51 -42.20 [-56.53, -27.87]    
H81                 3.40 -8.51 [-39.34, 22.32]     
J37                 3.46 102.83 [79.18, 126.48]     
L19                 2.83 98.60 [24.11, 173.09]     
L20                 3.04 105.93 [45.53, 166.33]     
L21                 3.49 43.18 [24.88, 61.48]      
L39                 2.67 29.84 [-54.70, 114.38]    
M05                 3.42 6.00 [-22.71, 34.71]     
M06                 3.50 -32.95 [-49.17, -16.73]    
Q11                 3.32 70.05 [31.95, 108.15]     
-100 -50 0 50 100
NHS hospitals longer IS providers longer
 
Comparison: 03 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2005/6)              
Outcome: 05 Inpatient waiting time                                       
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.54 1.17 [-17.47, 19.81]     
B13                 3.33 17.21 [-20.56, 54.98]     
C22                 3.50 123.06 [99.84, 146.28]     
C58                 3.56 89.60 [75.15, 104.05]     
E14                 3.53 34.68 [15.61, 53.75]      
F06                 3.56 -21.93 [-37.08, -6.78]     
F35                 3.29 -70.55 [-111.10, -30.00]   
F54                 3.20 -24.13 [-70.85, 22.59]     
F73                 3.37 101.16 [66.32, 136.00]     
F74                 3.50 89.40 [65.98, 112.82]     
F93                 3.44 103.80 [75.23, 132.37]     
F95                 3.40 93.87 [61.71, 126.03]     
G14                 3.42 99.56 [69.12, 130.00]     
H04                 3.57 -24.95 [-39.15, -10.75]    
H10                 3.56 44.86 [30.48, 59.24]      
H12                 3.35 118.46 [82.23, 154.69]     
H13                 3.56 19.39 [3.55, 35.23]       
H14                 3.41 27.08 [-4.86, 59.02]      
H17                 3.49 67.90 [44.13, 91.67]      
H22                 1.91 110.58 [-13.34, 234.50]    
H80                 3.56 -33.62 [-49.41, -17.83]    
H81                 3.40 41.12 [8.58, 73.66]       
J37                 3.49 78.88 [54.75, 103.01]     
L19                 2.72 97.01 [21.89, 172.13]     
L20                 2.97 128.85 [67.87, 189.83]     
L21                 3.53 38.54 [19.58, 57.50]      
L39                 2.54 22.64 [-62.31, 107.59]    
M05                 3.44 9.44 [-19.41, 38.29]     
M06                 3.55 -30.28 [-47.24, -13.32]    
Q11                 3.31 45.46 [6.32, 84.60]       
-100 -50 0 50 100
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Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 3.04; 
 99% confidence interval -6.14 to 12.21 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 48.36; 
99% confidence interval 20.50 to 76.22 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 45.05; 
99% confidence interval 20.14 to 69.97 
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Figure 12: Forest plot for differences in inpatient 
waiting time (days): NHS hospitals vs. NHS 
Treatment centres (2006/7) 
Figure 13: Forest plot for differences in inpatient 
waiting time (days): NHS hospitals vs. IS providers 
(2006/7) 
Figure 14: Forest plot for differences in inpatient 
waiting time (days): NHS Treatment centres vs. IS 
providers (2006/7) 
Comparison: 04 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2006/7)                                 
Outcome: 05 Inpatient waiting time                                       
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.53 7.47 [1.38, 13.56]       
B13                 3.58 10.02 [7.76, 12.28]       
B15                 1.76 -21.53 [-67.90, 24.84]     
C55                 3.54 2.77 [-2.70, 8.24]       
C58                 3.57 2.57 [-0.68, 5.82]       
E14                 3.48 13.62 [5.66, 21.58]       
F06                 3.54 35.87 [30.65, 41.09]      
F35                 3.38 37.02 [25.63, 48.41]      
F54                 3.17 49.77 [33.23, 66.31]      
F73                 3.48 15.52 [7.36, 23.68]       
F74                 3.54 13.70 [8.21, 19.19]       
F93                 3.48 0.03 [-8.27, 8.33]       
G14                 3.45 22.18 [13.01, 31.35]      
H04                 3.56 -18.71 [-22.91, -14.51]    
H10                 3.58 -11.70 [-14.63, -8.77]     
H12                 3.48 -23.79 [-31.98, -15.60]    
H13                 3.56 0.87 [-3.58, 5.32]       
H17                 3.52 6.63 [-0.03, 13.29]      
H22                 3.57 10.42 [6.82, 14.02]       
H80                 3.53 -9.31 [-15.48, -3.14]     
H81                 3.50 -27.60 [-34.82, -20.38]    
J37                 3.57 13.67 [10.15, 17.19]      
L20                 3.43 0.31 [-9.47, 10.09]      
L21                 3.53 11.97 [6.18, 17.76]       
L39                 3.52 -11.30 [-17.85, -4.75]     
L48                 3.59 -20.87 [-21.74, -20.00]    
M05                 3.58 0.84 [-2.11, 3.79]       
M06                 3.55 -11.14 [-15.78, -6.50]     
Q11                 3.44 10.11 [0.74, 19.48]       
-100 -50 0 50 100
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Comparison: 05 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7)                      
Outcome: 05 Inpatient waiting time                                       
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.88 -80.61 [-88.12, -73.10]    
B13                 3.90 -50.71 [-52.92, -48.50]    
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 3.57 85.65 [56.09, 115.21]     
C58                 3.89 80.90 [74.04, 87.76]      
E14                 3.89 42.06 [35.74, 48.38]      
F06                 3.90 -42.35 [-43.88, -40.82]    
F35                 3.90 -102.26 [-106.03, -98.49]   
F54                 3.88 -57.02 [-64.89, -49.15]    
F73                 3.59 17.23 [-11.53, 45.99]     
F74                 3.84 -19.06 [-31.89, -6.23]     
F93                 3.71 13.61 [-8.82, 36.04]      
G14                 3.68 61.38 [37.70, 85.06]      
H04                 3.83 -12.14 [-25.85, 1.57]      
H10                 3.88 -32.28 [-40.25, -24.31]    
H12                 3.81 -41.95 [-56.88, -27.02]    
H13                 3.88 -24.86 [-32.87, -16.85]    
H17                 3.83 2.51 [-10.81, 15.83]     
H22                 3.83 -8.96 [-22.92, 5.00]      
H80                 3.82 -19.94 [-34.38, -5.50]     
H81                 3.74 33.32 [12.90, 53.74]      
J37                 3.90 -14.61 [-19.15, -10.07]    
L20                 1.52 9.86 [-111.21, 130.93]   
L21                 3.86 -55.27 [-66.02, -44.52]    
L39                 3.72 -44.42 [-65.72, -23.12]    
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.87 1.38 [-8.15, 10.91]      
M06                 3.67 -21.73 [-46.20, 2.74]      
Q11                 3.22 -90.27 [-134.70, -45.84]   
-100 -50 0 50 100
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Comparison: 06 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2006/7)              
Outcome: 05 Inpatient waiting time                                       
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.83 -88.08 [-97.69, -78.47]    
B13                 3.85 -60.73 [-63.87, -57.59]    
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 3.64 82.88 [52.84, 112.92]     
C58                 3.84 78.33 [70.76, 85.90]      
E14                 3.83 28.44 [18.31, 38.57]      
F06                 3.84 -78.22 [-83.59, -72.85]    
F35                 3.82 -139.28 [-151.09, -127.47]  
F54                 3.77 -106.79 [-124.89, -88.69]   
F73                 3.65 1.71 [-28.13, 31.55]     
F74                 3.80 -32.76 [-46.66, -18.86]    
F93                 3.72 13.58 [-10.24, 37.40]     
G14                 3.70 39.20 [13.86, 64.54]      
H04                 3.80 6.57 [-7.69, 20.83]      
H10                 3.83 -20.58 [-29.02, -12.14]    
H12                 3.78 -18.16 [-34.98, -1.34]     
H13                 3.83 -25.73 [-34.81, -16.65]    
H17                 3.80 -4.12 [-18.91, 10.67]     
H22                 3.80 -19.38 [-33.75, -5.01]     
H80                 3.79 -10.63 [-26.23, 4.97]      
H81                 3.74 60.92 [39.48, 82.36]      
J37                 3.84 -28.28 [-33.98, -22.58]    
L20                 2.00 9.55 [-111.91, 131.01]   
L21                 3.81 -67.24 [-79.40, -55.08]    
L39                 3.73 -33.12 [-55.34, -10.90]    
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.83 0.54 [-9.41, 10.49]      
M06                 3.71 -10.59 [-35.48, 14.30]     
Q11                 3.41 -100.38 [-145.74, -55.02]   
-100 -50 0 50 100
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Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 3.99; 
99% confidence interval -4.63 to 12.60 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -14.371; 
99% confidence interval -33.49 to 4.74 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -19.891; 
99% confidence interval -44.72 to 4.93 
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Figure 15: Forest plot for differences in length of 
stay (days): NHS hospitals vs. NHS Treatment 
centres (2005/6) 
Figure 16: Forest plot for differences in length of 
stay (days): NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6) 
Figure 17: Forest plot for differences in length of 
stay (days): NHS Treatment centres vs. IS providers 
(2005/6) 
Comparison: 01 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2005/6)                                 
Outcome: 03 Length of stay                                               
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.80 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]        
B13                 3.80 -0.06 [-0.07, -0.05]      
C22                 3.29 -0.21 [-0.30, -0.12]      
C58                 3.45 -0.16 [-0.23, -0.09]      
E14                 2.85 -0.07 [-0.20, 0.06]       
F06                 3.80 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
F35                 3.80 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
F54                 3.48 -0.12 [-0.19, -0.05]      
F73                 3.10 -0.71 [-0.81, -0.61]      
F74                 3.63 -0.12 [-0.17, -0.07]      
F93                 2.90 -0.21 [-0.33, -0.09]      
F95                 3.40 -0.03 [-0.11, 0.05]       
G14                 3.10 -0.52 [-0.63, -0.41]      
H04                 2.59 -1.70 [-1.85, -1.55]      
H10                 3.74 -0.17 [-0.20, -0.14]      
H12                 2.92 -0.36 [-0.48, -0.24]      
H13                 3.72 -0.06 [-0.09, -0.03]      
H14                 3.17 -0.54 [-0.64, -0.44]      
H17                 3.30 -0.43 [-0.52, -0.34]      
H22                 3.78 -0.03 [-0.05, -0.01]      
H80                 1.91 -1.98 [-2.20, -1.76]      
H81                 1.86 -1.94 [-2.16, -1.72]      
J37                 3.78 -0.07 [-0.09, -0.05]      
L19                 3.39 -0.67 [-0.75, -0.59]      
L20                 2.84 -0.42 [-0.55, -0.29]      
L21                 3.78 -0.08 [-0.10, -0.06]      
L39                 3.74 -0.08 [-0.11, -0.05]      
M05                 3.79 -0.16 [-0.17, -0.15]      
M06                 3.69 -0.20 [-0.24, -0.16]      
Q11                 3.60 -0.12 [-0.17, -0.07]      
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Comparison: 02 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6)                      
Outcome: 03 Length of stay                                               
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 Not estimable         
B13                 4.27 0.01 [-0.05, 0.07]       
C22                 4.27 0.14 [0.08, 0.20]        
C58                 4.27 0.39 [0.33, 0.45]        
E14                 Not estimable         
F06                 Not estimable         
F35                 4.29 0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]       
F54                 4.10 -0.10 [-0.27, 0.07]       
F73                 4.17 -0.58 [-0.71, -0.45]      
F74                 4.18 0.06 [-0.07, 0.19]       
F93                 4.16 -0.08 [-0.22, 0.06]       
F95                 4.22 0.00 [-0.11, 0.11]       
G14                 3.92 -0.77 [-1.01, -0.53]      
H04                 3.92 -2.21 [-2.44, -1.98]      
H10                 4.25 -0.12 [-0.20, -0.04]      
H12                 4.02 -0.38 [-0.58, -0.18]      
H13                 4.27 -0.05 [-0.11, 0.01]       
H14                 4.16 -0.50 [-0.64, -0.36]      
H17                 4.02 -0.31 [-0.51, -0.11]      
H22                 4.08 -0.01 [-0.18, 0.16]       
H80                 3.56 -2.54 [-2.88, -2.20]      
H81                 3.05 -1.81 [-2.30, -1.32]      
J37                 4.29 -0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]      
L19                 4.19 -0.75 [-0.87, -0.63]      
L20                 4.16 -0.44 [-0.58, -0.30]      
L21                 3.20 0.10 [-0.35, 0.55]       
L39                 4.24 -0.07 [-0.16, 0.02]       
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 Not estimable         
Q11                 2.74 0.11 [-0.46, 0.68]       
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Comparison: 03 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2005/6)              
Outcome: 03 Length of stay                                               
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 Not estimable         
B13                 5.07 0.07 [0.01, 0.13]        
C22                 4.76 0.35 [0.25, 0.45]        
C58                 4.89 0.55 [0.46, 0.64]        
E14                 Not estimable         
F06                 Not estimable         
F35                 5.20 0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]       
F54                 4.19 0.02 [-0.15, 0.19]       
F73                 4.22 0.13 [-0.03, 0.29]       
F74                 4.51 0.18 [0.05, 0.31]        
F93                 4.02 0.13 [-0.05, 0.31]       
F95                 4.56 0.03 [-0.10, 0.16]       
G14                 3.28 -0.25 [-0.51, 0.01]       
H04                 3.16 -0.51 [-0.78, -0.24]      
H10                 4.95 0.05 [-0.03, 0.13]       
H12                 3.56 -0.02 [-0.25, 0.21]       
H13                 5.04 0.01 [-0.06, 0.08]       
H14                 4.22 0.04 [-0.12, 0.20]       
H17                 3.70 0.12 [-0.09, 0.33]       
H22                 4.10 0.02 [-0.15, 0.19]       
H80                 2.18 -0.56 [-0.95, -0.17]      
H81                 1.58 0.13 [-0.37, 0.63]       
J37                 5.16 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]       
L19                 4.53 -0.08 [-0.21, 0.05]       
L20                 5.10 -0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]       
L21                 1.86 0.18 [-0.27, 0.63]       
L39                 4.85 0.01 [-0.08, 0.10]       
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 Not estimable         
Q11                 1.30 0.23 [-0.35, 0.81]       
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Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.30;  
99% confidence interval -0.34 to -0.26 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.37; 
99% confidence interval -0.53 to -0.22 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.05; 99% 
confidence interval -0.03 to 0.12 
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Figure 18: Forest plot differences in for length of 
stay (days): NHS hospitals vs. NHS Treatment 
centres (2006/7) 
Figure 19: Forest plot for differences in length of 
stay (days): NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7) 
Figure 20: Forest plot for differences in length of 
stay (days): NHS Treatment centres vs. IS providers 
(2006/7) 
Comparison: 04 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2006/7)                                 
Outcome: 03 Length of stay                                               
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 4.82 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]        
B13                 4.81 -0.04 [-0.05, -0.03]      
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 0.50 0.09 [-0.33, 0.51]       
C58                 4.43 -0.17 [-0.21, -0.13]      
E14                 1.68 0.03 [-0.16, 0.22]       
F06                 4.84 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
F35                 4.83 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
F54                 4.61 -0.06 [-0.09, -0.03]      
F73                 2.34 -0.50 [-0.65, -0.35]      
F74                 2.50 -0.12 [-0.26, 0.02]       
F93                 2.80 -0.18 [-0.30, -0.06]      
G14                 2.26 -0.35 [-0.50, -0.20]      
H04                 1.84 -1.23 [-1.41, -1.05]      
H10                 4.71 -0.14 [-0.16, -0.12]      
H12                 1.75 -1.10 [-1.29, -0.91]      
H13                 4.73 -0.07 [-0.09, -0.05]      
H17                 3.69 -0.62 [-0.70, -0.54]      
H22                 4.80 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
H80                 1.17 -1.58 [-1.83, -1.33]      
H81                 1.48 -1.39 [-1.60, -1.18]      
J37                 4.72 -0.07 [-0.09, -0.05]      
L20                 3.76 -0.25 [-0.33, -0.17]      
L21                 4.70 -0.07 [-0.09, -0.05]      
L39                 4.78 -0.08 [-0.10, -0.06]      
L48                 3.96 0.02 [-0.05, 0.09]       
M05                 4.74 -0.11 [-0.13, -0.09]      
M06                 4.65 -0.17 [-0.20, -0.14]      
Q11                 4.11 -0.15 [-0.21, -0.09]      
-4 -2 0 2 4
NHS hospitals longer NHS TC longer
 
Comparison: 05 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7)                      
Outcome: 03 Length of stay                                               
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 Not estimable         
B13                 5.02 -0.05 [-0.06, -0.04]      
B15                 5.02 -0.05 [-0.06, -0.04]      
C55                 3.17 0.20 [-0.13, 0.53]       
C58                 4.22 0.55 [0.36, 0.74]        
E14                 4.99 -0.25 [-0.29, -0.21]      
F06                 Not estimable         
F35                 5.03 -0.02 [-0.02, -0.02]      
F54                 4.85 -0.04 [-0.12, 0.04]       
F73                 4.76 -1.01 [-1.11, -0.91]      
F74                 4.99 -0.28 [-0.32, -0.24]      
F93                 4.86 -0.37 [-0.45, -0.29]      
G14                 4.52 -0.43 [-0.58, -0.28]      
H04                 4.26 -2.65 [-2.83, -2.47]      
H10                 4.99 -0.25 [-0.29, -0.21]      
H12                 4.18 -1.45 [-1.64, -1.26]      
H13                 4.83 -0.05 [-0.14, 0.04]       
H17                 4.86 -0.72 [-0.80, -0.64]      
H22                 4.98 -0.01 [-0.05, 0.03]       
H80                 4.45 -3.25 [-3.41, -3.09]      
H81                 1.90 -1.99 [-2.54, -1.44]      
J37                 4.99 -0.09 [-0.13, -0.05]      
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 5.01 -0.08 [-0.11, -0.05]      
L39                 Not estimable         
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 Not estimable         
Q11                 4.09 -0.31 [-0.52, -0.10]      
-4 -2 0 2 4
NHS hospitals longer IS providers longer
 
Comparison: 06 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2006/7)              
Outcome: 03 Length of stay                                               
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 Not estimable         
B13                 8.47 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 0.57 0.11 [-0.42, 0.64]       
C58                 3.13 0.72 [0.53, 0.91]        
E14                 3.01 -0.28 [-0.47, -0.09]      
F06                 Not estimable         
F35                 8.47 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
F54                 6.21 0.02 [-0.07, 0.11]       
F73                 3.72 -0.51 [-0.67, -0.35]      
F74                 4.36 -0.16 [-0.30, -0.02]      
F93                 4.32 -0.19 [-0.33, -0.05]      
G14                 2.73 -0.08 [-0.29, 0.13]       
H04                 2.14 -1.42 [-1.67, -1.17]      
H10                 7.83 -0.11 [-0.15, -0.07]      
H12                 3.84 -0.35 [-0.51, -0.19]      
H13                 6.19 0.02 [-0.07, 0.11]       
H17                 6.24 -0.10 [-0.19, -0.01]      
H22                 7.79 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]       
H80                 1.79 -1.67 [-1.95, -1.39]      
H81                 0.49 -0.60 [-1.18, -0.02]      
J37                 7.88 -0.02 [-0.06, 0.02]       
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 8.20 -0.01 [-0.04, 0.02]       
L39                 Not estimable         
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 Not estimable         
Q11                 2.63 -0.16 [-0.37, 0.05]       
-4 -2 0 2 4
NHS TCs longer IS providers longer
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.19; 
99% confidence interval -0.22 to -0.16 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.521; 
99% confidence interval -0.62 to -0.42 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.121; 
99% confidence interval -0.16 to -0.08 
 
58   CHE Research Paper 39 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Forest plot for differences in the 
proportion of day cases: NHS hospitals vs. NHS 
Treatment centres (2005/6) 
Figure 22: Forest plot for differences in the 
proportion of day cases: NHS hospitals vs. IS 
providers (2005/6) 
Figure 23: Forest plot for differences in the 
proportion of day cases: NHS Treatment centres vs. 
IS providers (2005/6) 
Comparison: 01 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2005/6)                                 
Outcome: 02 Proportion of Day Cases                                      
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.77 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
B13                 3.86 0.05 [0.05, 0.05]        
C22                 2.32 0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]       
C58                 3.54 0.09 [0.06, 0.12]        
E14                 3.20 0.04 [0.00, 0.08]        
F06                 3.86 0.02 [0.02, 0.02]        
F35                 3.84 0.01 [0.00, 0.02]        
F54                 3.74 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]        
F73                 2.80 0.09 [0.03, 0.15]        
F74                 3.37 0.03 [0.00, 0.06]        
F93                 2.60 0.14 [0.08, 0.20]        
F95                 3.05 0.03 [-0.02, 0.08]       
G14                 3.68 -0.06 [-0.08, -0.04]      
H04                 3.87 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
H10                 3.72 0.06 [0.04, 0.08]        
H12                 3.07 0.06 [0.01, 0.11]        
H13                 3.81 0.05 [0.04, 0.06]        
H14                 2.82 0.31 [0.26, 0.36]        
H17                 3.18 0.09 [0.05, 0.13]        
H22                 3.54 0.01 [-0.02, 0.04]       
H80                 Not estimable         
H81                 3.86 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
J37                 3.78 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]        
L19                 3.28 0.36 [0.32, 0.40]        
L20                 3.65 0.12 [0.10, 0.14]        
L21                 3.84 0.06 [0.05, 0.07]        
L39                 3.47 0.07 [0.04, 0.10]        
M05                 3.79 0.14 [0.13, 0.15]        
M06                 3.54 0.13 [0.10, 0.16]        
Q11                 3.16 -0.04 [-0.08, 0.00]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS hospitals larger NHS TCs larger
 
Comparison: 02 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6)                      
Outcome: 02 Proportion of Day Cases                                      
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.99 0.04 [-0.04, 0.12]       
B13                 4.16 -0.03 [-0.09, 0.03]       
C22                 4.52 -0.26 [-0.28, -0.24]      
C58                 4.33 -0.45 [-0.50, -0.40]      
E14                 4.40 0.15 [0.11, 0.19]        
F06                 4.55 0.03 [0.03, 0.03]        
F35                 4.42 -0.03 [-0.06, 0.00]       
F54                 3.83 0.01 [-0.08, 0.10]       
F73                 3.82 -0.15 [-0.24, -0.06]      
F74                 4.04 -0.16 [-0.23, -0.09]      
F93                 3.48 -0.13 [-0.24, -0.02]      
F95                 3.42 -0.15 [-0.27, -0.03]      
G14                 4.02 0.06 [-0.01, 0.13]       
H04                 4.55 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
H10                 4.23 -0.01 [-0.07, 0.05]       
H12                 3.69 0.03 [-0.07, 0.13]       
H13                 4.36 -0.02 [-0.06, 0.02]       
H14                 3.47 0.12 [0.01, 0.23]        
H17                 3.45 -0.12 [-0.23, -0.01]      
H22                 1.37 -0.12 [-0.43, 0.19]       
H80                 Not estimable         
H81                 Not estimable         
J37                 4.29 -0.06 [-0.11, -0.01]      
L19                 2.83 0.38 [0.22, 0.54]        
L20                 4.29 0.14 [0.09, 0.19]        
L21                 4.49 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]        
L39                 3.58 0.06 [-0.04, 0.16]       
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 Not estimable         
Q11                 2.40 -0.08 [-0.27, 0.11]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS hospitals larger IS providers larger
 
Comparison: 03 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2005/6)              
Outcome: 02 Proportion of Day Cases                                      
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 4.08 0.04 [-0.04, 0.12]       
B13                 4.40 -0.08 [-0.14, -0.02]      
C22                 4.13 -0.30 [-0.37, -0.23]      
C58                 4.58 -0.54 [-0.59, -0.49]      
E14                 4.52 0.11 [0.05, 0.17]        
F06                 5.15 0.01 [0.00, 0.02]        
F35                 4.88 -0.04 [-0.08, 0.00]       
F54                 3.80 -0.03 [-0.12, 0.06]       
F73                 3.49 -0.24 [-0.34, -0.14]      
F74                 4.02 -0.19 [-0.27, -0.11]      
F93                 2.99 -0.27 [-0.40, -0.14]      
F95                 3.04 -0.18 [-0.30, -0.06]      
G14                 4.09 0.12 [0.04, 0.20]        
H04                 5.15 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
H10                 4.47 -0.07 [-0.13, -0.01]      
H12                 3.42 -0.03 [-0.14, 0.08]       
H13                 4.75 -0.07 [-0.11, -0.03]      
H14                 3.05 -0.19 [-0.31, -0.07]      
H17                 3.13 -0.21 [-0.33, -0.09]      
H22                 0.98 -0.13 [-0.44, 0.18]       
H80                 Not estimable         
H81                 Not estimable         
J37                 4.60 -0.08 [-0.13, -0.03]      
L19                 2.39 0.02 [-0.14, 0.18]       
L20                 4.56 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07]       
L21                 5.02 -0.02 [-0.04, 0.00]       
L39                 3.38 -0.01 [-0.12, 0.10]       
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 Not estimable         
Q11                 1.91 -0.04 [-0.23, 0.15]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS TCs larger IS providers larger
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.06;  
99% confidence interval 0.05 to 0.08 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.03; 
99% confidence interval -0.07 to 0.01 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.09 
 99% confidence interval -0.12 to -0.05 
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Figure 24: Forest plot for differences in the 
proportion of day cases: NHS hospitals vs. NHS 
Treatment centres (2006/7) 
Figure 25: Forest plot for differences in the 
proportion of day cases: NHS hospitals vs. IS 
providers (2006/7) 
Figure 26: Forest plot for differences in the 
proportion of day cases: NHS Treatment centres vs. 
IS providers (2006/7) 
Comparison: 04 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2006/7)                                 
Outcome: 02 Proportion of Day Cases                                      
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 4.28 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
B13                 4.47 0.04 [0.03, 0.05]        
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 4.10 0.07 [0.05, 0.09]        
C58                 4.03 0.07 [0.05, 0.09]        
E14                 2.92 -0.01 [-0.05, 0.03]       
F06                 4.49 0.01 [0.01, 0.01]        
F35                 4.47 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
F54                 4.34 0.03 [0.02, 0.04]        
F73                 2.44 0.16 [0.11, 0.21]        
F74                 3.66 0.11 [0.08, 0.14]        
F93                 2.61 0.17 [0.12, 0.22]        
G14                 3.31 -0.03 [-0.07, 0.01]       
H04                 4.50 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
H10                 4.16 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]        
H12                 2.65 0.15 [0.10, 0.20]        
H13                 4.33 0.03 [0.02, 0.04]        
H17                 3.22 0.14 [0.10, 0.18]        
H22                 4.13 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]        
H80                 Not estimable         
H81                 Not estimable         
J37                 4.38 0.04 [0.03, 0.05]        
L20                 3.54 -0.01 [-0.04, 0.02]       
L21                 4.36 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
L39                 4.13 0.09 [0.07, 0.11]        
L48                 4.48 -0.02 [-0.02, -0.02]      
M05                 4.24 0.09 [0.08, 0.10]        
M06                 3.69 0.10 [0.07, 0.13]        
Q11                 3.04 0.03 [-0.01, 0.07]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS hospitals larger NHS TCs larger
 
Comparison: 05 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7)                      
Outcome: 02 Proportion of Day Cases                                      
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 2.24 0.02 [-0.11, 0.15]       
B13                 4.78 0.04 [0.03, 0.05]        
B15                 4.78 0.05 [0.05, 0.05]        
C55                 1.61 -0.10 [-0.27, 0.07]       
C58                 4.19 -0.55 [-0.59, -0.51]      
E14                 4.75 0.14 [0.13, 0.15]        
F06                 4.79 0.02 [0.02, 0.02]        
F35                 4.78 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]        
F54                 4.14 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]       
F73                 3.70 0.43 [0.37, 0.49]        
F74                 4.55 0.19 [0.16, 0.22]        
F93                 3.26 0.18 [0.10, 0.26]        
G14                 4.04 -0.01 [-0.06, 0.04]       
H04                 4.79 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
H10                 4.65 0.21 [0.19, 0.23]        
H12                 4.03 0.42 [0.37, 0.47]        
H13                 4.75 0.06 [0.05, 0.07]        
H17                 4.05 0.23 [0.18, 0.28]        
H22                 4.07 0.04 [-0.01, 0.09]       
H80                 4.78 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
H81                 Not estimable         
J37                 4.76 0.06 [0.05, 0.07]        
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 4.55 0.05 [0.02, 0.08]        
L39                 3.83 0.09 [0.03, 0.15]        
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 2.94 0.20 [0.11, 0.29]        
Q11                 1.19 0.19 [-0.02, 0.40]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS hospitals larger IS providers larger
 
Comparison: 06 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2006/7)              
Outcome: 02 Proportion of Day Cases                                      
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 2.38 0.03 [-0.10, 0.16]       
B13                 5.62 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 1.67 -0.17 [-0.34, 0.00]       
C58                 4.69 -0.62 [-0.67, -0.57]      
E14                 4.83 0.15 [0.11, 0.19]        
F06                 5.64 0.01 [0.01, 0.01]        
F35                 5.62 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]        
F54                 4.72 -0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]       
F73                 3.55 0.27 [0.19, 0.35]        
F74                 5.02 0.08 [0.04, 0.12]        
F93                 3.21 0.01 [-0.08, 0.10]       
G14                 4.27 0.02 [-0.04, 0.08]       
H04                 5.65 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]        
H10                 5.34 0.17 [0.14, 0.20]        
H12                 3.99 0.27 [0.20, 0.34]        
H13                 5.54 0.03 [0.02, 0.04]        
H17                 4.25 0.09 [0.03, 0.15]        
H22                 4.57 0.00 [-0.05, 0.05]       
H80                 Not estimable         
H81                 Not estimable         
J37                 5.57 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]        
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 5.27 0.05 [0.02, 0.08]        
L39                 4.27 0.00 [-0.06, 0.06]       
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 Not estimable         
M06                 3.12 0.10 [0.00, 0.20]        
Q11                 1.20 0.16 [-0.05, 0.37]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS TCs larger IS providers larger
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.05; 
 99% confidence interval 0.03 to 0.06 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.081; 
99% confidence interval 0.05 to 0.10 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.031; 
99% confidence interval 0.00 to 0.05 
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Figure 27: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of diagnoses: NHS hospitals vs. NHS Treatment 
centres (2005/6) 
Figure 28: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of diagnoses: NHS hospitals vs. IS providers 
(2005/6) 
Figure 29: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of diagnoses: NHS Treatment centres vs. IS 
providers (2005/6) 
NHS hospitals larger NHS TC larger
Comparison: 01 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2005/6)                                 
Outcome: 04 Number of Diagnoses                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.40 -0.26 [-0.32, -0.20]      
B13                 3.41 -0.78 [-0.83, -0.73]      
C22                 3.18 -0.13 [-0.29, 0.03]       
C58                 3.41 -0.12 [-0.17, -0.07]      
E14                 2.97 -0.47 [-0.69, -0.25]      
F06                 3.42 -0.56 [-0.60, -0.52]      
F35                 3.42 -0.35 [-0.39, -0.31]      
F54                 3.41 -0.22 [-0.27, -0.17]      
F73                 3.08 -0.17 [-0.36, 0.02]       
F74                 3.41 -0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]       
F93                 3.35 -0.05 [-0.14, 0.04]       
F95                 3.31 -0.08 [-0.19, 0.03]       
G14                 3.33 -0.14 [-0.24, -0.04]      
H04                 3.32 0.36 [0.25, 0.47]        
H10                 3.42 -0.12 [-0.16, -0.08]      
H12                 3.32 -0.19 [-0.29, -0.09]      
H13                 3.42 -0.22 [-0.26, -0.18]      
H14                 3.35 -0.35 [-0.44, -0.26]      
H17                 3.41 -0.19 [-0.24, -0.14]      
H22                 3.36 -0.24 [-0.33, -0.15]      
H80                 3.26 -0.22 [-0.35, -0.09]      
H81                 3.14 0.15 [-0.02, 0.32]       
J37                 3.43 -0.04 [-0.07, -0.01]      
L19                 3.35 -0.22 [-0.31, -0.13]      
L20                 3.18 -1.17 [-1.33, -1.01]      
L21                 3.43 -0.13 [-0.16, -0.10]      
L39                 3.40 0.00 [-0.06, 0.06]       
M05                 3.39 -0.16 [-0.22, -0.10]      
M06                 3.33 0.00 [-0.10, 0.10]       
Q11                 3.39 -0.04 [-0.11, 0.03]       
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
 
-0.21 [-0.67, 0.25]       
-1.06 [-1.10, -1.02]      
0.00 [-0.16, 0.16]       
-0.29 [-0.34, -0.24]      
0.48 [-0.15, 1.11]       
-0.94 [-0.98, -0.90]      
-0.73 [-0.77, -0.69]      
Not estimable         
-0.89 [-1.14, -0.64]      
-0.21 [-0.24, -0.18]      
-0.22 [-0.32, -0.12]      
-0.36 [-0.43, -0.29]      
-0.33 [-0.46, -0.20]      
-0.08 [-0.36, 0.20]       
0.62 [0.35, 0.89]        
-0.53 [-0.66, -0.40]      
0.68 [0.37, 0.99]        
-0.03 [-0.35, 0.29]       
0.08 [-0.26, 0.42]       
-0.49 [-0.84, -0.14]      
0.07 [-0.28, 0.42]       
0.49 [-0.25, 1.23]       
-0.04 [-0.11, 0.03]       
-0.25 [-0.74, 0.24]       
-0.29 [-0.94, 0.36]       
-0.08 [-0.18, 0.02]       
Comparison: 02 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6)                      
Outcome: 04 Number of Diagnoses                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.23
B13                 3.88
C22                 3.79
C58                 3.88
E14                 2.82
F06                 3.88
F35                 3.88
F54                 
F73                 3.67
F74                 3.88
F93                 3.85
F95                 3.87
G14                 3.83
H04                 3.63
H10                 3.63
H12                 3.83
H13                 3.57
H14                 3.55
H17                 3.50
H22                 3.49
H80                 3.47
H81                 2.56
J37                 3.87
L19                 3.16
L20                 2.77
L21                 3.85
L39                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.76 -0.39 [-0.58, -0.20]      
M06                 3.29 -0.14 [-0.58, 0.30]       
Q11                 3.62 -0.13 [-0.41, 0.15]       
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS hospitals larger IS providers larger
 
Comparison: 03 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2005/6)              
Outcome: 04 Number of Diagnoses                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 2.61 0.05 [-0.42, 0.52]       
B13                 4.54 -0.28 [-0.34, -0.22]      
C22                 3.91 0.13 [-0.10, 0.36]       
C58                 4.52 -0.17 [-0.24, -0.10]      
E14                 1.79 0.95 [0.28, 1.62]        
F06                 4.55 -0.38 [-0.44, -0.32]      
F35                 4.55 -0.38 [-0.44, -0.32]      
F54                 Not estimable         
F73                 3.43 -0.72 [-1.03, -0.41]      
F74                 4.55 -0.19 [-0.25, -0.13]      
F93                 4.32 -0.17 [-0.31, -0.03]      
F95                 4.36 -0.28 [-0.41, -0.15]      
G14                 4.21 -0.19 [-0.35, -0.03]      
H04                 3.53 -0.44 [-0.73, -0.15]      
H10                 3.64 0.74 [0.47, 1.01]        
H12                 4.21 -0.34 [-0.50, -0.18]      
H13                 3.45 0.90 [0.59, 1.21]        
H14                 3.33 0.32 [-0.01, 0.65]       
H17                 3.24 0.27 [-0.08, 0.62]       
H22                 3.19 -0.25 [-0.61, 0.11]       
H80                 3.07 0.29 [-0.09, 0.67]       
H81                 1.52 0.34 [-0.42, 1.10]       
J37                 4.52 0.00 [-0.07, 0.07]       
L19                 2.44 -0.03 [-0.53, 0.47]       
L20                 1.78 0.88 [0.21, 1.55]        
L21                 4.43 0.05 [-0.05, 0.15]       
L39                 Not estimable         
M05                 4.03 -0.23 [-0.43, -0.03]      
M06                 2.69 -0.14 [-0.59, 0.31]       
Q11                 3.58 -0.09 [-0.38, 0.20]       
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS TCs larger IS providers larger
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.20; 
 99% confidence interval -0.31 to -0.10 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.21; 
99% confidence interval -0.41 to 0.00 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.04;  
99% confidence interval -0.15 to 0.08 
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Figure 30: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of diagnoses: NHS hospitals vs. NHS Treatment 
centres (2006/7) 
Figure 31: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of diagnoses: NHS hospitals vs. IS providers 
(2006/7) 
Figure 32: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of diagnoses: NHS Treatment centres vs. IS 
providers (2006/7) 
Comparison: 04 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2006/7)                                 
Outcome: 04 Number of Diagnoses                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.47 -0.25 [-0.31, -0.19]      
B13                 3.47 -0.62 [-0.69, -0.55]      
B15                 2.99 0.26 [-0.51, 1.03]       
C55                 3.47 -0.07 [-0.15, 0.01]       
C58                 3.47 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]       
E14                 3.45 -1.07 [-1.23, -0.91]      
F06                 3.47 -0.18 [-0.22, -0.14]      
F35                 3.47 -0.07 [-0.11, -0.03]      
F54                 3.47 -0.21 [-0.27, -0.15]      
F73                 3.44 0.13 [-0.06, 0.32]       
F74                 3.47 0.04 [-0.02, 0.10]       
F93                 3.46 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12]       
G14                 3.46 0.18 [0.05, 0.31]        
H04                 3.46 -0.01 [-0.10, 0.08]       
H10                 3.47 0.00 [-0.05, 0.05]       
H12                 3.46 -0.25 [-0.37, -0.13]      
H13                 3.47 -0.17 [-0.22, -0.12]      
H17                 3.47 -0.14 [-0.21, -0.07]      
H22                 3.47 -0.24 [-0.31, -0.17]      
H80                 3.46 -0.54 [-0.67, -0.41]      
H81                 3.46 -0.18 [-0.31, -0.05]      
J37                 3.47 -0.09 [-0.12, -0.06]      
L20                 3.46 -0.55 [-0.68, -0.42]      
L21                 3.47 -0.03 [-0.06, 0.00]       
L39                 3.47 -0.03 [-0.09, 0.03]       
L48                 3.47 -1.17 [-1.17, -1.17]      
M05                 3.47 -0.04 [-0.10, 0.02]       
M06                 3.46 -0.03 [-0.13, 0.07]       
Q11                 3.46 0.02 [-0.07, 0.11]       
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS hospitals larger NHS TC larger
 
Comparison: 05 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7)                      
Outcome: 04 Number of Diagnoses                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 Not estimable         
B13                 Not estimable         
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 4.27 -0.31 [-0.49, -0.13]      
C58                 4.36 -0.35 [-0.42, -0.28]      
E14                 4.24 0.77 [0.57, 0.97]        
F06                 4.38 -1.23 [-1.26, -1.20]      
F35                 4.38 -1.17 [-1.18, -1.16]      
F54                 4.38 -0.62 [-0.65, -0.59]      
F73                 4.37 -1.60 [-1.63, -1.57]      
F74                 4.38 -0.43 [-0.44, -0.42]      
F93                 4.37 -0.43 [-0.48, -0.38]      
G14                 4.37 -0.76 [-0.80, -0.72]      
H04                 4.37 -1.82 [-1.87, -1.77]      
H10                 4.38 -0.95 [-0.97, -0.93]      
H12                 4.38 -1.00 [-1.03, -0.97]      
H13                 4.38 -0.56 [-0.59, -0.53]      
H17                 4.38 -0.61 [-0.64, -0.58]      
H22                 4.38 -0.91 [-0.93, -0.89]      
H80                 4.37 -1.86 [-1.91, -1.81]      
H81                 4.28 -1.49 [-1.66, -1.32]      
J37                 4.38 -0.28 [-0.29, -0.27]      
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 4.37 -0.77 [-0.82, -0.72]      
L39                 4.37 -0.23 [-0.27, -0.19]      
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 4.33 -0.71 [-0.83, -0.59]      
M06                 4.16 -0.83 [-1.08, -0.58]      
Q11                 Not estimable         
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS hospitals larger IS providers larger
 
Comparison: 06 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2006/7)              
Outcome: 04 Number of Diagnoses                                          
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 Not estimable         
B13                 Not estimable         
B15                 Not estimable         
C55                 4.28 -0.24 [-0.44, -0.04]      
C58                 4.38 -0.36 [-0.45, -0.27]      
E14                 4.19 1.84 [1.58, 2.10]        
F06                 4.39 -1.05 [-1.10, -1.00]      
F35                 4.40 -1.10 [-1.14, -1.06]      
F54                 4.39 -0.41 [-0.47, -0.35]      
F73                 4.29 -1.73 [-1.91, -1.55]      
F74                 4.39 -0.47 [-0.53, -0.41]      
F93                 4.37 -0.46 [-0.56, -0.36]      
G14                 4.34 -0.94 [-1.08, -0.80]      
H04                 4.37 -1.81 [-1.91, -1.71]      
H10                 4.40 -0.95 [-1.00, -0.90]      
H12                 4.36 -0.75 [-0.86, -0.64]      
H13                 4.39 -0.39 [-0.45, -0.33]      
H17                 4.39 -0.47 [-0.54, -0.40]      
H22                 4.38 -0.67 [-0.74, -0.60]      
H80                 4.34 -1.32 [-1.45, -1.19]      
H81                 4.26 -1.31 [-1.52, -1.10]      
J37                 4.40 -0.19 [-0.22, -0.16]      
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 4.39 -0.74 [-0.80, -0.68]      
L39                 4.39 -0.20 [-0.27, -0.13]      
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 4.35 -0.67 [-0.80, -0.54]      
M06                 4.17 -0.80 [-1.07, -0.53]      
Q11                 Not estimable         
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS TCs larger IS providers larger
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.18; 
99% confidence interval -0.54 to 0.17 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.791; 
99% confidence interval -1.02 to -0.56 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.661; 
99% confidence interval -0.90 to -0.42 
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Figure 33: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of operations: NHS hospitals vs. NHS Treatment 
centres (2005/6) 
Figure 34: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of operations: NHS hospitals vs. IS providers 
(2005/6) 
Figure 35: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of operations: NHS Treatment centres vs. IS 
providers (2005/6) 
Comparison: 01 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2005/6)                                 
Outcome: 06 Number of operations                                         
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.34 -0.23 [-0.30, -0.16]      
B13                 3.37 -0.25 [-0.26, -0.24]      
C22                 3.25 -0.20 [-0.35, -0.05]      
C58                 3.35 -0.07 [-0.14, 0.00]       
E14                 3.36 0.46 [0.41, 0.51]        
F06                 3.36 0.43 [0.40, 0.46]        
F35                 3.36 0.32 [0.29, 0.35]        
F54                 3.28 0.20 [0.07, 0.33]        
F73                 3.33 0.31 [0.23, 0.39]        
F74                 3.35 0.23 [0.17, 0.29]        
F93                 3.29 0.33 [0.20, 0.46]        
F95                 3.26 0.25 [0.10, 0.40]        
G14                 3.34 0.27 [0.19, 0.35]        
H04                 3.35 0.50 [0.44, 0.56]        
H10                 3.36 -0.02 [-0.06, 0.02]       
H12                 3.29 -0.25 [-0.38, -0.12]      
H13                 3.36 0.07 [0.03, 0.11]        
H14                 3.28 -0.25 [-0.38, -0.12]      
H17                 3.34 -0.07 [-0.15, 0.01]       
H22                 3.34 0.03 [-0.04, 0.10]       
H80                 3.36 -0.17 [-0.21, -0.13]      
H81                 3.35 -0.09 [-0.14, -0.04]      
J37                 3.35 0.17 [0.11, 0.23]        
L19                 3.30 0.36 [0.25, 0.47]        
L20                 3.35 0.32 [0.26, 0.38]        
L21                 3.37 0.12 [0.10, 0.14]        
L39                 3.35 0.17 [0.11, 0.23]        
M05                 3.36 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07]       
M06                 3.32 0.45 [0.36, 0.54]        
Q11                 3.33 0.40 [0.32, 0.48]        
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS hospitals larger NHS TC larger
 
Comparison: 02 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2005/6)                      
Outcome: 06 Number of operations                                         
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.46 -1.08 [-1.25, -0.91]      
B13                 3.48 -0.87 [-1.02, -0.72]      
C22                 3.43 0.68 [0.48, 0.88]        
C58                 3.51 0.36 [0.23, 0.49]        
E14                 3.54 -0.30 [-0.38, -0.22]      
F06                 3.53 0.28 [0.19, 0.37]        
F35                 3.50 0.10 [-0.04, 0.24]       
F54                 2.76 1.00 [0.46, 1.54]        
F73                 3.41 0.39 [0.18, 0.60]        
F74                 3.49 0.65 [0.51, 0.79]        
F93                 3.37 0.19 [-0.05, 0.43]       
F95                 3.45 -0.26 [-0.44, -0.08]      
G14                 3.53 0.06 [-0.03, 0.15]       
H04                 3.53 -0.26 [-0.36, -0.16]      
H10                 3.50 -0.26 [-0.39, -0.13]      
H12                 3.29 -0.35 [-0.64, -0.06]      
H13                 3.53 0.04 [-0.06, 0.14]       
H14                 3.39 -0.37 [-0.59, -0.15]      
H17                 3.30 -0.33 [-0.61, -0.05]      
H22                 2.38 -0.93 [-1.64, -0.22]      
H80                 3.44 -0.07 [-0.26, 0.12]       
H81                 3.33 0.03 [-0.23, 0.29]       
J37                 3.49 0.13 [-0.02, 0.28]       
L19                 3.17 0.12 [-0.23, 0.47]       
L20                 3.45 0.36 [0.18, 0.54]        
L21                 3.55 0.37 [0.30, 0.44]        
L39                 3.29 0.59 [0.30, 0.88]        
M05                 3.39 0.15 [-0.07, 0.37]       
M06                 3.10 0.24 [-0.15, 0.63]       
Q11                 2.40 -0.62 [-1.32, 0.08]       
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS hospitals larger IS providers larger
 
Comparison: 03 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2005/6)              
Outcome: 06 Number of operations                                         
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.45 -0.85 [-1.03, -0.67]      
B13                 3.48 -0.62 [-0.77, -0.47]      
C22                 3.37 0.88 [0.63, 1.13]        
C58                 3.49 0.43 [0.29, 0.57]        
E14                 3.53 -0.76 [-0.85, -0.67]      
F06                 3.52 -0.15 [-0.24, -0.06]      
F35                 3.49 -0.22 [-0.36, -0.08]      
F54                 2.81 0.80 [0.25, 1.35]        
F73                 3.40 0.08 [-0.15, 0.31]       
F74                 3.48 0.42 [0.26, 0.58]        
F93                 3.34 -0.14 [-0.41, 0.13]       
F95                 3.40 -0.51 [-0.74, -0.28]      
G14                 3.51 -0.21 [-0.33, -0.09]      
H04                 3.51 -0.76 [-0.87, -0.65]      
H10                 3.49 -0.24 [-0.38, -0.10]      
H12                 3.28 -0.10 [-0.41, 0.21]       
H13                 3.52 -0.03 [-0.14, 0.08]       
H14                 3.36 -0.12 [-0.37, 0.13]       
H17                 3.31 -0.26 [-0.55, 0.03]       
H22                 2.48 -0.96 [-1.67, -0.25]      
H80                 3.44 0.10 [-0.09, 0.29]       
H81                 3.35 0.12 [-0.15, 0.39]       
J37                 3.48 -0.04 [-0.20, 0.12]       
L19                 3.18 -0.24 [-0.61, 0.13]       
L20                 3.45 0.04 [-0.15, 0.23]       
L21                 3.54 0.25 [0.18, 0.32]        
L39                 3.30 0.42 [0.12, 0.72]        
M05                 3.40 0.13 [-0.10, 0.36]       
M06                 3.13 -0.21 [-0.61, 0.19]       
Q11                 2.50 -1.02 [-1.72, -0.32]      
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS TCs larger IS providers larger
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.13; 
 99% confidence interval -0.02 to 0.27 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.01; 
99% confidence interval -0.18 to 0.20 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.12; 
99% confidence interval -0.32 to 0.09 
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Figure 36: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of operations: NHS hospitals vs. NHS Treatment 
centres (2006/7) 
Figure 37: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of operations: NHS hospitals vs. IS providers 
(2006/7) 
Figure 38: Forest plot for differences in the number 
of operations: NHS Treatment centres vs. IS 
providers (2006/7) 
Comparison: 04 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2006/7)                                 
Outcome: 06 Number of operations                                         
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.67 -0.35 [-0.42, -0.28]      
B13                 3.74 -0.13 [-0.16, -0.10]      
B15                 0.76 -0.62 [-1.57, 0.33]       
C55                 3.60 0.03 [-0.07, 0.13]       
C58                 3.71 -0.20 [-0.25, -0.15]      
E14                 3.71 0.29 [0.24, 0.34]        
F06                 3.74 0.41 [0.38, 0.44]        
F35                 3.74 0.27 [0.24, 0.30]        
F54                 3.59 0.22 [0.12, 0.32]        
F73                 3.60 0.32 [0.22, 0.42]        
F74                 3.70 0.29 [0.23, 0.35]        
F93                 3.55 0.22 [0.11, 0.33]        
G14                 3.63 0.33 [0.24, 0.42]        
H04                 3.72 0.18 [0.14, 0.22]        
H10                 3.72 0.11 [0.07, 0.15]        
H12                 3.47 -0.17 [-0.31, -0.03]      
H13                 3.72 0.06 [0.02, 0.10]        
H17                 3.65 0.04 [-0.04, 0.12]       
H22                 3.71 -0.01 [-0.06, 0.04]       
H80                 3.72 -0.18 [-0.22, -0.14]      
H81                 3.72 -0.12 [-0.16, -0.08]      
J37                 3.70 0.16 [0.11, 0.21]        
L20                 3.71 0.17 [0.12, 0.22]        
L21                 3.74 0.07 [0.05, 0.09]        
L39                 3.71 0.07 [0.02, 0.12]        
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.72 0.01 [-0.03, 0.05]       
M06                 3.63 0.14 [0.05, 0.23]        
Q11                 3.63 0.16 [0.07, 0.25]        
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS hospitals larger NHS TC larger
 
Comparison: 05 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7)                      
Outcome: 06 Number of operations                                         
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.52 -1.21 [-1.74, -0.68]      
B13                 3.77 -0.96 [-1.00, -0.92]      
B15                 3.77 -2.02 [-2.04, -2.00]      
C55                 3.43 0.21 [-0.42, 0.84]       
C58                 3.75 0.40 [0.26, 0.54]        
E14                 3.76 0.89 [0.78, 1.00]        
F06                 3.77 -0.78 [-0.82, -0.74]      
F35                 3.77 -0.78 [-0.81, -0.75]      
F54                 3.68 -0.14 [-0.45, 0.17]       
F73                 3.76 -0.71 [-0.82, -0.60]      
F74                 3.76 -0.59 [-0.65, -0.53]      
F93                 3.74 -0.04 [-0.20, 0.12]       
G14                 3.76 -0.54 [-0.64, -0.44]      
H04                 3.77 -0.89 [-0.94, -0.84]      
H10                 3.77 -1.49 [-1.54, -1.44]      
H12                 3.75 -1.68 [-1.80, -1.56]      
H13                 3.76 -0.71 [-0.78, -0.64]      
H17                 3.76 -1.71 [-1.83, -1.59]      
H22                 3.75 -2.09 [-2.24, -1.94]      
H80                 3.77 -1.03 [-1.08, -0.98]      
H81                 3.77 -0.29 [-0.34, -0.24]      
J37                 3.76 -1.53 [-1.60, -1.46]      
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 3.75 0.20 [0.07, 0.33]        
L39                 3.74 0.20 [0.03, 0.37]        
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.74 0.06 [-0.11, 0.23]       
M06                 3.63 0.05 [-0.34, 0.44]       
Q11                 3.04 -0.19 [-1.18, 0.80]       
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS hospitals larger IS providers larger
 
Comparison: 06 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2006/7)              
Outcome: 06 Number of operations                                         
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.38 -0.86 [-1.39, -0.33]      
B13                 3.88 -0.83 [-0.88, -0.78]      
B15                 2.64 -1.40 [-2.35, -0.45]      
C55                 3.21 0.18 [-0.46, 0.82]       
C58                 3.84 0.60 [0.45, 0.75]        
E14                 3.85 0.60 [0.48, 0.72]        
F06                 3.88 -1.19 [-1.24, -1.14]      
F35                 3.88 -1.05 [-1.09, -1.01]      
F54                 3.68 -0.36 [-0.69, -0.03]      
F73                 3.84 -1.03 [-1.18, -0.88]      
F74                 3.87 -0.88 [-0.96, -0.80]      
F93                 3.81 -0.26 [-0.46, -0.06]      
G14                 3.85 -0.87 [-1.00, -0.74]      
H04                 3.88 -1.07 [-1.13, -1.01]      
H10                 3.87 -1.60 [-1.67, -1.53]      
H12                 3.82 -1.51 [-1.69, -1.33]      
H13                 3.87 -0.77 [-0.85, -0.69]      
H17                 3.84 -1.75 [-1.89, -1.61]      
H22                 3.84 -2.08 [-2.23, -1.93]      
H80                 3.88 -0.85 [-0.91, -0.79]      
H81                 3.88 -0.17 [-0.23, -0.11]      
J37                 3.87 -1.69 [-1.77, -1.61]      
L20                 Not estimable         
L21                 3.85 0.13 [0.00, 0.26]        
L39                 3.82 0.13 [-0.04, 0.30]       
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.82 0.05 [-0.13, 0.23]       
M06                 3.59 -0.09 [-0.49, 0.31]       
Q11                 2.57 -0.35 [-1.34, 0.64]       
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
NHS TCs larger IS providers larger
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.08; 
99% confidence interval -0.01 to 0.18 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.651; 
99% confidence interval -1.04 to -0.26 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.711; 
99% confidence interval -0.98 to -0.43 
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Figure 39: Forest plot for differences in IMD (income 
deprivation): NHS hospitals vs. NHS Treatment 
centres (2006/7) 
Figure 40: Forest plot for differences in IMD (income 
deprivation): NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7) 
Figure 41: Forest plot for differences in IMD (income 
deprivation): NHS Treatment centres vs. IS 
providers (2006/7) 
Comparison: 04 NHS hospitals vs NHS treatment centres (2006/7)                                 
Outcome: 07 IMD Income Score (proportion with income deprivation)        
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 3.57 -0.05 [-0.05, -0.05]      
B13                 3.57 -0.04 [-0.04, -0.04]      
B15                 1.43 -0.05 [-0.12, 0.02]       
C55                 3.36 0.01 [0.00, 0.02]        
C58                 3.55 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
E14                 3.55 -0.06 [-0.07, -0.05]      
F06                 3.58 -0.07 [-0.07, -0.07]      
F35                 3.58 -0.05 [-0.05, -0.05]      
F54                 3.56 -0.06 [-0.07, -0.06]      
F73                 3.43 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
F74                 3.53 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
F93                 3.39 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
G14                 3.48 -0.05 [-0.06, -0.04]      
H04                 3.56 -0.02 [-0.02, -0.02]      
H10                 3.57 -0.01 [-0.01, -0.01]      
H12                 3.48 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H13                 3.56 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H17                 3.52 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H22                 3.53 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
H80                 3.54 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H81                 3.52 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
J37                 3.55 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
L20                 3.53 -0.04 [-0.05, -0.03]      
L21                 3.58 -0.05 [-0.05, -0.05]      
L39                 3.45 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
L48                 3.58 -0.06 [-0.06, -0.06]      
M05                 3.53 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
M06                 3.45 0.01 [0.00, 0.02]        
Q11                 3.48 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS hospitals larger NHS TCs larger
 
Comparison: 05 NHS hospitals vs. IS providers (2006/7)                      
Outcome: 07 IMD Income Score (proportion with income deprivation)        
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 1.50 -0.01 [-0.06, 0.04]       
B13                 4.65 -0.04 [-0.05, -0.03]      
B15                 4.71 -0.01 [-0.01, -0.01]      
C55                 1.68 -0.01 [-0.06, 0.04]       
C58                 3.83 0.02 [0.00, 0.04]        
E14                 4.00 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]        
F06                 4.68 -0.04 [-0.05, -0.03]      
F35                 4.69 -0.03 [-0.03, -0.03]      
F54                 3.38 -0.02 [-0.04, 0.00]       
F73                 4.15 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
F74                 4.58 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
F93                 3.41 -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01]       
G14                 3.93 -0.03 [-0.05, -0.01]      
H04                 4.59 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
H10                 4.67 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
H12                 4.30 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H13                 4.56 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H17                 4.30 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H22                 4.23 -0.04 [-0.05, -0.03]      
H80                 4.61 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
H81                 3.06 0.00 [-0.03, 0.03]       
J37                 4.65 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
L20                 0.90 0.00 [-0.07, 0.07]       
L21                 3.16 0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]       
L39                 2.06 -0.01 [-0.05, 0.03]       
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.34 -0.04 [-0.06, -0.02]      
M06                 1.82 -0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]      
Q11                 0.56 0.02 [-0.08, 0.12]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS hospitals larger IS providers larger
 
Comparison: 06 NHS treatment centres vs. IS providers (2006/7)              
Outcome: 07 IMD Income Score (proportion with income deprivation)        
Study WMD (random) Weight WMD (random)
or sub-category 99% CI % 99% CI
A07                 2.55 0.04 [-0.01, 0.09]       
B13                 4.20 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
B15                 1.98 0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]       
C55                 2.64 -0.02 [-0.07, 0.03]       
C58                 3.92 0.05 [0.03, 0.07]        
E14                 3.98 0.10 [0.08, 0.12]        
F06                 4.22 0.03 [0.02, 0.04]        
F35                 4.22 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]        
F54                 3.76 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]        
F73                 3.94 -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01]       
F74                 4.15 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
F93                 3.65 0.01 [-0.02, 0.04]       
G14                 3.91 0.02 [0.00, 0.04]        
H04                 4.18 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
H10                 4.21 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
H12                 4.02 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02]       
H13                 4.16 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
H17                 4.06 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]       
H22                 4.04 -0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]      
H80                 4.16 -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]       
H81                 3.59 0.02 [-0.01, 0.05]       
J37                 4.18 -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]      
L20                 1.83 0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]       
L21                 3.68 0.07 [0.04, 0.10]        
L39                 2.97 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]       
L48                 Not estimable         
M05                 3.72 -0.03 [-0.05, -0.01]      
M06                 2.79 -0.06 [-0.11, -0.01]      
Q11                 1.28 0.03 [-0.07, 0.13]       
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5
NHS TCs larger IS providers larger
 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.031; 
99% confidence interval -0.04 to -0.02 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference -0.021; 
99% confidence interval -0.03 to -0.01 
Pooled effect: weighted mean difference 0.011; 
99% confidence interval 0.00 to 0.02 
 
1 Τεχηνιχαλ Αππενδιξ 1. Πριχε αδϕυστmεντ
ϖσ. σπεχιχ παψmεντσ
Τηε χοστσ οφ πριϖατε προϖιδερσ mαψ δι¤ερ φροm τηε χοστσ οφ πυβλιχ προϖιδερσ
ιν φουρ mαιν ρεσπεχτσ. Φιρστ, λαβουρ χοστσ mαψ δι¤ερ βεχαυσε οφ δι¤ερεντ
ρεχρυιτmεντ χοστσ ορ πενσιονσ χοντριβυτιονσ; σεχονδ, χαπιταλ χοστ mιγητ δι¤ερ
φορ πριϖατε προϖιδερσ βεχαυσε οφ τηε ρισκ πρεmιυm παιδ ον ιντερεστ ρατεσ (ωηιχη
mιγητ αλσο βε ρελατεδ το τηε ηιγηερ ρισκ φορ πριϖατε προϖιδερσ οφ βυσινεσσ
χλοσινγ); τηιρδ, χοστ οφ οτηερ ινπυτσ (λικε mεδιχινεσ) mαψ βε δι¤ερεντ δυε το
δι¤ερεντ ςΑΤ ρεγιmεσ; φουρτη, πυβλιχ ανδ πριϖατε προϖιδερσ mιγητ δι¤ερ ιν
τηε δεγρεε οφ ε′χιενχψ.
Τηερε αρε τωο ποτεντιαλ mετηοδσ το χορρεχτ φορ τηεσε δι¤ερενχεσ: 1) τηε
ρστ ισ το υσε α δι¤ερεντιαλ ταρι¤; 2) τηε σεχονδ ισ το υσε σπεχιχ παψmεντσ.
Wε σηοω βελοω τηατ τηε τωο mετηοδσ αρε εθυιϖαλεντ ιφ τηε ταρι¤ ισ χορ−
ρεχτλψ χαλχυλατεδ ανδ ωηεν δι¤ερενχεσ ιν χοστσ ρεεχτ δι¤ερενχεσ ιν τηε ϖαρι−
αβλε χοστσ. Ιφ δι¤ερενχεσ ιν χοστσ αρε δυε το δι¤ερενχεσ ιν ξεδ χοστσ, τηεν
σπεχιχ παψmεντσ σηουλδ βε πρεφερρεδ.
1.1 Ονε ινπυτ, χονσταντ ρετυρνσ το σχαλε
Πυρχηασερ παψσ α πριχε π φορ εαχη υνιτ οφ θυαντιτψ θ προϖιδεδ. Τηερε ισ ονε
ινπυτ, λαβουρ Λ (φορ εξαmπλε τηε νυmβερ οφ δοχτορσ, νυρσεσ ορ αδmιν στα¤),
ωιτη υνιτ χοστ ω. Τηε προδυχτιον φυνχτιον εξηιβιτσ χονσταντ ρετυρνσ το σχαλε:
θ = Λ=, ωηερε  ισ α ποσιτιϖε παραmετερ. τ ισ δενεδ ασ τηε εξτρα λαβουρ χοστ
φορ εξαmπλε δυε το ηιγηερ πενσιον χοντριβυτιονσ ασ α προπορτιον οφ σαλαρψ.
Τηε χοστ φυνχτιον ισ Χ = ωΛ(1 + τ). Ιφ τ = 0 τηεν τηε πυβλιχ ανδ πριϖατε
προϖιδερ ηαϖε τηε σαmε χοστ. Ιφ τ > 0 τηε πυβλιχ προϖιδερ ηασ α ηιγηερ χοστ
τηαν τηε πριϖατε προϖιδερ. Ιφ τ < 0 τηε πριϖατε προϖιδερ ηασ α ηιγηερ χοστ
τηαν τηε πυβλιχ προϖιδερ. Συβστιτυτινγ ιν τηε προδυχτιον φυνχτιον, τηε χοστ
φυνχτιον ισ: Χ(θ) = ω(1 + τ)θ.
Τηε υτιλιτψ οφ τηε προϖιδερ ισ γιϖεν βψ τηε δι¤ερενχε βετωεεν ρεϖενυεσ ανδ
mονεταρψ ανδ νον−mονεταρψ χοστσ: Υ = πθ Χ(θ) ∋(θ) ωηερε ∋(θ) ισ νον−
mονεταρψ δισυτιλιτψ οφ προϖιδινγ θυαντιτψ θ, ωιτη ∋0(θ) > 0 ανδ ∋00(θ) > 0.
Τηε οπτιmαλ λεϖελ οφ θυαντιτψ θ ισ συχη τηατ:
π = ω(1 + τ) + ∋0(θ) (1)
Συπποσε τηατ τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτψ ισ τηε ονε χυρρεντλψ προϖιδεδ βψ πυβλιχ
προϖιδερσ, ωιτη τ = 0; σο τηατ π = ω + ∋0(θ). Wηατ ισ τηε ταρι¤, χαλλ ιτ ππ
φορ τηε πριϖατε σεχτορ, τηατ ωουλδ λεαδ το τηε σαmε θυαντιτψ? Ιτ ισ:
ππ = π+ τω (2)
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Τηε Προοφ ισ στραιγητφορωαρδ. Τηε πριϖατε προϖιδερ mαξιmισεσ ππθ   ω(1 +
τ)θ   ∋(θ) = (π+ τω) θ   ω(1 + τ)θ   ∋(θ), ωηοσε ΦΟΧ ισ: π + τω =
ω(1 + τ) + ∋0(θ) ορ π = ω + ∋0(θ), ωηιχη προϖεσ τηε ρεσυλτ.
Ηοωεϖερ, τηε σαmε σολυτιον χαν βε οβταινεδ βψ ρειmβυρσινγ τηε προϖιδερ
τηε χοστ τωΛ, ιε γιϖινγ α συβσιδψ οφ τ ον λαβουρ χοστ. Ιφ τηισ ισ τηε χασε, τηε
προβλεm οφ τηε πριϖατε προϖιδερ ισ το mαξιmισε: πθ ω(1+ τ)θ ∋(θ)+ τωΛ,
ορ αφτερ συβστιτυτιον: πθ   ω(1 + τ)θ   ∋(θ) + τωθ = πθ   ωθ   ∋(θ).
Προποσιτιον 1 Πυβλιχ ανδ πριϖατε προϖιδερσ αρε συβϕεχτ το τηε σαmε ινχεν−
τιϖεσ (ιε τηεψ ωιλλ προδυχε τηε σαmε θυαντιτψ) ιφ ειτηερ (ι) τηε πριϖατε προϖιδερ
ισ παιδ α πριχε: ππ = π+ τω, ωηερε π ισ τηε πριχε οφ τηε πυβλιχ προϖιδερ ανδ
τ ? 0 ισ τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν χοστσ βετωεεν τηε τωο τψπεσ οφ προϖιδερ; (ιι) τηε
πριϖατε προϖιδερ ρεχειϖεσ α τρανσφερ τ ον τηε λαβουρ ινπυτ, ωιτη αν οϖεραλλ
τρανσφερ οφ τωΛ, ωηερε ω ισ τηε σαλαρψ οφ λαβουρ.
Νοτιχε τηατ τηε τωο mετηοδσ ηαϖε τηε σαmε χοστ φορ τηε πυρχηασερ. Υνδερ
mετηοδ 1 τηε χοστ φορ τηε πυρχηασερ ισ: τωθ = τωΛ; ωηιχη ισ ιδεντιχαλ το
τηε χοστ υνδερ mετηοδ 2.
1.2 Μορε τηαν ονε ινπυτ, χονσταντ ρετυρνσ το σχαλε
Τηε αβοϖε αναλψσισ ηολδσ αλσο ωιτη mορε τηαν ονε ινπυτ. Dενε Λ; Κ ανδ Ι
ασ λαβουρ ινπυτ, χαπιταλ ινπυτ ανδ οτηερ ινπυτσ (mεδιχινεσ, τεστσ ανδ σο ον).
Τηε χοστ οφ εαχη υνιτ οφ ινπυτ ισ ω, ρ, ν ωηιχη στανδ φορ σαλαρψ, ιντερεστ ρατε
ον χαπιταλ ανδ χοστ οφ mεδιχινεσ ανδ σο ον.
Τηε χοστ φυνχτιον ισ ιν τηισ χασε: Χ = ω(1+ τ)Λ+ ρ(1+η)Κ +ν(1+ ϖ)Ι,
ωηερε τ ισ χοντριβυτιονσ ον πενσιονσ, η ισ ρισκ πρεmιυm παιδ ον ιντερεστ ρατεσ
ανδ ϖ ισ ςΑΤ.
Υνδερ χονσταντ ρετυρνσ το σχαλε τηε χοστ φυνχτιον ισ:
Χ(θ) = χ(ω(1 + τ); ρ(1 + η); ν(1 + ϖ); 1)θ (3)
ωηερε χ(:) ισ τηε χοστ οφ ονε υνιτ οφ ουτπυτ. Ασ ιν τηε αβοϖε σεχτιον, τηε
mαργιναλ χοστ οφ αχτιϖιτψ ισ χονσταντ ανδ τηε ρεσυλτ πρεσεντεδ ιν προποσιτιον
1 ηολδσ.
1.3 Dι¤ερενχεσ ιν ξεδ χοστσ
Συπποσε τηατ τηε τωο τψπεσ οφ προϖιδερ δι¤ερ ιν τηε ξεδ χοστσ ονλψ. Dενε
Φ πυβ ανδ Φ πρι ασ τηε ξεδ χοστσ φορ πυβλιχ ανδ πριϖατε προϖιδερσ.
Τηε προβλεm οφ εαχη προϖιδερ ισ το mαξιmισε πθ   Χ(θ)  Φ . Ρεγαρδλεσσ
οφ τηε ξεδ χοστ, τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτψ ισ συχη τηατ π = Χ 0(θ):
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Ιτ ισ ιmmεδιατε τηατ δι¤ερεντιαλ ταρι¤σ ωιλλ λεαδ το δι¤ερεντιαλ θυαντιτιεσ.
Τηερεφορε, δι¤ερενχεσ ιν ξεδ χοστσ σηουλδ βε ρειmβυρσεδ τηρουγη δι¤ερεντ
αδ−ηοχ λυmπ−συm τρανσφερσ ορ σπεχιχ παψmεντσ.
1.4 Μορε τηαν ονε ινπυτ, δεχρεασινγ ρετυρνσ το σχαλε
Dενε Λ;Κ ανδ Ι ασ λαβουρ ινπυτ, χαπιταλ ινπυτ ανδ οτηερ ινπυτσ (mεδιχινεσ,
τεστσ ανδ σο ον). Τηε χοστ οφ εαχη υνιτ οφ ινπυτ ισ ω, ρ, ν ωηιχη στανδ φορ
σαλαρψ, ιντερεστ ρατε ον χαπιταλ ανδ χοστ οφ mεδιχινεσ ανδ σο ον.
1.4.1 Πριϖατε σεχτορ
Τηε χοστ φυνχτιον ισ: Χ = ω(1+ τ)Λ+ ρ(1+η)Κ+ν(1+ϖ)Ι, ωηερε τ ισ εξτρα
χοντριβυτιονσ ον πενσιονσ, η ισ ρισκ πρεmιυm ανδ ϖ ισ ςΑΤ. Τηε ρεϖενυεσ φορ
τηε προϖιδερ αρε πθ. Τηε προδυχτιον φυνχτιον ισ: θ = φ(Λ;Κ; Ι). Wε ασσυmε
τηατ τηε προδυχτιον φυνχτιον εξηιβιτσ δεχρεασινγ ρετυρνσ το σχαλε δυε το σοmε
ξεδ ινπυτσ (φορ εξαmπλε τηε νυmβερ οφ βεδσ).
Τηε προϖιδερ χηοοσεσ 1) τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτψ ανδ τηεν 2) ιmπλεmεντσ ιτ
τηρουγη τηε οπτιmαλ χοmβινατιον οφ ινπυτσ ωηιχη mινιmισεσ τοταλ χοστσ. Wε
σολϖε βψ βαχκωαρδ ινδυχτιον.
Ιν σταγε 2 τηε προϖιδερ mινιmισεσ χοστσ συβϕεχτ το τηε προδυχτιον οφ α
γιϖεν θυαντιτψ:
mιν
Λ;Κ;Ι
Χ = ω(1 + τ)Λ+ ρ(1 + η)Κ + ν(1 + ϖ)Ι (4)
συβϕεχτ το : θ = φ(Λ;Κ; Ι)
Τηε λαγρανγιαν ισ λ = ω(1+τ)Λ+ρ(1+η)Κ+ν(1+ϖ)Ι+ [θ   φ(Λ;Κ; Ι)].
Τηε Φιρστ Ορδερ Χονδιτιονσ ωιτη ρεσπεχτ το τηε τηρεε ινπυτσ αρε:
λΛ(Λ
) = 0 : ω(1 + τ) = φΛ(Λ;Κ; Ι) (5)
λΚ(Κ
) = 0 : ρ(1 + η) = φΚ(Λ;Κ; Ι) (6)
λΙ(Ι
) = 0 : ν(1 + ϖ) = φΙ(Λ;Κ; Ι) (7)
ωηερε  = λθ ισ τηε οππορτυνιτψ χοστ οφ ινχρεασινγ θυαντιτψ βψ ονε υνιτ.
Wε ασσυmε τηατ τηε προβλεm ισ ωελλ βεηαϖεδ ανδ τηε ΣΟΧσ αρε σατισεδ.
Τηε οπτιmαλ λεϖελ οφ τηε ινπυτσ αρε: Λ(θ; ω; ρ; ν; τ; η; ϖ), Κ(θ; ω; ρ; ν; τ; η; ϖ),
Ι(θ; ω; ρ; ν; τ; η; ϖ). Συβστιτυτινγ ιν τηε χοστ φυνχτιον ωε οβταιν:
Χ(θ; ω; ρ; ν; τ; η; ϖ) = ω(1 + τ)Λ(θ; ω; ρ; ν; τ; η; ϖ) (8)
+ρ(1 + η)Κ(θ; ω; ρ; ν; τ; η; ϖ)
+ν(1 + ϖ)Ι(θ; ω; ρ; ν; τ; η; ϖ)
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Υσινγ τηε ενϖελοπε τηεορεm, ωε οβταιν:
δΧ
δτ
= ωΛ > 0;
δΧ
δη
= ρΚ > 0;
δΧ
δϖ
= νΙ > 0: (9)
Νοτ συρπρισινγλψ, τηε χοστ ισ ινχρεασινγ ιν τηε δετερmιναντσ οφ τηε χοστ δι¤ερ−
εντιαλ. Ανδ,
δΧ
δθ
= ω(1 + τ)
δΛ
δθ
+ ρ(1 + η)
δΚ
δθ
+ ν(1 + ϖ)
δΙ
δθ
> 0 (10)
Dενε ππ ασ τηε πριχε ιν τηε πριϖατε σεχτορ. Ιν τηε ρστ σταγε τηε προϖιδερ
χηοοσεσ θυαντιτψ το mαξιmισε τηε δι¤ερενχε βετωεεν ρεϖενυεσ ανδ χοστσ:
mαξ
θ
ππθ   Χ(θ) (11)
ωηοσε ΦΟΧ ισ:
θ: ππ = ω(1 + τ)
δΛ
δθ
+ ρ(1 + η)
δΚ
δθ
+ ν(1 + ϖ)
δΙ
δθ
(12)
Τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτψ ισ αχηιεϖεδ ατ τηε ποιντ ωηεν τηε mαργιναλ βενετ ισ
εθυαλ το τηε mαργιναλ χοστ.
1.4.2 Πυβλιχ σεχτορ
Ιν σταγε 2 τηε προϖιδερ mινιmισεσ χοστσ συβϕεχτ το τηε προδυχτιον οφ α γιϖεν
θυαντιτψ:
mιν
Λ;Κ;Ι
Χ = ωΛ+ ρΚ + νΙ σ.τ. θ = φ(Λ;Κ; Ι) (13)
Τηε λαγρανγιαν λ = ω(1+ τ)Λ+ρ(1+η)Κ+ν(1+ϖ)Ι+ [θ   φ(Λ;Κ; Ι)].
Τηε Φιρστ Ορδερ Χονδιτιονσ ωιτη ρεσπεχτ το τηε τηρεε ινπυτσ αρε:
λΛ(Λ
) = 0 : ω = φΛ(Λ;Κ; Ι) (14)
λΚ(Κ
) = 0 : ρ = φΚ(Λ;Κ; Ι)
λΙ(Ι
) = 0 : ν = φΙ(Λ;Κ; Ι)
ωηερε  = λθ ισ τηε οππορτυνιτψ χοστ οφ ινχρεασινγ θυαντιτψ βψ ονε υνιτ.
Τηε mαργιναλ χοστ οφ αχτιϖιτψ ισ
δΧ
δθ
= ω
δΛ
δθ
+ ρ
δΚ
δθ
+ ν
δΙ
δθ
(15)
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Τηε πριχε ιν τηε πυβλιχ σεχτορ ισ γιϖεν βψ π. Τηε προβλεm ισ το mαξιmισε
τηε δι¤ερενχε βετωεεν ρεϖενυεσ ανδ χοστσ:
mαξ
θ
πθ   Χ(θ) (16)
ωηοσε ΦΟΧ ισ:
θ: π = ω
δΛ
δθ
+ ρ
δΚ
δθ
+ ν
δΙ
δθ
(17)
Τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτψ ισ αγαιν αχηιεϖεδ ατ τηε ποιντ ωηεν τηε mαργιναλ βενετ
ισ εθυαλ το τηε mαργιναλ χοστ.
1.4.3 Χοmπαρισον
Wηατ ισ τηε οπτιmαλ πριχε ππ συχη τηατ θ = θ? Ιτ ισ συχη τηατ
θ : π = ω
δΛ
δθ
+ ρ
δΚ
δθ
+ ν
δΙ
δθ
(18)
θ : ππ = ω(1 + τ)
δΛ
δθ
+ ρ(1 + η)
δΚ
δθ
+ ν(1 + ϖ)
δΙ
δθ
(19)
Νοτιχε τηατ δΛ

δθ
= δΛ

δθ
, δΚ

δθ
= δΚ

δθ
ανδ δΙ

δθ
= δΙ

δθ
: Τηε φολλοωινγ προποσιτιον
χαν βε εσταβλισηεδ.
Προποσιτιον 2 Πυβλιχ ανδ πριϖατε προϖιδερσ αρε συβϕεχτ το τηε σαmε ινχεν−
τιϖεσ (ιε τηεψ ωιλλ προδυχε τηε σαmε θυαντιτψ) ιφ ειτηερ (ι) τηε πριϖατε προϖιδερ
ισ παιδ α πριχε:
ππ = π+ ωτ
δΛ
δθ
+ ρη
δΚ
δθ
+ νϖ
δΙ
δθ
(20)
ωηερε π ισ τηε πριχε οφ τηε πυβλιχ προϖιδερ; ιι) τηε πριϖατε προϖιδερ ρεχειϖεσ α
συβσιδψ τ ον τηε λαβουρ ινπυτ, α συβσιδψ η ον χαπιταλ ινπυτ ανδ α συβσιδψ ϖ
ον οτηερ ινπυτσ ωιτη αν οϖεραλλ συβσιδψ οφ τωΛ+ ηρΛ+ ϖνΙ.
Τηε αβοϖε εθυατιον συγγεστσ τηατ τηε πριχε ιν τηε πριϖατε σεχτορ ισ εθυαλ
το τηε πριχε ιν τηε πυβλιχ σεχτορ πλυσ τηε εξτρα mαργιναλ χοστ συσταινεδ ιν τηε
πριϖατε σεχτορ.
Αγαιν, βψ αδϕυστινγ τηε πριχε αχχορδινγλψ τηε τωο σψστεmσ αρε εθυιϖαλεντ.
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1.5 Wελφαρε αναλψσισ
Τηε mοδελσ δεϖελοπεδ σο φαρ ιmπλψ τηατ τηε χορρεχτιον ιν ταρι¤ ισ συχη τηατ
τηε θυαντιτψ προδυχεδ βψ τηε τωο προϖιδερσ ισ τηε σαmε ιν εθυιλιβριυm.
Ιν τηισ σεχτιον ωε δεριϖε τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτιεσ φροm α σοχιαλ ωελφαρε ποιντ
οφ ϖιεω. Τψπιχαλλψ τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτιεσ ωιλλ δι¤ερ αχροσσ προϖιδερσ ανδ τηισ
ηασ ιmπλιχατιονσ φορ τηε χορρεχτιονσ ον τηε οπτιmαλ ταρι¤σ.
Τηε mαιν ρεσυλτ σηοων βελοω συγγεστσ τηατ τηε πριχε φορ τηε προϖιδερ ωιτη
ηιγηερ χοστ ισ αλωαψσ ηιγηερ τηαν τηε πριχε φορ τηε προϖιδερ ωιτη λοωερ χοστ,
βυτ τηατ τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν πριχεσ ισ σmαλλερ τηαν τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε mαργιναλ
χοστ.
Τηε ωελφαρε φυνχτιον ισ γιϖεν βψ τηε συm οφ χονσυmερ ωελφαρε ανδ προϖιδερ
προτ. Νετ χονσυmερ ωελφαρε ισ: Β(θ)   πθ ωηιλε προτ ισ γιϖεν βψ: πθ  
Χ(; θ); ωηερε  ισ α παραmετερ οφ τηε χοστ φυνχτιον. Wε ασσυmε τηατ 
χαν ηαϖε τωο ϖαλυεσ  ανδ , ωηιχη στανδσ ρεσπεχτιϖελψ φορ ηιγη χοστ ανδ
λοω χοστ. Wε αλσο ασσυmε: Βθ > 0, Βθθ < 0, Χθ(; θ) > Χ(; θ) > 0 ανδ
Χθθ(; θ) > 0. Τηε προπορτιον οφ ηιγη−χοστ ηοσπιταλσ ισ . Τοταλ ωελφαρε ισ
τηεν: [Β(θ)   πθ] + [πθ   Χ(; θ)] = Β(θ)   Χ(; θ): Τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτιεσ
φορ τηε τωο τψπεσ σατισφψ:
Βθ(θ
 ()) = Χθ(; θ
 ()) (21)
Ιφ τηε mαργιναλ χοστ ισ ηιγηερ φορ τηε προϖιδερ ωιτη ηιγηερ , τηεν ιτ φολλοωσ
τηατ:
θ () > θ
 


(22)
Ιντυιτιϖελψ, σινχε τηε mαργιναλ χοστ ισ ηιγηερ φορ τηε ηιγη−χοστ τψπε, τηε οπτι−
mαλ θυαντιτψ ισ λοωερ. Τηε ρεγυλατορ ηασ τωο ινστρυmεντσ, ιε π () ανδ π
 


.
Τηε οπτιmαλ πριχεσ αρε σετ συχη τηατ:
π
 


= Βθ(θ

 


) = Χθ(; θ

 


)
π () = Βθ(θ
 ()) = Χθ(; θ
 ())
Νοτιχε τηατ τηε πριχε φορ τηε ηιγη−χοστ τψπε ισ ηιγηερ:
π = π
 


  π () = Βθ(θ

 


) Βθ(θ
 ()) > 0
Σινχε τηε θυαντιτψ οφ τηε ηιγη−χοστ τψπε ισ λοωερ, θ
 


< θ (), τηε
mαργιναλ βενετ ισ ηιγηερ ανδ τηε οπτιmαλ ταρι¤ ισ ηιγηερ. Αλσο,
π = π
 


  π () = Χθ(; θ

 


)  Χθ(; θ
 ())
=

Χθ(; θ

 


)  Χθ(; θ

 


)

 

Χθ(; θ
 ())  Χθ(; θ

 


)

<

Χθ(; θ

 


)  Χθ(; θ

 


)

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Τηε ρστ τερm ισ τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε mαργιναλ χοστ οφ προδυχινγ τηε θυαντιτψ
οφ τηε ηιγη−χοστ τψπε. Τηε σεχονδ τερm ιν βραχκετ ισ τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε χοστ
οφ προδυχινγ τηε τωο οπτιmαλ θυαντιτιεσ φορ τηε λοω−χοστ προϖιδερ. Τηερεφορε,
τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε πριχε ισ βελοω τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε mαργιναλ χοστ ωηεν
εϖαλυατεδ ατ θ
 


.
Σιmιλαρλψ,
π = π
 


  π () = Χθ(; θ

 


)  Χθ(; θ
 ())
=

Χθ(; θ
 ())  Χθ(; θ
 ())

  [Χθ(; θ
 ())  Χθ(; θ

 


)]
<

Χθ(; θ
 ())  Χθ(; θ
 ())

Τηε ρστ τερm ισ τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε mαργιναλ χοστ οφ προδυχινγ τηε ε′χιεντ
θυαντιτψ. Τηε σεχονδ τερm ιν βραχκετ ισ τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε χοστ οφ προδυχινγ
τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτιεσ. Τηερεφορε, τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε πριχε ισ βελοω τηε
δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε mαργιναλ χοστ αλσο ωηεν εϖαλυατεδ ατ θ ().
Ιν συmmαρψ,
Προποσιτιον 3 Τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν πριχεσ ισ σmαλλερ τηαν τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε
mαργιναλ χοστ βετωεεν τηε ηιγη−χοστ ανδ τηε λοω−χοστ προϖιδερ.
Τηε mαιν πολιχψ ιmπλιχατιον οφ τηισ σεχτιον ισ τηατ τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε
πριχε φορ τηε ηιγη−χοστ ανδ λοω−χοστ προϖιδερ σηουλδ βε σmαλλερ τηαν τηειρ
δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε mαργιναλ χοστ. Τηισ αρισεσ βεχαυσε σινχε τηε mαργιναλ βενετ
ισ δεχρεασινγ, τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτψ φορ τηε ηιγη−χοστ προϖιδερ ισ σmαλλερ τηαν
φορ τηε λοω−χοστ προϖιδερ.
Ασ σπεχιαλ χασεσ ωε χαν σηοω τηατ ιφ τηε mαργιναλ βενετ οφ χαρε ισ χον−
σταντ, τηεν τηε δι¤ερενχε ισ πριχεσ ισ ζερο, π = 0 (προοφσ οmιττεδ). Ιν
χοντραστ ισ τηε mαργιναλ βενετ ισ ιννιτελψ ινελαστιχ (τηε δεmανδ χυρϖε ισ
α ϖερτιχαλ λινε), τηεν τηε δι¤ερενχε ισ πριχεσ ισ εθυαλ το τηε δι¤ερενχε ιν τηε
mαργιναλ χοστ.
Νοτιχε τηατ ιφ ινστεαδ οφ πριχεσ, ωε υσε σπεχιχ παψmεντσ, α σιmιλαρ ρεσυλτ
αρισεσ. Τηε σπεχιχ παψmεντσ σηουλδ βε δεσιγνεδ ιν συχη α ωαψ τηατ ονλψ α
προπορτιον οφ ινπυτ χοστσ αρε ρειmβυρσεδ το τηε προϖιδερ.
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2 Τεχηνιχαλ Αππενδιξ 2. ΠΧΤσ ανδ πριχε αδ−
ϕυστmεντ
Χονσιδερ α ΠΧΤ ανδ τωο προϖιδερσ. Τηε νυmβερ οφ ρεφερραλσ φορ α ΠΧΤ (ορ
θυαντιτψ δεmανδεδ) αρε θδ
1
ανδ θδ
2
ρεσπεχτιϖελψ φορ προϖιδερσ 1 ανδ 2.
Wε ωαντ το αναλψσε τωο σχεναριοσ: 1) τηε πριχε αδϕυστmεντ ισ δελεγατεδ
το τηε ΠΧΤσ: ΠΧΤσ ηαϖε το παψ α ηιγηερ πριχε φορ τηε προϖιδερ ωιτη ηιγηερ
χοστσ; 2) πριχε αδϕυστmεντ ισ τοπ σλιχεδ: τηε ΠΧΤ παψσ τηε σαmε πριχε φορ βοτη
προϖιδερσ ανδ τηε εξτρα χοστ ισ παιδ διρεχτλψ βψ τηε Dεπαρτmεντ οφ Ηεαλτη
(DοΗ).
Τηε βενετ φορ τηε πατιεντσ ποπυλατιον χοϖερεδ βψ τηε ΠΧΤ φροm τρεατ−
mεντ ιν ηοσπιταλσ 1 ανδ 2 ισ Β(θδ
1
; θδ
2
). Υνδερ σχεναριο 1 τηε ΠΧΤ παψσ πριχε
π1 ανδ π2 ρεσπεχτιϖελψ φορ προϖιδερσ 1 ανδ 2, ωιτη π1 < π2 ανδ ρεχειϖεσ α ξεδ
βυδγετ ΦΑ. Υνδερ σχεναριο 2 τηε ΠΧΤ παψσ πριχε π = π1 (τηε λοωεστ πριχε)
φορ βοτη προϖιδερσ ανδ ρεχειϖεσ α ξεδ βυδγετ ΦΒ < ΦΑ (τηε DΟΗ ρεταινσ
σοmε mονεψ το mακε υπ φορ τηε εξτρα πριχε χοmπενσατιον).
Το αϖοιδ χορνερ σολυτιονσ, ωε ασσυmε τηατ τηε τωο ηοσπιταλσ αρε ιmπερφεχτ
συβστιτυτεσ (τηισ mαψ βε δυε το δι¤ερεντ λοχατιονσ φορ εξαmπλε).
2.1 Σχεναριο 1
Wε ασσυmε τηατ τηε ΠΧΤ mαξιmισεσ βενετσ φορ τηε πατιεντσ συβϕεχτ το α
βυδγετ χονστραιντ, ιε ιτ mαξιmισεσ:
mαξ
θδ
1
;θδ
2
Β(θδ
1
; θδ
2
) σ.τ. π1θ1 + π2θ2  Φ
Α (23)
Dενε  τηε λαγρανγιαν mυλτιπλιερ. Ασσυmινγ τηατ τηε βυδγετ χονστραιντ ισ
βινδινγ, τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτιεσ αρε γιϖεν βψ:
Βθδ
1
= π1 (24)
Βθδ
2
= π2 (25)
Σινχε τηε mοδελ ισ σψmmετριχ ανδ π1 < π2 ιτ φολλοωσ τηατ θ
δ
1
> θδ
2
ι.ε. τηε
θυαντιτψ δεmανδεδ φροm προϖιδερ 1 ισ ηιγηερ τηαν τηε θυαντιτψ δεmανδεδ
φροm προϖιδερ 2.
2.2 Σχεναριο 2
Ιφ τηε παψmεντ ισ τοπ σλιχεδ, τηεν τηε προβλεm ισ
mαξ
θδ
1
;θδ
2
Β(θδ
1
; θδ
2
) σ.τ. π1(θ1 + θ2)  Φ
Β (26)
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ανδ τηε οπτιmαλ θυαντιτιεσ αρε:
Βθδ
1
= π1 (27)
Βθδ
2
= π1 (28)
σο τηατ θδ
1
= θδ
2
.
2.3 Dισχυσσιον
Wε ηαϖε σηοων, ασ ισ ιντυιτιϖε, τηατ ιφ τηε ΠΧΤ παψσ δι¤ερεντ πριχεσ φορ
δι¤ερεντ προϖιδερσ, ιτ ωιλλ δεmανδ mορε τρεατmεντ φροm τηε ηοσπιταλ ωηιχη
ηασ τηε λοωεστ πριχε. Ιφ τηε DοΗ ωαντσ το χρεατε α φαιρ−πλαψινγ ελδ, ιν τηισ
χασε τηε ηοσπιταλ ωιτη ηιγηερ χοστ ωιλλ βε δισαδϖανταγεδ.
Ηοωεϖερ, εϖεν ιφ τηε δεmανδ φορ τρεατmεντ ισ δι¤ερεντ, τηισ δοεσ νοτ
ιmπλψ τηατ τηε συππλψ ισ δι¤ερεντ. Ιφ τηερε ισ εξχεσσ δεmανδ, τηε οπτιmαλ
θυαντιτψ συππλιεδ βψ βοτη προϖιδερσ mιγητ βε λοωερ τηαν τηε ονε δεmανδεδ
βψ τηε ΠΧΤ ανδ τηερεφορε, βοτη προϖιδερσ ωιλλ προϖιδε τηειρ οπτιmαλ θυαντιτψ
ιν εθυιλιβριυm. Ιτ ισ ονλψ ωηεν τηερε ισ εξχεσσ συππλψ τηατ τηε προϖιδερ ωιτη
ηιγηερ πριχε ισ δισαδϖανταγεδ βεχαυσε ιτ ρεχειϖεσ α λοωερ νυmβερ οφ ρεφερραλσ
ανδ τηερεφορε τρεατσ φεωερ πατιεντσ.
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